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Abstract
This thesis studies some philosophical and ethical issues that economic design
raises. Chapter 1 gives an overview of economic design and argues that a cross-
fertilisation between philosophy and economic design is possible and insightful
for both sides. Chapter 2 examines the implications of mechanism design for
theories of rationality. I show that non-classical theories, such as constrained
maximization and team reasoning, are at odds with the constraint of incentive
compatibility. This poses a problem for non-classical theories, which propo-
nents of these theories have not addressed to date. Chapter 3 proposes a
general epistemology of economic engineering, which is motivated by a novel
case study, viz. the reform of a matching market for medical practitioners.
My account makes use of causal graphs to explain how models allow encoding
counterfactual information about how market outcomes change if the design
of the market changes. The second part of the thesis examines ethical issues.
In Chapter 4, I apply tools from matching theory to gain insights into the dis-
tribution of refugees, such as among countries of the European Union. There
is an ethical trade-off between the fairness of matchings and their efficiency,
and I argue that in this context, fairness is the morally weightier criterion.
Chapter 5 deals with the ethics of kidney exchange. Against critics, I give
two arguments for the implementation of kidney exchange programmes. The
first argument is that they are instrumental in meeting a moral obligation,
namely to donate effectively. The second is that kidney exchange may in-
crease the motivation for altruistic donations, because the donation of one
kidney may trigger > 1 life savings. The final chapter identifies questions for
future research and it closes with some thoughts about the future trajectory
of economic design.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Some institutions evolve naturally over time; others are designed with specific
goals in mind. As we shall see, well-designed institutions can save people’s
lives, and improve the lot of many more. Conversely, a badly designed institu-
tion can lead to catastrophic social consequences, and it can produce adverse
incentives that may in turn threaten the institution.
The design of institutions, in particular of markets, is the subject of much
recent work in economic theory and practice. I use “economic design” as an
umbrella for these endeavours. Various recent Nobel Memorial Prizes have
been awarded for contributions to economic design, making it a highly topical
field in economics.1 At the same time, even though it raises many philosoph-
ical and ethical questions, it has been relatively neglected by philosophers.
1In 2007, the award went to Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin und Roger Myerson, “for
having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory” (Information for the Public
2007, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2007/
popular-economicsciences2007.pdf), and in 2012 to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley,
“for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design” (Press Release
2012, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2012/
press_02.pdf). The 2014 Prize to Jean Tirole could also be seen as an award for economic
design, broadly conceived, in the field of industrial organization. Going further back, in 1994
John F. Nash, Reinhard Selten and John Harsanyi were awarded for their contributions to
game theory, which plays a vital role in economic design. The 1996 Nobel Prize went to
James Mirrlees and William Vickrey, the latter of whom pioneered auction design. Further-
more, in 2005, game theorists Thomas Schelling and Robert Aumann received the prize. I
bet that the broad field will continue to recruit laureates.
15
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Moreover, moral philosophy and economic design have at times appeared as
adversaries. This is especially the case in debates about the moral limits of
markets, in which many economists hold liberal views about their reach, while
some moral philosophers argue for a narrower domain.
This thesis makes a case for the view that a cross-fertilization between phi-
losophy and economic design is possible and insightful for both sides. I seek
to show that, first, economic design has the potential to produce novel in-
sights into a variety of philosophical questions. These include the nature of
institutions and of rationality, how knowledge about the social world can be
gained, and how society should be organised. Second, ethics should form an
integral part of economic design because many design decisions are subject to
substantive ethical questions.
Here, I shall give an overview of economic design. I will sketch its history, and
I will identify important developments within the field. My overview starts
with the theory of mechanism design in the next section, whose origins lie
in the controversy over the relative merits of centrally planned versus market
economies. I shall show that this large-scale, theoretical focus on economic
systems that was prevalent in the early days of mechanism design theory,
successively got replaced by a more narrow focus on particular marketplaces.
In section 1.2, I show how economic designers increasingly act as “engineers”,
or even “plumbers”, who repair deficient markets or create new ones where
they can be expected to produce more desirable outcomes. In discussing these
developments, I also mention the philosophical questions that economic design
raises. In section 1.3, I discuss the relationship between economic design
and ethics. In particular, I argue that ethics should form an integral part of
economic design. Section 1.4 gives a short summary, and section 1.5 provides
an overview of the chapters to follow.
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1.1 Mechanism Design
Leonid Hurwicz is the founding father of mechanism design, which provides the
theoretical foundations of economic design. Hurwicz started his 1973 Richard
Ely Lecture, “The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation”, describing
how this field differs from more traditional economic analyses:
“Traditionally, economic analysis treats the economic system as
one of the givens. The term “design” in the title is meant to stress
that the structure of the economic system is to be regarded as
an unknown. An unknown in what problem? Typically, that of
finding a system that would be, in a sense to be specified, superior
to the existing one. The idea of searching for a better system is
at least as ancient as Plato’s Republic, but it is only recently that
tools have become available for a systematic, analytical approach
to such search procedures. This new approach refuses to accept
the institutional status quo of a particular time and place as the
only legitimate object of interest and yet recognizes constraints
that disqualify naive utopias.” Hurwicz (1973), p. 1
Hurwicz was interested in answering large-scale questions about economic sys-
tems, in particular, to decide the controversy over the relative merits of cen-
trally planned versus market economies. By the time of his writing, this plan-
ning controversy had been raging for decades: Oskar Lange (1942) and Abba
Lerner (1944) argued that a centrally planned economy could in principle repli-
cate the efficient allocation of resources in a free market and could improve on
the workings of the free market by correcting market failures. Other theorists,
notably Friedrich Hayek (1935) and Ludwig von Mises (1935), argued on the
contrary. Hayek famously asserted that central planning could lead to efficient
resource allocations only if the planner possesses at least as much information
18 Chapter 1. Introduction
about the desires and resources of other agents as the market mechanism gen-
erates spontaneously, but that it is not in the interests of agents to reveal their
private information (Hayek (1945)). However, the economic models available
at the time of the debate accounted for economic systems only as mechanisms
for the allocation of scarce resources, but not as mechanisms for communi-
cating private information that is widely dispersed throughout the economy.
Therefore, they ignored the incentives for conveying information that differ-
ent mechanisms provide to agents (cf. Myerson (2008)). Because a precise
mathematical treatment of incentives was lacking, the planning controversy
remained largely inconclusive.
Hurwicz (1972) provided a theory that introduced incentive constraints, in ad-
dition to resource constraints. Institutions are modelled as mechanisms that
determine how social decisions and allocations of goods depend on the actions
of the individuals interacting through these institutions. Importantly, their ac-
tions can include conveying private information, e.g. about their endowments,
or their preferences. It is assumed that the individuals are rational and game
theory is used to predict the institutional outcomes. In this framework, in-
dividuals may be strategic, while adhering to the rules of the game.2 For
instance, they may lie about their preferences if this is in their best interest.
This leads to the concept of incentive compatibility : a mechanism is incentive-
compatible if it implements some predefined social goal in equilibrium, that
is, it gives everyone incentives to act according to the social plan.3
This analysis of incentives laid the foundation of mechanism design theory,
which subsequently evolved rapidly. As Makowski and Ostroy (1992) wrote,
“around 1970, the issue of incentives surfaced forcefully, as if a pair of blinders
2Note that, by allowing strategic behaviour, the model delimits the knowledge and power
of the social planner (e.g. Trockel (2002), p. 30). The model thus excludes dictatorial
systems, in which the social planner could simply tell everyone what to do.
3The idea of incentive compatibility appears already in Hurwicz (1953), where he suggests
that mechanisms with this feature be called “cooperative”, or “self-interest cooperative”
(p. 7). Hurwicz (1960) seems to have used “incentive-compatible” for the first time. The
canonical paper is Hurwicz (1972).
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were removed” (p. 14). Among the most notable subsequent results is, first,
the Revelation Principle, which characterises the set of feasible social out-
comes as those that are implementable by incentive-compatible mechanisms;4
and second, Maskin Monotonicity, which is a property of implementable so-
cial choice rules and which together with a second property (called “no veto
power”) can be used to construct mechanisms that implement the choice rule
in question (Maskin (1999)). I will make use of the concept of incentive com-
patibility in the next chapter, where I show that certain theories of rational-
ity, which are popular especially among philosophers, conflict with incentive-
compatible institutional design. I will argue that this presents a challenge for
those theories. We will also be led to a fundamental question in social ontol-
ogy, namely, what are institutions? I will try to show that mechanism design
yields important insights into this question.5
Let’s consider again the planning controversy. Mechanism design provides
flexible tools for comparing the efficiency and incentives that different eco-
nomic systems provide. For instance, Eric Maskin (2015) shows that Hayek’s
claims – that the market is the only informationally efficient and incentive-
compatible mechanism – are true when there are a large number of buyers and
sellers and no externalities.6 However, if these assumptions are not met, there
are mechanisms that generally improve upon the market.
Furthermore, Roger Myerson (2009) models how different kinds of incentive
4Several theorists discovered the revelation principle independently around the same time
in the late 1970s, including Dasgupta et al. (1979) and Myerson (1979), among others.
5Recent work by Francesco Guala and Frank Hindriks has refocused attention on this
question (see Hindriks and Guala (2015a) and Guala (2016)). I will suggest some amend-
ments to their theory.
6The relation between Hayek’s work and mechanism design is peculiar. On the one hand,
mechanism design can be seen as a consequence of Hayek’s treatment of knowledge and
incentives, and Hayek seems to have anticipated crucial results from mechanism design. On
the other hand, treating economic systems as variables in the problem of finding a superior
system to the existing one must have been utterly unacceptable to Hayek, because it must
mean for him to mess with the desirable, “spontaneous order” of the market economy. (Note,
however, that Hayek scholars have debated whether he believed that spontaneous orders are
superior to artificial orders. Caldwell (2000) rejects this interpretation, while Angner (2004,
2007) defends it.)
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problems figure in unbridled capitalism and in centrally planned economies.
Remember that mechanisms determine how allocations of goods depend on
individual actions. These actions may include means of communication, but
also other actions, such as exerting efforts that the social planner cannot re-
liably observe. The social planner wants to design incentives for the agents
to report their private information honestly, otherwise she will face adverse
selection problems. She also wants to design incentives for agents to do what
they are supposed to do when their actions are hidden, otherwise there are
moral hazard problems. Accordingly, we can distinguish two types of incentive
constraints that social planners should take into account: informational incen-
tive constraints to avoid adverse selection, and strategic incentive constraints
to eliminate moral hazard.
The distinction between informational and strategic incentive constraints is
significant for the planning debate: in Myerson’s models, socialism can be
shown to have advantages concerning adverse selection problems, but disad-
vantages concerning moral hazard. Capitalism, in contrast, shows disadvan-
tages concerning adverse selection but advantages concerning moral hazard. It
is not difficult to make intuitive sense of this result. For instance, motivating
workers in the absence of significant monetary incentives and property rights
is typically thought to be a problem plaguing socialism. In contrast, adverse
selection presents problems for private ownership because property rights give
people “vested interests, which can make it more difficult to motivate them to
share their private information with each other” (Myerson (2009), p. 66).
However, according to Myerson, the choice between moral hazard and adverse
selection is not a symmetric one. Rather, moral hazard is the fundamental
problem threatening economic efficiency. To avoid it, even socialism must
give some property rights to individuals, because they are better motivated to
work hard in order to maintain their property. But this will give rise to adverse
selection problems after all and it therefore delimits the possible advantages of
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socialism. So Myerson turns the analysis into an argument against socialism.
Does this analysis show that capitalism is superior to socialism? This is doubt-
ful. While an answer to this question would require a longer discussion, I shall
point out two limitations of the analysis here. First, Myerson does not provide
full-fledged models of capitalism and socialism, but only models of the incen-
tive problems that arise in the allocation of capital under both systems. Of
course, the allocation of capital may be an essential part of evaluating economic
systems (Myerson follows von Mises (1935) in this assumption). Nevertheless,
deciding the planning controversy might require including in the analysis other
markets than the capital market alone. Second, if the analysis is correct, it
shows that the choice between capitalist and socialist allocation of capital is
subject to a trade-off between different kinds of incentive problems. It does
not show that capitalism is superior to socialism in every respect. It may
be plausible that moral hazard is a more fundamental problem than adverse
selection. However, this is a substantive assumption Myerson makes, which
does not follow from the models themselves.
To conclude this section, we note two factual limitations of mechanism design
in the search for a better economic system. First, even though mechanism
design regards the structure of the economic system as an unknown, as Hur-
wicz reminds us, the theory did not offer a “third way” besides capitalism and
socialism. It is typically thought that the collapse of most socialist economies
decided the planning controversy in favour of capitalism. Moreover, it is some-
times lamented that, since capitalism lost its main rival, we lack a grand,
alternative idea to capitalism. Mechanism design remained largely silent on
such an idea. The theory may be better equipped to exclude systems, rather
than finding a superior one to the existing ones, even though some attempts
at this have been made. Recently, Eric Posner and Glen Weyl put forward
the system of “radical markets”, which aims to provide such a third way, in-
tegrating features of both capitalism and socialism (Posner and Weyl (2018)).
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We will come back to their proposal in the last chapter.
Second, even though Hurwicz draws attention to the potential practical im-
portance of this research programme in designing a “superior” system to the
existing one, it did not directly lead to real-world social reforms. This may in
part be due to the large-scale focus on economic systems. Models of economic
systems are hard to test in practice. Moreover, they neglect the details of eco-
nomic interactions, such as the rules for exchanges on a specific marketplace.
But these details may affect the success of large-scale reforms. This is because
changing the fundamental institutions may also change those interactions, for
example, by affecting the choices available to individuals. Understanding the
details of specific interactions may be a precondition for successful large-scale
design.
1.2 The Economist as Engineer
Since the 1980s the main focus of economic design has shifted from grand eco-
nomic systems to particular markets and marketplaces, and the recommended
designs are increasingly implemented. To emphasise their focus on practi-
cal problem-solving, Alvin Roth (2002) calls economists engaged in this field
engineers; Esther Duflo (2017) describes them as plumbers.
Various reasons for this shift can be identified. One reason is that considerable
progress had been made on game-theoretic models that concern specific trans-
actions. Importantly, these included auctions, a field of research initiated by
William Vickrey (1961), and matching under preferences. For an illustration
of the latter, consider David Gale and Lloyd Shapley’s “marriage market”:
“A certain community consists of n men and n women. Each
person ranks those of the opposite sex in accordance with his or
her preferences for a marriage partner. We seek a satisfactory
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way of marrying off all members of the community... we call a
set of marriages unstable (and here the suitability of the term is
quite clear) if under it there are a man and a woman who are not
married to each other but prefer each other to their actual mates.”
Gale and Shapley (1962), p. 388
They formalise the marriage market and they define a simple procedure in
which men iteratively propose to women, who reject all but their most pre-
ferred proposal in each step, which always produces stable matchings. The way
in which this abstract formulation of a matching problem finally got applied
to the real world provides an interesting case study in economic engineering.
Roth (1984) considers the matching market that allows medical graduates in
the US to find training positions in public hospitals. This market had been
subject to severe market failures before a matching procedure had been intro-
duced. This procedure can be shown to be equivalent to Gale and Shapley’s
mechanism, and it temporarily cured the market failures. However, Roth also
shows that the market was failing again when increasing numbers of married
couples entered the market. Adding couples to the model, it can be shown
that stable matchings may not exist, which provided an explanation for the
new market failure. Roth was later commissioned with the redesign of this
market, which led to one of the great success stories of market design that was
a key motivation behind the 2012 Nobel Prize to Roth and Shapley.
Matching theory has become an important tool for economic engineers and
its results have been applied to various labour markets, school choice, or
for matching organ donors with transplant patients (see Roth (2018) for an
overview). While the design of auctions – in particular for radio spectra – has
been subject of detailed methodological analyses in the philosophy of science
(e.g. Guala (2005) chapter 8, Alexandrova (2006)), matching has not been
analysed in detail before. I address this gap in the literature: in chapter 3, I
give a detailed methodological analysis of the redesign of the matching market
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for medical graduates. Matching markets will be a recurrent theme in this
thesis: in chapters 4 and 5, we will consider ethical issues that specific match-
ing problems raise, namely matching refugees with host countries and kidney
donors with patients, respectively.
A further reason for the development of economic engineering is the rise of ex-
perimental economics. Engineers and plumbers are aware that minor changes
in a marketplace can cause it to unravel in ways that simple models often
cannot predict. Therefore, experimental testbeds increasingly complement
mathematical models in the development of well-working market rules (see
Guala (2005) for a methodology of experimental economics). Besides labo-
ratory experiments, market designers make use of natural experiments, sta-
tistical analyses, simulations, etc. It is also common for economists who are
(re)designing a particular market to draw upon the expertise of participants
in that market, as when medical practitioners are consulted in the design of a
kidney exchange.
The methodology of economic engineering is relevant to important debates
in the philosophy of science. In particular, there has been extensive debate
about how (or whether) economic models create knowledge about the social
world.7 I add to this debate in chapter 3 by giving a general epistemology
of economic engineering. According to my account, economic theory encodes
counterfactual information in its models about how interventions in a market
would change the market outcomes, and we can learn about this counterfactual
information by manipulating the models. These manipulations may include
de-idealisation techniques, as when couples are added to a simple matching
model; and the complementary use of empirical methods. This addresses what
has been labelled a “paradox” in the philosophy of economics, viz. that models
7The following is an (incomplete) list of contributions to this big debate: Alexandrova
(2008); Cartwright (2009); Guala (2005); Hausman (1992); Kuorikoski and Lehtinen (2009);
Ma¨ki (2009, 2017); Morgan (2001); Reiss (2012); Rubinstein (2006, 2012); Schelling (2010);
Sugden (2000). Alexandrova and Northcott (2013) and Alexandrova and Northcott (2015)
take a sceptical stance, calling into doubt that economic models yield explanations.
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provide insights into the social world even though they are highly idealised and
incorporate false assumptions.
Following success stories such as the one above, there is increasing demand
from policy-makers for economists “repairing” deficient markets, or creating
new markets. What kinds of markets do economic engineers recommend?
While it is very sensitive to the context what design could yield a successful
market institution, a few general constraints on successful markets can be
identified.
Incentive compatibility still figures as an important constraint. However, in-
centive compatibility is defined against the stringent rationality assumptions
prevalent in mechanism design, which should in some contexts be relaxed. For
instance, Shengwu Li (2017b) defines “obviously strategy-proof mechanisms”,
which provide cognitively limited agents with weakly dominant strategies in
a way that they can recognise these strategies as weakly dominant and thus
manage to play equilibria. Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms exclude sit-
uations in which game theorists predict equilibrium outcomes, which do not
materialise in the real world because the individuals’ strategies are too com-
plicated.
In addition to incentive constraints, Roth identifies a variety of constraints
on well-functioning markets (see Roth (2013, 2015a)). For instance, markets
should be thick, that is, they should attract a sufficient number of potential
buyers and sellers to facilitate satisfactory trades. However, as markets get
thick, they might congest : a congested market makes it complicated or time-
consuming for traders to identify favourable trades. Furthermore, they should
avoid repugnance. A repugnant market is one that people do not want individ-
uals participating, even though they do not have externalities. We will come
back to repugnance in the discussion of ethics and economic design below.
A lack of any of these features can cause a market to unravel. But there is
no one-size-fits-all mechanism that could achieve these features for all kinds
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of transactions. Obviously, while few would object to selling one’s old bike
on ebay, offering one’s kidney will arouse considerable repugnance (and is in
fact illegal). Likewise, what a good design is depends on the goods to be ex-
changed in the market in question, its structure, size, etc. Some markets work
best when unregulated, others are “crippled by inconsistencies in information,
control, incentives, and behavior, and require social management” (McFad-
den (2009), p. 78). These insights from market design caution against overly
ideological debates concerning free markets vs. regulation. Market designers’
mixed recommendations that depend on the details of the marketplace sug-
gest that this is a false dichotomy. This might be a reason why, as economic
design became more practical, large-scale debates about economic systems
increasingly slipped out of focus.
To take stock, we have identified two grand traditions within economic design.
The theory of mechanism design provides a framework for comparing and
evaluating economic systems. It promised a third way besides capitalism and
socialism, but despite its reformist spirit, its contributions remained mainly
theoretical. The other is economic engineering, which is compartmentalised
and focused on the details of small-scale problems. It is closer to policy-
making, but this practical advantage comes at the expense of losing the role
of evaluating fundamental economic institutions. We will take up the relation
between these two traditions, as well as possible future developments, in the
last chapter.
1.3 Economic Design and Ethics
The choice between different mechanisms depends not only on figuring out
incentives and efficiency, but it often involves substantive ethical questions.
This raises questions about the relation between economic design and ethics.
Is there a ‘right’ ethical theory for economic design? And if so, is preference
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utilitarianism this theory, which is assumed as default by many economists
outside economic design? If this is the case then economic design should ap-
pear as an adversary to many strains of moral philosophy, namely all those
opposed to preference utilitarianism. Debates about the moral limits of mar-
kets might suggest that this is indeed the case. Many economic designers hold
liberal views about their reach. In contrast, some moral philosophers argue for
a narrower domain, adducing normative reasons for this view (Sandel (2012)).8
However, this is an oversimplified and indeed a false picture of how economic
designers treat ethics. They have suggested a multitude of properties, and
mechanisms implementing them, that do not speak to (preference) utilitarian-
ism. Examples are procedural fairness (Klaus and Klijn (2009)), or the elimi-
nation of justified envy (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003)), to only mention
two properties that can be implemented by matching mechanisms. Given this
multitude of properties and associated mechanisms, the crucial question is,
how should the mechanisms be chosen that ought to govern a specific interac-
tion? Moreover, who should choose it – in particular, what is the right division
of labour between economic designers, ethicists and policy-makers?
Li (2017a) provides a simple and flexible framework for thinking about the
relation between economic design and ethics. Suppose we wish to design
an institution, say a market, that will govern some prespecified interactions.
There is a set of feasible designs D and a set of consequences C. A function
f : D −→ C determines what consequences the feasible designs would lead to.
To each of the consequences corresponds a value judgement J , specified by a
value function v : C −→ J . Defining v(d) := v(f(d)) for all d ∈ D, we extend
the value function to range over the designs themselves.
This model captures only consequentialist ethical theories. Redefining the
domain of the value function to cover design-consequence pairs v : D×C −→ J
allows including non-consequentialist theories, in which the value may change
8See Besley (2013) for an interesting discussion of how moral philosophy and economics
treat the moral limits of markets.
28 Chapter 1. Introduction
depending on the mechanism in use.
Now, it could be thought that there is a stark division of labour: market
designers investigate f , whereas ethicists and policy-makers investigate v, and
there is no overlap between their respective tasks. However, this is false. To
see this, note that, how f is specified partly depends on v. Market designers do
not specify all consequences of a design, because the set of consequences may
be large and many properties of consequences are relatively uninformative.
Instead, they classify consequences along properties that are morally relevant.
This requires a theory of what properties are morally relevant in the first
place and it requires an interpretation of those properties within the model in
question. For instance, remember Gale and Shapley’s marriage model. Here,
f could include statements such as, “deferred acceptance procedures lead to
fair matchings”. This presupposes that fairness is a relevant property. In
addition, it requires an interpretation of fairness within this model, as, for
instance, fairness in a monetary market will have a different meaning than
fairness in a matching market.
For these reasons, the model should be extended again to include a set of
“intermediate judgements” I that state what ethically relevant properties a
design-consequence pair implements, such as efficiency, fairness, transparency,
etc. With each design-consequence pair is associated an intermediate judge-
ment, so there is a function g : D × C −→ I. This function states things like,
“d implements fair matchings”. With each intermediate judgement is associ-
ated an overall judgement, v : I −→ J . This function states things like, “all
things considered, we should implement d”.
Li then proposes the following division of labour: economic designers study
g; ethicists and policy-makers study v. This division of labour means that
“the theory and practice of [economic] design should maintain an informed
neutrality between reasonable ethical positions” (p. 717). Economic designers
should be informed in order to define all the relevant elements of I in a way
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that is consistent with their standard meaning in ethics. They should be
neutral, that is, leave it to ethicists and policy-makers to resolve fundamental
ethical disagreements about v.
It should be added to Li’s analysis that his proposed division of labour also
requires of moral philosophers to know some results from economic design.
Obviously, they need knowledge about I, which is the domain of the value
function v. They must know the meanings of these intermediate judgements:
if an intermediate judgement asserts that “d produces fair matchings”, they
should know how fairness is defined in this context. Moreover, they should
know what the relevant elements of I are, that is, what combinations of fea-
tures are feasible in a given market. For instance, it is not a reasonable po-
sition to demand fairness and efficiency if this demand is impossible to meet.
(We will grapple with this problem concerning the distribution of refugees in
chapter 4.)
The second part of the thesis discusses v with regard to two matching prob-
lems. In chapter 4, I discuss some ethical issues concerning the distribution
of refugees over host countries. In chapter 5, I give an argument for kid-
ney exchange. The two chapters differ in how coarse-grained they partition
I. Concerning the distribution of refugees, I apply basic matching models
and mechanisms, which provide insights into some of the ethical trade-offs
that arise in this context. In contrast, concerning kidney donations, I do not
consider specific matching procedures. Rather, the motivation is that some
countries ban the possibility of matching donors and recipients altogether, by
restricting live organ donations to close relatives who may be incompatible.
I argue for the implementation of matching markets in this context, because
these markets are instrumental in meeting a moral obligation, namely to do-
nate effectively.
Does the practice of economic design generally follow Li’s ideal of an informed
neutrality concerning ethical theories? It could fail neutrality or informed-
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ness. Concerning neutrality, consider how economic designers treat repug-
nance. Roth (2007) introduces repugnance as a factual constraint on markets.
For instance, if there are many people who object fiercely to a monetary market
in kidneys, such a market might unravel. However, Roth has also advocated
removing financial disincentives for donating kidneys, or designing a market
in which government buys and allocates kidneys.9 So repugnance is in this
case not only seen as a factual constraint on markets, but as one that ought
to be removed.
Concerning informedness, if economic designers are more aware of some eth-
ical theories than others, this can lead to a biased provision of intermediate
judgements. For instance, given the prevalence of preference utilitarianism
in the broader discipline of economics, it is plausible that the intermediate
judgements are predominantly consequentialist.10
Failing neutrality is not so problematic if economic designers do not fail in-
formedness. It seems fine (and perhaps inevitable) that an economic designer
would make all-things-considered judgements (statements about v) if the func-
tion g : D × C −→ I is defined in the following way: first, I contains el-
ements from a large class of ethical theories, as opposed to, say, elements
corresponding to consequentialist judgements but no elements corresponding
to non-consequentialist judgements; and second, I is partitioned in a way that
respects the standard meaning of ethical concepts. A moral philosopher, or
a policy-maker, would then be free to disagree with the all-things-considered
judgement by this specific economic designer. To a moral philosopher who
disagrees in this way, economic design would not, as a discipline, appear as
9See https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/give-a-kidney-get-
a-check/412609/ for removing financial disincentives. For government buying and allocating
kidneys, see the session summary of the 2016 Normative Ethics and Welfare Economics
Conference, Harvard Business School, https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/conferences/2016-
newe/Documents/Session%20IV.pdf. Both accessed on 18/04/2019. I should add that Roth
does not make these recommendations in his academic articles.
10It is also easier in practice (e.g. more parsimonious with regard to notation) to eval-
uate consequences, rather than design-consequence pairs, which might additionally favour
consequentialist theories.
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an adversary, even though the particular economic designer with whom she
disagrees might. An informed debate would be possible. In contrast, if the
elements of I were defined and partitioned in an uninformed way – important
elements are missing, the partition is skewed – then a moral philosopher study-
ing v could perceive the discipline of economic design as an adversary, even if
economic designers were silent about all-things-considered judgements (they
only studied g). Moreover, if moral philosophers lack the technical expertise
for redefining the set of intermediate judgements and a corresponding g′ in a
less problematic way, an informed debate is not possible.
Since informedness is key, this argument provides a rationale for the impor-
tance of ethical theory for economic design. In particular, it may suggest that
ethics should form an integral part of the curriculum of economic designers.
1.4 Conclusion
Economic design is at the intersection between positive and normative eco-
nomics. Its origins lie in the debates over the relative merits of centrally
planned versus market economies. Mechanism design provides important in-
sights into these debates by examining the incentives that economic systems
provide people with. Subsequently, economic design became focussed on spe-
cific transactions, such as auctions, or matching problems. Economic designers
have developed an engineering approach that seeks to devise well-functioning,
real-world institutions, but the large-scale system design increasingly slipped
out of focus. The choice of a mechanism often involves ethical considerations
and trade-offs. Arguably, economic designers need not always live up to the
ideal of informed neutrality concerning reasonable ethical theories: they need
not always be neutral, but they should be literate in ethics. This provides a
rationale for the importance of ethics in economic theory.
Economic design raises a variety of philosophical and ethical issues: how do
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rational individuals interact with each other through institutions? And what
does this tell us about how our economic system should be organised? How
can economic models be used for predicting how market outcomes will change
as we intervene in markets? How ought we to design specific markets and
other institutions? In the next chapters, I hope to provide some insights into
these questions.
1.5 Overview of the Chapters
In the next chapter, I examine the implications of incentive compatibility for
notions of rationality. Against the orthodoxy to view Nash equilibrium as “the
embodiment of the idea that economic agents are rational” (Aumann (1985), p.
43), some theorists have proposed non-classical notions of rationality in games,
asserting the possibility of rational choices that do not constitute equilibria.
I discuss an implication that non-classical theories, such as constrained maxi-
mization, or team reasoning share: they are at odds with the requirement that
institutions be designed to be incentive-compatible, that is, that they imple-
ment desired social goals in equilibrium. Proponents of non-classical theories
face a choice between three options to resolve this conflict: either they deny
that incentive compatibility is required as a constraint on institutional design,
or they deny that individuals interacting through the designed institutions are
rational, or they accept that their theories do not apply to institutional design.
I discuss these options critically and I argue that institutional design presents
a challenge to non-classical theories of rationality to which proponents of those
theories haven’t responded convincingly.
Chapter 3 gives an account of the epistemology of economic engineering. I in-
troduce a case study – the reform of a matching market for medical residents
– which hasn’t been previously studied in the philosophy of science and which
challenges some views on economic engineering. In particular, some philoso-
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phers of science have been critical of the contribution of economic theory to
economic engineering. However, in our case study, the use of economic models
is key for understanding and redesigning the market. I suggest a more general
account according to which models, e.g. from game theory, allow formulating
policy goals. Complemented by experiments and other methods, they project
institutions implementing those goals. Directed graphs are introduced to il-
lustrate how in this process, economic institutions are treated as variables to
be intervened on. Finally, I argue that the creation of knowledge in economic
engineering urges caution on a recent call in the philosophy of science for more
aggressively evaluating the use of models in economics.
The second part of the thesis examines ethical questions that the design of spe-
cific institutions raises. Chapter 4 is about the distribution of refugees over
host countries. It has been suggested that their distribution can be made more
fair or efficient if policy makers take into account not only numbers of refugees
to be distributed but also the goodness of the matches between refugees and
their possible host countries. There are different ways to design distribution
mechanisms that incorporate this practice, which opens up a space for nor-
mative considerations. In particular, if the mechanism takes countries’ or
refugees’ preferences into account, there may be trade-offs between satisfying
their preferences and the number of refugees distributed. I argue that in such
cases, it is not a reasonable policy to satisfy preferences. Moreover, conditions
are given which, if satisfied, prevent the trade-off from occurring. Finally,
it is argued that countries should not express preferences over refugees, but
rather that priorities for refugees should be imposed, and that fairness beats
efficiency in the context of distributing asylum. The framework of matching
theory is used to make the arguments precise, but the results are general and
relevant for other distribution mechanisms such as the relocations currently in
effect in the European Union.
Chapter 5 discusses the ethics of kidney exchange. The best treatment for
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end-stage renal disease is the transplantation of a live donor kidney, but many
people cannot donate to their loved ones because they are incompatible. Kid-
ney exchange promises relief. Kidney exchange programmes use centralised
procedures to match donors with recipients in a way that maximises the quan-
tity and quality of transplants. However, kidney exchange has met ethical
concerns, and the transplant laws in many countries render it impossible. I
give two arguments for the implementation of kidney exchange programmes.
The first is that they are instrumental in meeting a moral obligation, namely
to donate effectively. The second is that they may increase the motivation
for altruistic donations, because the donation of one kidney may trigger > 1
life savings. Moreover, ethical concerns are considered that are embodied in
transplant laws preventing the implementation of kidney exchange, and it is
argued that they can be overcome.
The final chapter identifies open questions for future research and it closes
with some thoughts about the future trajectory of economic design.
Chapter 2
Of Rats and Rationality
Institutional Design and Rationality
in Games
Michael Vann describes an episode of French colonialism in the city of Hanoi.
Threatened by a rat infestation that was apprehended to cause an outbreak
of the pest, the colonial administration declared that it would pay a bounty
to Vietnamese residents for each rat-tail that they would bring them. The
Vietnamese handed in thousands of tails, yet the rat population did not di-
minish. The reason became evident when officials discovered that the “exter-
minators” were cutting off rat-tails while leaving the rats alive and able to
breed and produce more valuable tails. Later, the authorities also detected
rat farming in the suburbs of Hanoi. “One can only imagine the frustration of
the municipal authorities, who realized that their best efforts at de´ratisation
had actually increased the rodent population by indirectly encouraging rat-
farming. Evidently, this was not what the French had in mind when they
encouraged capitalist development and the entrepreneurial spirit in Vietnam”
(Vann (2003), p. 198, emphasis in the original).
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The colonial rulers were apparently not aware of what economists now almost
universally acknowledge: institutions – such as markets for disinfestations –
should be designed to be incentive-compatible, that is, they should not bring
about adverse incentives that produce unintended outcomes. Game theory
plays a central role in the design of incentive-compatible institutions: insti-
tutional designers devise games that implement some desired social goals in
equilibrium, and they aim to make institutions resemble those games. This
methodology is based on a specific notion of rationality, as well as on a rational-
ity assumption. The notion of rationality is, roughly, that rational agents play
equilibria, and the rationality assumption is that the people who will interact
through the designed institution are rational. Together, these assumptions
imply that the designed institution will bring about the desired social goals.
This methodology coheres with the logic of incentives, because in equilibrium,
individuals have no incentives to deviate from their actions.
However, some theorists maintain that there are rational choices that do not
constitute equilibria. Such “non-classical” theories include team reasoning
and constrained maximization, both of which will be introduced in the next
section. This chapter sheds light on the contrast between classical and non-
classical theories from the perspective of institutional design. It shows that
non-classical accounts are at odds with the constraint of incentive compatibil-
ity: what institutional designers expect individuals to do when they impose
this constraint is in many cases inconsistent with what non-classical rationality
requires them to do. The chapter then identifies the options that non-classical
theorists can choose from in order to resolve this conflict: either they reject
incentive compatibility as a constraint on institutional design; or they deny
that the individuals interacting through the designed institutions are rational;
or they concede that their theories do not apply to institutional design.
I shall critically discuss these options in turn. First, rejecting the constraint of
incentive compatibility risks diminishing social welfare and empirical evidence
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suggests that it would indeed diminish social welfare. Second, treating people
as irrational has been unpopular among non-classical theorists themselves and
it shows an advantage of classical relative to non-classical theories. Third,
conceding that non-classical theories do not apply to institutional design seems
to present an argument against those theories. More charitably, it could be
seen as delimiting the scope of applicability of those theories. But non-classical
theorists should then give an account of the conditions under which their
theories supposedly apply. However, a convincing account is to date owed
and it is difficult to see how such an account could be provided. I conclude
that institutional design constitutes a challenge to non-classical theories of
rationality to which proponents of those theories haven’t given a convincing
response.
If a theorist argues for a contextual account of rationality (that is, opts for
the third option above), there is an interesting implication: the meaning of
“rational” may depend on the concept of institution, because institutional
contexts delimit the possible scope of non-classical theories of rationality. For
this reason, a sideline of this chapter is to offer some insights into the concept
of institution. In particular, I shall make some constructive criticisms of a
recent theory of institutions by Francesco Guala and Frank Hindriks. Accord-
ing to their theory, institutions are “rules-in-equilibrium”. I argue that their
account provides valuable insights by emphasising that successful institutions
implement desirable outcomes in equilibrium. I suggest two amendments to
this account: first, they should include mechanisms (in a sense that will be de-
fined) as essential parts of institutions. Second, their account takes incentive
compatibility for granted, which excludes entities typically thought of as insti-
tutions, and it may obscure the fact that institutions can succeed or fail. From
the perspective of institutional design, it is preferable to regard institutions as
entities governed by mechanisms that may or may not be in equilibrium.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents classical and
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non-classical theories of rationality in games and Section 2.2 introduces the
concept of incentive-compatible institutional design. Section 2.3 brings to-
gether the previous two sections: I show that non-classical theories of ratio-
nality are at odds with incentive compatibility and I discuss the options that
non-classical theorists have to resolve this conflict. Section 2.4 picks up the
discussion about the concept of institution, and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1 Notions of Rationality in Games
How do rational individuals interact with each other? This question has occu-
pied many philosophers and economists alike. Their responses can be classified
into two distinct families, which I call “classical” and “non-classical”, respec-
tively. Each family subsumes various theories of rationality in games. I shall
first introduce classical theories and give their defining characteristic, which is
that they place Nash equilibrium at centre stage. Then I present two promi-
nent examples of non-classical theories, namely constrained maximization and
team reasoning.
In order to introduce these notions of rationality, it is convenient to consider
some simple games in normal form. For instance, consider the Hi-Lo game in
Figure 2.1. In this game, players I and II simultaneously choose Hi or Lo. Each
combination of their choices results in a cell, specifying both players’ payoffs.
Player I’s payoff is shown on the bottom left and player II’s payoff on the top
right of each cell. The payoff numbers refer to the players’ utilities. These
summarise everything that is motivationally relevant to the players (I shall
have more to say about this below). We make the standard assumption that
players’ utilities are measured on an interval scale, that is, the point of zero
utility and the units of utility are arbitrary and the ratios of the differences
between the utilities are non-arbitrary. Interpersonal comparability of players’
utilities is not assumed. Moreover, the utilities are not transferable between
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Figure 2.1: Example of a Hi-Lo game. Player I’s payoff is shown on the bottom
left and player II’s payoff on the top right of each cell. A square around a payoff
number denotes a player’s best reply to a possible choice of the opponent.
the players.
Under these assumptions, what should player I choose? This obviously de-
pends on what player II chooses: if II chooses Hi, I’s best reply is to play Hi
too, if II chooses Lo, I’s best reply is to play Lo. Because of the symmetry
of the game, the same holds for player II. A player’s best replies to the op-
ponent’s possible choices are marked with squares around her payoff numbers
in the figure. There are two outcomes in the game in which the players’ ac-
tions are best replies to each other: both players play Hi, or both players play
Lo. Furthermore, instead of choosing an action with certainty, the players
may come up with a strategy to choose both available actions with non-zero
probabilities. For example, they could choose their actions depending on the
outcome of the throw of dice. If players’ strategies include such plans of ac-
tion in which they mix their choices, then there is a third outcome in which
the players’ strategies are best responses to each other: both players play Hi
with probability 1/3 and Lo with probability 2/3, which yields both players
an expected payoff of 2/3.
In general, a strategy profile in which each player’s strategy is a best reply to all
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the other players’ strategies (where strategies may be pure or mixed), is a Nash
equilibrium. In the following, I will drop “Nash” when it is clear that Nash
equilibrium is at stake, and I will call individual strategies that are played with
a positive probability in some equilibrium, “equilibrium strategies”. According
to classical theories of rationality, then, a strategy is rational only if it is
an equilibrium strategy. Because in an equilibrium, no player has incentives
to deviate from her strategy, classical theories establish tight links between
rationality and incentives. This leads Robert Aumann to state the classical
view thus:
“The Nash equilibrium is the embodiment of the idea that eco-
nomic agents are rational; that they simultaneously act to maxi-
mize their utility. If there is any idea that can be considered the
driving force of economic theory, that is it. Thus in a sense, Nash
equilibrium embodies the most important and fundamental idea
of economics, that people act in accordance with their incentives.”
(Aumann (1985), p. 43)
According to the most common classical theory, equilibrium strategies are not
only necessary, but also sufficient for rationality (e.g. Binmore (2007)). This
theory is sometimes challenged because games can have many equilibria, some
of which may be less than optimal. For instance, in the Hi-Lo game, despite
there being three equilibria, it seems “trivial” to many that (Hi, Hi) should
be the unique rational outcome of this game (e.g. Gold and Sugden (2007),
p. 284), and “paradoxical” that standard game theory does not solve for this
outcome alone (e.g. Bacharach (2006), p. 44 et seq., Guala (2018b)).
However, even though this critique is sometimes supposed to motivate a de-
parture from classical theories (e.g. Gold and Sugden (2007), p. 284 et seq.),
it should be noted that refinements of Nash equilibrium, according to which
playing equilibrium strategies is necessary, but not sufficient for rationality,
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can rule out “bad” equilibria. John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten developed
a general theory that selects a unique equilibrium in a large class of games (in-
cluding all games in normal form), which is the rational outcome, according to
their theory (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)). For instance, in Hi-Lo games, their
concept of “payoff dominance” implies that only the Hi strategy is rational to
play, thus ruling out the two dominated equilibria.1
In contrast to classical theories, according to which equilibrium strategies are a
necessary condition for rational play (and in some of which equilibrium strate-
gies are also a sufficient condition for rational play), non-classical theories of
rationality in games maintain that equilibrium strategies are neither necessary
nor sufficient for rational play. The motivation for proposing these theories is
typically an unease with inefficient equilibria, and so the theories imply that
rational players can improve upon inefficient equilibria. Apart from Hi-Lo
games, where this unease may fall short of necessitating non-classical theo-
ries (because some classical theories accommodate this concern), Prisoners’
Dilemma (PD) games are typically adduced as evidence for the alleged short-
comings of all classical theories. An example of a PD game is shown in Figure
2.2. In this game, it is a dominant strategy for both players to defect, therefore
(Defect, Defect) is the unique, dominant-strategy equilibrium. But (Cooper-
ate, Cooperate) strictly Pareto-dominates this equilibrium, that is, were the
players able to achieve this outcome, both would be better off. According to
classical theories, they could never achieve this outcome since both players
would have incentives to deviate by playing Defect. Instead of interpreting
these incentives as a constraint on what can rationally be achieved, propo-
nents of non-classical theories consider this a weakness of the orthodoxy. We
next consider two prominent examples, constrained maximization and team
reasoning, in more depth.
1However, Bacharach (2006) criticises Harsanyi and Selten’s theory on the basis that it
is aimed at equilibrium selection, that is, determining a unique rational outcome. According
to Bacharach, a theory of rationality should reflect intuitions of rationality, but these are
indeterminate in many other games (see p. 60 et seqq.).
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Figure 2.2: Example of a Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
Constrained maximization. David Gauthier is a prominent defender of
the view that rational players can improve upon suboptimal equilibria in sit-
uations in which there is ground for mutual trust. He locates rationality at
the level of agents’ dispositions to choose (rather than at the level of strate-
gies for choices), and he defines “constrained maximization” as the disposition
to choose cooperatively if the other agent(s) have the identical disposition,
and non-cooperatively otherwise.2 A population of constrained maximizers
playing PDs could therefore improve upon the non-cooperative outcome that
“straight maximizers” achieve, who simply choose best replies.
This view faces the problem that straight maximizers could simply exploit
constrained maximizers in PD-situations. The latter would then be worse off
as a consequence of their disposition to cooperate, which would constitute
an odd account of practical rationality. In order to exclude this possibility,
Gauthier introduces the condition of “translucency”, according to which an
agent’s disposition for constrained or straight maximization is known to oth-
ers in the population with a positive probability. Thus, when agents within
the population play against each other, there is a probability that constrained
2The canonical exposition of his theory of constrained maximization is in chapter 6 of
Gauthier (1987). His most recent attempt at rationalising cooperation in PD games is
Gauthier (2015). For a critique of the latter, see van Basshuysen (2016).
2.1. Notions of Rationality in Games 43
maximizers will recognise each other and therefore cooperate, and there is a
probability that a constrained maximizer will fail to recognise a straight max-
imizer in the population and will therefore be exploited. According to Gau-
thier, it is rational for an individual to choose the disposition to constrained
maximization if this maximises her expected utility. This is the case, roughly,
when the choice of disposition is sufficiently translucent and the proportion of
constrained maximizers in the population sufficiently high.3
Thus, constrained maximization is designed as a strategy to rationalise coop-
eration in PDs by placing rationality at the level of dispositions and requiring
that these dispositions be translucent. More generally, the same argument
supposedly rationalises non-equilibrium play in games in which an outcome
strictly Pareto-dominates all equilibria. Moreover, in games, such as Hi-Lo, in
which there is a Pareto efficient equilibrium, the theory solves for this equilib-
rium. So in short, for Gauthier, Pareto efficiency takes the place of equilibrium
as the criterion for rationality.
Team reasoning. A number of theorists have criticised concepts of rational-
ity that derive from best-reply reasoning as too individualistic. These theorists
argue that players may sometimes reason from the perspective of “we”, instead
of “I”, that is, as a team.4 When they reason as a team, players are assumed
to identify the action profiles (instead of their individual actions only) that
best promote the common interests of the team they form part of. Then they
3For constrained maximization to maximise utility requires a combination of the two
conditions – level of translucency and proportion of constrained maximizers in the population
– such that the more constrained maximizers there are, the higher the risks can be that
constrained maximizers fail to cooperate and be exploited by straight maximizers. For a
detailed exposition, cf. Gauthier (1987), p. 176 et seq.
4The following are some of the main contributions to team reasoning in games. Robert
Sugden introduced team reasoning to game theory in Sugden (1993). Bacharach (2006),
which was completed by Natalie Gold and Sugden after Michael Bacharach passed away in
2002, has the status of a classic. Some recent developments are Sugden (2011, 2015) and
Karpus and Radzvilas (2018). For comparisons of different theories of team reasoning, see
Gold and Sugden (2007) and Karpus and Gold (2017). I shall present what I take to be the
core tenets of team reasoning here, rather than the details over which some of the theorists
are at variance with each other.
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choose their individual actions that jointly generate those action profiles. For
example, if the players of a PD game form a team, then, assuming that uni-
versal cooperation is identified as the unique optimal outcome for this team,
the players will choose to cooperate.
For individuals to reason as a team requires an identification of these individ-
uals with the team that they jointly constitute. This identification can also
be described as a transformation from individual to collective agency (Gold
and Sugden (2007), p. 292). As a result of this transformation, the players
put aside their individual interests and act upon the interests of the team.
This process raises two questions: how do individual interests convert to team
interests? And why would rational players act upon the team interests, which
might (depending on the answer to the first question) require them to sacrifice
their individual utility to benefit the team? We shall consider these questions
and some proposed answers in turn.
According to some early versions of the theory, as a consequence of the de-
scribed agency transformation individual utilities map into ‘team utilities’, the
maximisation of which is taken to best promote the interests of the team. For
instance, if the team utilities in a given game equal the average of the agents’
individual utilities, then advancing the team interests would amount to max-
imising the average of the agents’ individual payoffs. However, in many games,
this would benefit some players at the expense of others in ways that may seem
unjust. For example, suppose in the example of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game
in Figure 2.2, the individual utilities from defecting if the other player cooper-
ates were 5 instead of 3, while the game is otherwise identical to before. In this
game, the asymmetric outcomes (Defect, Cooperate) and (Cooperate, Defect)
maximise the average of the agents’ utilities. But these outcomes may seem to
demand an undue sacrifice from the cooperating member to benefit the non-
cooperating member of the team (remember that utility is non-transferable
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so a compensation is not possible).5 Sugden (2011, 2015) proposes a more
promising approach: team play should yield the players a mutual advantage,
requiring that the outcome is at least as good as the players’ maximin payoff
(that is, the utility that each player can achieve independently of the other
players). Karpus and Radzvilas (2018) give a possible formal characterization
of mutual advantage in normal form games. They present a measure that can
be applied to calculate which outcome(s) in a normal form game maximise
the players’ mutual advantage, relative to possible reference points. The out-
come(s) that maximally advance team interests are then defined as those that
yield maximum mutual advantage.
If rational players could reach action profiles that maximise mutual advantage,
or some other measure of team interest, they could thereby implement out-
comes which in many games yield better individual payoffs to the players than
equilibrium outcomes. But this would often require them to choose contrary
to their incentives, for instance, when cooperation is identified as the outcome
that best advances the team interest in a PD game. Why would rational play-
ers do this? According to proponents of team reasoning, as a consequence of
the agency transformation, the joint action of the team can be described as
rational. The rationality of this joint action implicates the rationality of the
individual choices of the team members, which constitute the joint action.6
There is disagreement between different proponents about whether or not the
agency transformation is itself a requirement of rationality. For instance, Hur-
5Moreover, averaging players’ utilities is meaningful only if their utilities are interperson-
ally comparable, which is an assumption that is not typically licensed in game theory (see
above), which may be seen as a further problem for these mappings.
6I should add that team reasoning is sometimes put forward as a descriptive theory of
interactive choice, rather than as a theory of rationality. For instance, when Sugden states
his own position in Bacharach (2006), he claims to be “less concerned with the validity of
team reasoning, treating it only as an idealised model of a form of reasoning which people
in fact use, whether justifiably or not” (p. xxii). However, this does not keep him from
suggesting in various other places that according to team reasoning, “the rationality of each
individual’s action derives from the rationality of the joint action of the team” (Sugden
(2003), p. 167; also cf. Gold and Sugden (2007), p. 285). Therefore, it could be doubted
that he sees team reasoning merely as a descriptive theory. Be that as it may, since our
concern here is rationality, we are interested in team reasoning insofar as it is proposed as a
normative theory.
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ley (2005a,b) argues that team identification is the result of rational choice.
Other theorists hold that team identification, or failure thereof is not the result
of conscious deliberation and choice, but rather of the workings of psycholog-
ical mechanisms that are in effect when certain conditions are satisfied (e.g.
Bacharach (2006)). (See Karpus and Gold (2017) for a comparison of differ-
ent proposals.) We will come back to these conditions below, but the details
of these disagreements are insignificant for present purposes. It suffices that,
according to theories of team reasoning, there are conditions under which indi-
viduals identify as a team, and when they are satisfied, rationality may require
those individuals to play non-equilibrium strategies.
To sum up, we have distinguished classical from non-classical theories of ra-
tionality in games. The distinguishing feature is that the former require of
rational strategies to be equilibrium strategies, whereas the latter seek to ra-
tionalise non-equilibrium strategies that may lead to outcomes that dominate
equilibria. Constrained maximization and team reasoning were introduced as
examples of non-classical theories.7 Even though they arrive at their con-
clusions for different reasons – team reasoning through group identification,
constrained maximization through individuals’ disposition to choose – they
share some of their conclusions. In particular, both imply that there are con-
ditions under which rational agents cooperate in PD games.
To conclude this section, I shall add a clarification regarding non-classical theo-
ries: these theories seek to rationalise non-equilibrium strategies while insisting
that the players’ utilities summarise everything that is motivationally relevant
for the players. For instance, suppose in the PD game in Figure 2.2, the payoff
numbers refer to dollar values instead of players’ utilities. In this game, the
players may be motivated by all sorts of considerations. For example, they
7These are not the only non-classical theories that have been proposed, but they may be
the ones most widely discussed in the literature. Another example of a non-classical theory
is hypothetical bargaining.
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might choose to cooperate because they sympathise with the opponent. If they
cooperate from sympathy, this would not falsify the classical analysis of the
PD, but would merely show that the PD game in which the payoffs are dollars
should not be analysed as a PD game in which the payoffs are utilities, because
doing so would leave out considerations – sympathy – that are motivationally
important to the players. Proponents of non-classical theories emphasise that
their theories cannot be reinterpreted as payoff transformations in games that
could then be analysed classically. In the case of team reasoning, an argument
to this effect is the following. Take the PD game in Figure 2.2 and suppose for
the sake of argument that the team consisting of players I and II prefers the
outcome (Cooperate, Cooperate) to (Defect, Defect) and it prefers (Defect,
Defect) to the asymmetric outcomes. So if they reason as a team, the players
will rationally cooperate. But if we simply substituted the team preferences
for the original, individual utilities, we would get an instance of the Hi-Lo
game, in which (Cooperate, Cooperate) corresponds to the Hi equilibrium,
(Defect, Defect) corresponds to the Lo equilibrium, and there is a third equi-
librium in mixed strategies. All three equilibria are rational to play, according
to the subset of classical theories that take all equilibrium strategies to be
rational. Therefore, the argument concludes, team reasoning cannot possibly
be accommodated by applying those classical solution concepts to games that
are the result of a payoff transformation – they must involve a deeper agency
transformation.8 To conclude, rather than accommodating factors, such as
sympathy, in players’ utilities and solving games classically, in many games
non-classical theories require of rational agents to act against their incentives.
8This argument is from Bacharach (2006), p. 173. For an equivalent line of argument that
takes Hi-Lo instead of PD as the initial game, see Karpus and Radzvilas (2018), p. 6 et seq.
The latter also mention that, while agency transformations go beyond payoff transformations,
they might involve payoff transformations. This possibility is not precluded by the above
argument. However, their article (and almost all the literature on team reasoning to date)
assumes that this does not happen, and we shall follow this assumption here.
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2.2 Incentive-Compatible Institutional Design
Institutions can develop ‘naturally’, but they can also be designed towards
specific social goals. In the latter case, a social planner defines the goals
that she wants the outcomes of some interactions to possess. A designer
then seeks to devise an institution that will govern these interactions in a
way that brings about the defined goals. Typically, the designer models the
interactions in question as games, using game theory to determine how the
interactions would result in different outcomes depending on different “rules of
the game”, or mechanisms, of which she chooses the one that best promotes the
defined social goals.9 Designers emphasise that mechanisms must be incentive-
compatible in order to reliably produce desirable outcomes. We shall consider
a simple example from Roger Myerson to introduce the concept of incentive-
compatible mechanism.
Following Myerson (2008), we consider the design of a mechanism when the
seller of a single, indivisible item faces one potential buyer. It is commonly
known that the seller values the item either at $0 or at $80, and that the
buyer values the item either at $100 or at $20. For simplicity, we assume that
traders simply seek to maximise their profits, that is, dollar values define their
utilities. So both the buyer and the seller profit from trade unless a type 80
seller (a “strong seller”) faces a type 20 buyer (a “strong buyer”). Whether
they are weak or strong is their private information, but it is commonly known
that each is of a strong or a weak type with an independent probability of 1/2.
We wish to come up with a mechanism that determines, depending on the
9The reader may note an ambiguity: “mechanism” can be used to refer to the institutional
rules themselves, or to refer to a formal model of those rules. This ambiguity is prevalent
in the mechanism design literature, as Guala (2005) notes (p. 163, footnote 4; also cf.
Guala (2001)). Moreover, this ambiguity extends to adjectives characterising mechanisms,
in particular, “incentive-compatible”. The ambiguity has no problematic implications for
my purposes; equivalently but more cumbersomely, we could have restricted the use of
“mechanism” to refer to the model of institutional rules, so that an institution would not be
governed by a mechanism, but by the rules that the mechanism is a model of. In the next
chapter, I discuss the use of models in institutional design in more depth.
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Figure 2.3: Split-the-Difference mechanism. From Myerson (2008).
traders’ valuations, whether trade should happen and if so, at what price.
Since the valuations are the traders’ private information, a mediator will ask
them for their valuations. Depending on the information provided, she will
announce whether the object will be sold and if so, at what price. What
could this mechanism look like? A natural idea is the “Split-the-Difference
mechanism”. It specifies that, whenever the buyer’s valuation is higher than
the seller’s, the item will be sold for a price that equals the difference between
their valuations. If both are strong, the item won’t be sold. The table in
Figure 2.3 shows this mechanism. Each cell corresponds to a combination of
the players’ types. The first number in a cell denotes the probability that the
item will be sold, and the second number the price in cases in which it is sold.
But will the players honestly report their types? This cannot be expected. For
example, if the seller is weak (i.e. values the item at $0), she would gain from
lying about her type: supposing the buyer reveals his type honestly, the seller’s
expected profit from revealing weakness is 1/2(10− 0) + 1/2(50− 0) = 30. If
she instead claims to be strong, her expected profit is 1/2(90−0) = 45. Thus,
it is not an equilibrium of Split-the-Difference that the traders honestly reveal
their types: the mechanism is incentive-incompatible.
Conversely, a mechanism that, unlike Split-the-Difference, does make it an
equilibrium for players to honestly report their types is called incentive-comp-
atible. Continuing the example, we can ask what constraints an incentive-
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Figure 2.4: Symmetric scheme with parameters q and y. From Myerson (2008).
compatible mechanism must satisfy. For simplicity, we make some assump-
tions, which are shown in the table in Figure 2.4. As before, it will be assumed
that if the seller and the buyer are both strong, the probability of trade is 0,
and if both are weak, the item will be sold for $50 with probability 1. If one
is weak and the other strong, then the trade will occur with a probability q
that does not depend on who is weak or strong. If the trade occurs, the profit
of a weak trader against a strong trader is some number y, which again is the
same no matter who is weak or strong, as can be seen in the lower-left and
the upper-right cell of the table. The buyer and the seller are thus treated
symmetrically. (The assumptions are only for simplicity. See Myerson (2008)
p. 595 for how they can be relaxed.)
With these assumptions in place, we can ask what constraints the parameters
q and y must satisfy in an incentive-compatible mechanism. First, note that
a strong buyer would agree to buy the item only for a price smaller than (or
equal to, suppose) $20. Similarly, a strong seller would sell the item only for
a price larger than or equal to $80. Therefore, the parameter y must satisfy
the participation constraint y ≤ 20.
For honesty to constitute an equilibrium, we must make it an optimal response
for any trader to honestly reveal her type if she expects the other trader to
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Figure 2.5: The 5/6-mechanism, which is incentive-compatible. From Myerson
(2008).
honestly reveal her type too. It can be verified in Figure 2.4 that a strong
seller or buyer would never gain by claiming to be weak. But, depending on
the parameters y and q, a weak seller or buyer might gain by claiming to
be strong. Consider the weak buyer. His expected payoff from honesty is
1/2(q)(y) + 1/2(50), and his expected payoff from lying is 1/2(q)(100 − y).
So for honesty to be an equilibrium, the parameters q and y must satisfy the
incentive constraint 1/2(q)(y) + 1/2(50) ≥ 1/2(q)(100 − y), which reduces to
q ≤ 25/(50− y). (It can easily be verified that this constraint is identical for
the seller.)
Thus, a mechanism that satisfies the participation constraint y ≤ 20 and the
incentive constraint q ≤ 25/(50−y) makes honest participation an equilibrium
and is therefore incentive-compatible. Setting y = 20 achieves the largest
feasible probability for the trade to happen, viz. q = 5/6. This mechanism,
call it the 5/6-mechanism, is shown in Figure 2.5. The expected profits (ex
ante, that is, before the types are revealed) for each trader in this mechanism
are [0 + 0 + (5/6)20 + (1)50]/4 = 16.67.
This concludes the example. It shows how incentive compatibility delimits
the amount of social welfare that is feasible: the 5/6-mechanism yields a pos-
itive probability that the item will not be traded when the traders are of
different types, even though this means that the item will not go to the in-
dividual who values it most. So ex post, after the traders reveal their types,
52 Chapter 2. Of Rats and Rationality
the mechanism produces allocative inefficiencies in cases in which the traders
are of different types but the trade does not occur. We saw that there is no
incentive-compatible mechanism with a lower probability of such allocative
inefficiency than the 5/6-mechanism.10 Thus, this mechanism determines the
boundary of feasible social welfare when agents are strategic.
The same point can also be made by comparing expected profits. There is
no incentive-compatible mechanism that would give both traders a higher ex-
pected profit than the $16.67 that the 5/6-mechanism yields: in technical
terms, this mechanism is ex ante incentive efficient. If it were possible to
rely on the players’ honesty and dispense with incentive compatibility, then
the Split-the-Difference mechanism would yield an expected profit of $17.5
for both players ([0 + 10 + 10 + 50]/4 = 17.5), thus improving upon the in-
centive efficient mechanism. However, institutional designers do not expect
rational and intelligent people who will interact through the mechanism to
reveal their private information honestly unless it is in their best interest to
do so. Therefore, they treat incentive compatibility as a general constraint on
the institutions that govern social interactions. Doing so delimits the social
welfare that institutions can achieve.11
It is important to note that, while we introduced the problem of incentive
compatibility with regard to agents revealing their private information, the
problem is a very general one facing social planners. Of every institution whose
outcomes depend on individuals revealing private information or performing
actions that the social planner cannot fully observe, it can be asked whether
it gives those individuals incentives to reveal their information and to perform
their hidden actions obediently. As an example of an incentive-incompatible
institution concerning hidden actions, remember the rats in Hanoi: a failure to
10In fact, a result from mechanism design, the “revelation principle”, implies that, if
the traders are strategic, there is no mechanism (incentive-compatible or not) in which the
probability of allocative inefficiency is lower than in the 5/6 mechanism.
11These limits to social welfare can be examined more generally: see Holmstro¨m and
Myerson (1983).
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provide incentives for the locals to perform the “right” actions, which the colo-
nial rulers could not observe (or which they did not want to observe, to avoid
descending to the sewer tunnels), caused the rat population to spread. Since
it is hard to think of an institution that does not rely on individuals’ private
information and in which all the individuals’ actions can be fully observed,
the problem of incentives is ubiquitous in institutional design.
2.3 Non-Classical Theories Conflict with the Con-
straint of Incentive Compatibility
Bringing together non-classical theories of rationality and incentive-compatible
institutional design, we arrive at a conflict: what institutional designers expect
individuals to do is inconsistent with what non-classical rationality requires
them to do, at least under certain conditions. In the example from the last
section, if the two traders reasoned as a team, or constrained their maximiza-
tion, they would commit to being honest about their types in the Split-the-
Difference mechanism and they could reap the benefits from this commitment,
receiving an expected payoff of $17.5. The constraint of incentive compatibil-
ity reduces the traders’ expected payoff to $16.7 at best. So if the institutional
designer’s goal is to maximise the traders’ expected payoff, she would only im-
plement an incentive-compatible mechanism if she does not expect the traders
to be honest when they can profit from lying in Split-the-Difference.
In general, when an institutional designer imposes incentive compatibility as
a constraint, she does not believe that the individuals interacting through the
institutions reason as a team, or constrain their maximization: for if she did,
she would expect that more social welfare could be achieved when dropping
the constraint. Thus, the following three claims form an inconsistent triad:
(i) institutions should be designed so as to maximise social welfare; (ii) they
should be designed incentive-compatible; and (iii) the individuals interacting
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through the designed institutions are non-classically rational. It is easy to see
that any two of the claims imply the negation of the remaining claim. Assert-
ing that institutions should be designed so as to maximise social welfare and
requiring incentive compatibility (that is, asserting (i) and (ii)) implies that in-
dividuals interacting through these institutions are not non-classically rational
(that is, denying (iii)). Likewise, stating that institutional design should max-
imise social welfare and that individuals are non-classically rational ((i) and
(iii)) implies that they should not be designed incentive-compatible (not (ii)).
And finally, stating that institutions should be designed incentive-compatible
and that individuals are non-classically rational ((ii) and (iii)) implies that
institutions should not be designed so as to maximise social welfare (not (i)).
In order to avoid inconsistency, non-classical theories must reject one of (i),
(ii) and (iii). But rejecting (i), that institutions should be designed so as
to maximise social welfare, should be excluded as an ethically unreasonable
position. Thus, these theories are left with two options: they could reject
that institutions should be designed incentive-compatible (reject (ii)), or that
individuals interacting through the designed institutions are non-classically
rational (reject (iii)). There are two ways in which (iii) could be rejected
because one could negate either the “rational”-part, or the “non-classical”-
part of the claim. That is, a proponent of a non-classical theory of rationality
could state that the individuals interacting through the designed institutions
are irrational, where the meaning of “rational” is fixed by her non-classical
theory. Or she could state that these individuals are rational, but not in any
non-classical meaning of the word. So in the latter case, proponents of non-
classical theories would concede that their own theories do not apply when it
comes to individuals interacting through institutions.
In summary, in order to avoid inconsistency and assuming that we should
design institutions to maximise social welfare, non-classical theorists must
make one of the following claims:
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(1.) Incentive compatibility is not required as a constraint on institutional
design;
(2.) the individuals interacting in the designed institutions are irrational; or
(3.) non-classical theories of rationality do not apply to institutional design.
I shall next consider these options in turn.
2.3.1 Away with Incentive Compatibility?
Since Leonid Hurwicz coined the term “incentive compatibility” and gave it a
rigorous treatment using game theory (cf. Hurwicz (1972)),12 it has become
an almost universally acknowledged constraint on institutional design, and
the prospects of relinquishing it appear dim to most. However, some critics of
classical rationality more or less explicitly dissent from the view that incentive
compatibility is required as a constraint on institutional design. For instance,
Amartya Sen criticises
“...the assumption that when asked a question, the individual gives
that answer which will maximize his personal gain. How good is
this assumption? I doubt that in general it is very good...What is
at issue is not whether people invariably give an honest answer to
every question, but whether they always give a gains-maximizing
answer, or at any rate, whether they give gains-maximizing answers
often enough to make that the appropriate general assumption for
economic theory.” Sen (1977), p. 331-2
12Ancestors of the concept of incentive compatibility date back at least to David Hume,
who famously wrote: “In contriving any system of government and fixing several checks
and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave and to have no
other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this interest, we must govern him,
and by means of it, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, cooperate to the
public good” (Hume (1742)). Thus, according to Hume, institutional designers must direct
self-interested actions to the public good. Moreover, Adam Smith’s praise of the market
mechanism, which presumably achieves socially desirable outcomes through agents’ pursuit
of their self-interest, is consistent with incentive compatibility too (Smith (1776)).
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Sen is concerned with the provision of public goods in this passage, where
everyone should pay a price proportional to how much they value the good
in question. The conventional logic of incentive compatibility implies that
people must be given incentives to reveal their true valuations, otherwise they
would pretend to have low valuations in order to pay less. But Sen believes
that people sometimes “commit” to being truthful, which would render in-
centive compatibilty moot. Similarly, Gauthier not only proposes constrained
maximization as a theory of rationality; he also asserts that people do of-
ten constrain their maximisation. As we have seen, incentive compatibility
sacrifices social welfare compared to some incentive-incompatible mechanisms
where everyone acts obediently. So in order to maximise social welfare, a so-
cial planner should not impose incentive compatibility as a general constraint
on institutional design, according to this view.13 14
There are at least two problems with this view. The first is empirical evi-
13I take the following quote as evidence for this interpretation of Gauthier, although it is
not entirely clear whether he has in mind incentive compatibility.
“We pay a heavy price, if we are indeed creatures who rationally accept no
internal constraint on the pursuit of our own utility ... Could we but voluntarily
comply with our rationally undertaken agreements, we should save ourselves
this price.
We do not suppose that voluntary compliance would eliminate the need for so-
cial institutions and practices, and their costs. But it would eliminate the need
for some of those institutions whose concern is with enforcement. Authorita-
tive decision-making cannot be eliminated, but our ideal would be a society in
which the coercive enforcement of such decisions would be unnecessary. More
realistically, we suppose that such enforcement is needed to create and maintain
those conditions under which individuals may rationally expect the degree of
compliance from their fellows needed to elicit their own voluntary compliance.
Internal, moral constraints operate to ensure compliance under conditions of
security established by external, political constraints.” Gauthier (1987), p.
164-65.
14Perhaps Luigino Bruni and Sugden (2013) can also be interpreted in line with Sen and
Gauthier. They criticise the standard view of why markets bring about mutual benefits
to buyers and sellers under ideal conditions. Following Adam Smith, these benefits are
typically interpreted as the unintended consequence of the pursuit of the traders’ individual
self-interest (Smith (1776)). Against this tradition, Bruni and Sugden argue that virtuous
traders intend this mutual benefit, instead of their own benefit only. In our example, if
the buyer and seller intended mutual benefit, this might motivate them to be honest about
their types in Split-the-Difference, thus suggesting that incentive compatibility should not
be required.
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dence. Whether we retain or let go of incentive compatibility should depend
on whether incentive-compatible institutions can achieve more social welfare
than some class of incentive-incompatible institutions can achieve. In princi-
ple, this can be resolved empirically, by comparing the extent to which people’s
behaviour approaches classical (or non-classical) rationality when they interact
through institutions. McFadden (2009) surveys some applications of mecha-
nism design and shows that individual behaviour meets the expectations of
classical rationality when incentives are large, even in complex choice settings.
In contrast, when incentives are small and ambiguous, the individual devia-
tions from these expectations grow, which McFadden attributes to individuals’
putting less effort into determining best replies, and being more distracted by
irrelevant factors. These findings suggest that incentive compatibility is cru-
cial, especially when much is at stake for the individuals who interact through
the institution in question, whereas there might be some room for relaxing
this constraint in some smaller-stake contexts.
It is unlikely that McFadden’s study alone could convince proponents of non-
classical theories who believe that incentive compatibility is not required as a
constraint on institutions. But there is a second problem for their view, which
concerns the burden of proof. As we have seen, incentive compatibility de-
limits feasible social welfare. But incentive-incompatible institutions produce
adverse incentives that may diminish welfare much more. Remember the rats
in Hanoi.15 Arguably, because of the potentially large welfare losses that are
at stake, a social planner should require incentive compatibility as a default
constraint on institutional design unless there is very good evidence that we
can let go of it in particular institutional arrangements. So the burden of proof
lies on the likes of Gauthier and Sen who believe that we should let go of it.
15This point can be made more precise in the example from the last section. We saw that
the incentive-compatible, 5/6-mechanism yields both players an expected profit of $16.67.
This is the maximum feasible social welfare when the traders are strategic. In contrast, when
players are strategic in the incentive-incompatible, Split-the-Difference mechanism, there is
a symmetric equilibrium in which both traders falsely report strong types when they are
weak with a probability of 3/5. The expected payoff in this equilibrium is only $10 for both
traders.
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The latter point reinforces the weight of the empirical study above. The study
provides evidence, at the very least, that proponents of non-classical theories
will have a hard time to live up to their burden of proof. In combination,
these two arguments go some way towards urging that option (1.), that is,
doing away with incentive compatibility, should be resisted. It seems to be
a case of utopian thinking that we could let go of incentive compatibility,
with potentially catastrophic consequences in high-stake situations. In Ken
Binmore’s words, “[i]n rejecting the second-best outcome in favor of an illusory
first-best outcome, you condemn yourself to a third-best or worse outcome”
(Binmore (2007), p. 31).
2.3.2 Institutions for the Irrational?
A non-classical theorist could reason as follows: “Individuals interacting through
institutions should not be expected to team-reason, or to constrain their max-
imization. Instead, these individuals can be expected to follow best-reply
reasoning, which justifies retaining incentive compatibility as a constraint on
institutions. Because the individuals cannot reap the fruits of cooperation,
they are irrational.” This is option (2.) for harmonising non-classical ratio-
nality with the constraint of incentive compatibility.
However, assuming people’s irrationality is unpopular, and our imagined non-
classical theorist is likely to be a fiction. There is a broad consensus that
we ought to treat people as rational and that the design of our institutions
and other policies should reflect this. A failure to do so is seen as a lack of
respect towards fellow citizens. For instance, nudging, which seeks to manip-
ulate people’s decisions by altering the presentation of their available options,
is sometimes criticised because it allegedly fails to treat people as rational,
deliberative agents (for a discussion, see Bovens (2009), p. 209 et seq.). What
is more, many proponents of non-classical theories explicitly defend the view
that human beings can, and often do, meet their rationality standards. For
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instance, Gauthier (1987) endorses the “conception of human beings as ratio-
nal (or potentially rational) individual actors” (p. 93). In fact, qualms with
the classical assumption that rational individuals cannot achieve optimal out-
comes in certain, e.g. PD-like situations, are the very reason for proposing
non-classical theories in the first place. Non-classical theorists demand that
stringent rationality requirements be applied, and it would be an odd view to
demand this while holding that people cannot in fact meet these requirements.
Thus far, the option of assuming people’s irrationality looks rather dismal.
But perhaps this is premature. I have until now talked as if non-classical the-
orists presume that agents are irrational whenever they do not constrain their
maximization, or do not reason as a team. But at least for some versions of
non-classical theories, the assumption would suffice that only some, not all,
agents are irrational, in order to justify the constraint of incentive compatibil-
ity. For example, remember that a constrained maximizer will rationally defect
in PD games when a sufficiently large fraction of the agents with whom she
interacts are defectors, and depending on the level of translucency. Similarly,
if a fraction of agents renege on their commitment to reveal information hon-
estly or to act obediently in an incentive-incompatible institution, it might be
rational for the others to do the same, according to constrained maximization.
For some varieties of team reasoning, similar arguments could be constructed.
For instance, according to Sugden (2015), in order to team reason, a player
requires assurance that the other player(s) will play as team members as well
– which is perhaps not the case if other players are irrational. Anticipating
that non-classically rational people would defect in an incentive-incompatible
institution in the presence of non-classically irrational people, proponents of
these theories could argue that the institution better be designed incentive-
compatible.
This line of argument nevertheless commits proponents of non-classical theo-
ries to the assumption that some people are irrational, which may be deemed
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undesirable. Alternatively, non-classical theorists could retain incentive com-
patibility for a similar reason for which drivers wear seatbelts: we don’t expect
the accident to happen, but why take a chance? Similarly, imposing incentive
compatibility would be the consequence of a kind of precautionary reasoning:
“There might be a fraction of irrational people who won’t cooperate. In the
face of this uncertainty, better take preventive action and impose incentive
compatibility as a constraint on institutional design, because failing to do so
entails the risk of bringing about a socially undesirable outcome.”
Perhaps some proponents of non-classical theories will consider the latter strat-
egy for justifying incentive compatibility to be a desirable option. Others may
reject it on the basis that assuming people are potentially irrational still in-
volves an undue paternalistic attitude towards them. We need not take up a
stance on this matter. We simply note that there is an asymmetry between
classical theories of rationality and non-classical theories when combined with
this strategy: while for the former, incentive compatibility is imposed because
of the assumption that people are rational, for the latter, incentive compat-
ibility is imposed because people are potentially irrational and despite the
expectation that they are rational. For anyone committed to the assumption
that people should be treated as rational, this constitutes an important dis-
advantage of non-classical theories when combined with this strategy relative
to classical theories.
2.3.3 Non-Classical Theories do not Apply to Institutional De-
sign
If a proponent of a non-classical theory is reluctant to give up incentive com-
patibility as a constraint on institutional design and to presume that insti-
tutions are designed for (potentially) irrational people, this seems to be a
self-defeating position, at least at first glance: he wants incentive compati-
bility and he wants to treat people as rational, but his rationality standards
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don’t allow for both. His remaining option is therefore to concede that rational
individuals do not constrain their maximization and do not reason as a team
when they interact through institutions. In other words, he would concur that
his own rationality standards do not apply to institutional design. Plausibly,
he would instead assert that the standards of classical rationality apply. He
would seem to overthrow his rationality standards and become a proponent of
a classical theory.
A more positive interpretation would be to allow the possibility of a contextual
account of rationality. One could endorse a classical notion of rationality when
it comes to agents interacting through institutions. One could at the same
time welcome the possibility that there might be conditions under which non-
classical theories do apply. But this strategy immediately raises a further
question: what are these conditions, and in which contexts are they satisfied?
Without an answer to this question, a contextual theory of rationality remains
indeterminate.
Some theorists have provided conditions under which individuals are suppos-
edly prone to act in accordance with the predictions of non-classical rational-
ity. Plausibly, these theorists would also maintain that, when an interaction
satisfies these conditions, then this interaction should be governed by non-
classical rationality. The conditions they provide appeal either to structural
features of games, or to features outside the game-theoretical description of an
interaction. For instance, consider Bacharach’s account, which includes both
kinds of conditions. Concerning the structural features, he suggested that
“strongly interdependent” games increase the likelihood of individuals iden-
tifying as a team. Strongly interdependent games are games with strategy
profiles (which are not necessarily equilibria) that strictly Pareto-dominate
some pure equilibria (Bacharach (2006), p. 84 et seqq.). Concerning external
features, Bacharach took findings from social psychology to show that belong-
ing to the same social group, face-to-face contact, and other factors can trigger
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team reasoning (ibid., p. 76 et seqq.).
However, Bacharach’s conditions fail to pick out only those contexts that could
possibly be governed by non-classical rationality because they do not exclude
institutional contexts, which are governed by classical rationality, according to
the contextual account of rationality that we are interested in here. Concerning
his structural feature, many games that are induced by incentive-incompatible
mechanisms have strategy profiles that dominate some equilibria and thus they
constitute strongly interdependent games. Split-the-Difference is an example
of such a mechanism. If some of these mechanisms are institutions, the crite-
rion of strong interdependence does not serve to pick out the conditions under
which individuals should be expected to team-reason.16 Below, I will argue
more generally that structural features of games are inapt for excluding insti-
tutional contexts, because structural features do not go a long way towards
defining institutions.
If this analysis is correct, proponents of a contextual account of rationality are
left with external features. As with structural features, many of the proposed
external features – including belonging to the same social group or having
face-to-face contact – could well be satisfied when individuals interact through
institutions. In general, any attempt to provide conditions for the applicabil-
ity of non-classical rationality will face this difficulty: the problem is not only
to find conditions under which non-classical theories should presumably ap-
ply, but which are not met whenever agents interact through institutions. A
possible response to this problem is to exclude institutions by fiat from the
proposed conditions. For instance, instead of claiming that non-classical ra-
tionality should apply in face-to-face interactions, it could be claimed that it
16Some accounts of institutions exclude incentive-incompatible mechanisms as possible
candidates for institutions. I will argue in the next section that this is a mistake, but
even if incentive-incompatible mechanisms could not be institutions, Bacharach’s criterion
won’t do. The reason is that incentive compatibility is required as a constraint because
individuals should not be expected to reason as a team in incentive-incompatible mecha-
nisms, strongly interdependent or not. But if strong interdependence were to trigger team
reasoning, incentive compatibility would not generally be required, because strongly inter-
dependent, incentive-incompatible mechanisms could be trusted to maximise welfare.
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should apply in such interactions in contexts other than institutions. How-
ever, this would merely shift the question one step back, as it would require
an answer to the question what are the special features of institutions that
delimit the possible scope of non-classical theories in this way.
Furthermore, using external features in order to single out those contexts in
which non-classical theories of rationality in games should presumably apply
is problematic in its own right. It is typically difficult to confirm that these
features could trigger team reasoning, or other non-classical reasoning. For
instance, if cooperative outcomes become more likely in inter-social-group in-
teractions, this might be because players sympathise more with each other, not
because they reason as a team. But sympathy is a motivationally relevant fac-
tor that affects individuals’ utilities, and is as such orthogonal to non-classical
rationality.
In summary, if proponents of non-classical theories choose option (3.), viz.
concede that their rationality standards do not apply to people’s interactions
through institutions, prima facie this looks like bad news for their theories.
In response, they can advance a contextual notion of rationality and insist
that non-classical rationality standards apply in some contexts in which in-
dividuals do not interact through institutions. But they are then asked to
come up with conditions under which non-classical theories presumably ap-
ply. Some proposals have been made that might be interpreted as providing
such conditions, but these proposals fail to pick out conditions that could not
be satisfied when agents interact through institutions. Thus, it appears fair
to conclude that no convincing account has been proposed to render option
(3.). Moreover, providing conditions that could not be satisfied when agents
interact through institutions seems to pose a general difficulty.
This is not a principled argument against the viability of this option; it merely
shows that it is difficult to see how a convincing account could be given.
Because this option implies that institutions delimit the possible scope of non-
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classical theories, I shall next make a few clarifying remarks on the concept of
institution, which we have treated as primitive until now.
2.4 Some Remarks on the Concept of Institution
“Institution”, in its everyday usage, is a somewhat enigmatic term that can re-
fer to such diverse things as a society’s morality, economic systems, free trade
agreements, the Roman Catholic Church, or Liverpool FC. I do not intend to
give an account that uncovers the fundamental structure that all institutions
have in common – if there is such a thing. Nevertheless, my remarks may
have implications for attempts to provide accounts of institutions, which are
supposed to do just that. An institution, as I have used the term here, is an
entity that governs some specified interactions through the use of an institu-
tional rule, or mechanism. A mechanism specifies how the outcomes of an
interaction depend on possible combinations of individuals’ actions. For in-
stance, remember the Split-the-Difference mechanism, depicted in Figure 2.3.
It specifies how the probabilities and prices at which the trade happens (the
outcomes) depend on the information that the two traders reveal (their ac-
tions). Imagine a market that facilitates one-shot interactions between single
buyers and sellers of single items through Split-the-Difference. If this market
existed, it could be seen as a simple institution.
It is important to note that there is typically more to an institution than
a mechanism. For instance, our imagined institution may have a material
basis, such as a marketplace where the traders state their valuations, and
enforcement devices to ensure that the trade effectively happens through Split-
the-Difference, and not some other mechanism (e.g. “Wild-West”, in which the
strongest “trader” simply takes the item). However, the theoretical literature
on institutions often neglects their material bases,17 and I will temporarily do
17Cf. Rabinowicz (2018), who criticises this neglect.
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this too, in order to connect to this literature.
The conception of institutions as mechanisms might be seen as akin to a
tradition that interprets institutions as rules. But rules, in the latter sense,
are interpreted simply as players’ actions or strategies, because they can be
formulated as prescriptions of the form, “choose X”, or “do Y” (see Hindriks
and Guala (2015a), p. 463, or Guala (2016), p. xxiv et seq.). Under this
interpretation, a rule is not a mechanism, but a subset of a mechanism (which,
to repeat, specifies all the actions available to the players, as well as what
outcomes the possible combinations of actions result in). Guala and Hindriks
criticise the rules-account because it fails to explain why successful institutions
manage to influence behaviour in desirable and predictable ways. For instance,
some rules are de facto ineffective, not followed by anyone: “[t]raffic lights in
Milan are regulation, in Rome they are a suggestion, and in Naples they are
just decoration” (Guala (2018a), p. 541). This is the case even though the
formal traffic rules (e.g. “stop at a red light”) are identical in the three cities.
Guala and Hindriks emphasise that effective rules are those that agents have
incentives to follow. Therefore, they combine the institutions-as-rules account
with a second tradition, which interprets institutions as equilibria. In the
Guala-Hindriks account, institutions are rules-in-equilibrium: they prescribe
the individuals’ actions, just like in the rules account, but at the same time
they require that these actions constitute an equilibrium. Since in equilibrium,
no one would be better off by unilaterally deviating from playing her part,
agents are motivated to follow these rules, which explains why the institution
“works”.18
18This is a simplified statement of Guala’s and Hindriks’s account; see Hindriks and Guala
(2015a) and Guala (2016) for more details. In particular, they maintain that institutions
solve coordination games with multiple equilibria by providing correlation devices: they
view institutions as correlated equilibria, instead of Nash equilibria. For present purposes,
the coordination aspect that many institutions undoubtedly involve can be ignored. As to
correlated equilibria, it has been argued that Nash equilibria are more suitable to account for
institutions (cf. Binmore (2015) and Rabinowicz (2018)). In response, Hindriks and Guala
(2015b) agree that “the unified theory could be expressed in terms of Nash equilibria” (p.
516). So correlated equilibrium appears to play a less important role in their theory than
they initially asserted.
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I would like to raise two issues about this account. The first is a sugges-
tion, namely that mechanisms should form an essential part of an institution
in the rules-in-equilibrium account. In an equilibrium, players choose opti-
mally given their (correct) expectations about the other players’ behaviour.
But expectations, as well as optimal responses to them, essentially depend
on the mechanism in effect. This is why social planners design mechanisms,
not only rules: they do not simply tell individuals what to do, but they seek
to determine the consequences of their actions, including consequences of de-
viations from the intended actions. Reference to mechanisms, instead of to
rules alone, would therefore increase the explanatory power of the rules-in-
equilibrium account, because mechanisms provide information about why a
rule is, or is not, in equilibrium. For example, consider again our example of
the sale of the item. The relevant rule in this example is, “be honest about
your type”. According to the rules-in-equilibrium account, this rule could only
form an institution if it is in equilibrium. But whether it is depends on the
mechanism used: the 5/6-mechanism implements this rule in equilibrium while
Split-the-Difference does not. Thus, explaining why a rule could constitute an
institution in the sense of the rules-in-equilibrium account requires reference
to the mechanism, which this account omits. Or consider that, according to
the rules-in-equilibrium account, traffic lights are an institution in Milan, but
not in Naples. This is because different equilibria are in effect in the two cities,
of which only one coincides with the relevant rule, “stop at red”. That differ-
ent equilibria prevail can be due to either of two things: either the identical
mechanism is effective in the two places but a different equilibrium selection
took place, or the difference is due to different mechanisms effective in the
two cities, despite the identity of the rule (for instance, disobeying the rule
might lead to different consequences in Milan, e.g. a higher probability of a
fine, than it does in Naples). In either case, an explanation of the difference
that simply maintains that different equilibria are in effect remains sketchy; a
complete explanation requires reference to a mechanism.
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The second issue concerns the argument for the rules-in-equilibrium account
that stating a rule is not sufficient for an institution because a rule that does
not make the actions that it prescribes an equilibrium is ineffective. This ar-
gument only repeats that, in order to entice individuals to perform certain
actions, institutions must be incentive-compatible, that is, these actions must
form an equilibrium of the mechanism that governs the institution. Thus, insti-
tutions in the Guala-Hindriks sense can be thought of as incentive-compatible
institutions in the sense of mechanism design (approximately that is, for see
the preceding footnote). Which definition is preferable? This is mainly a mat-
ter of convention, but I would like to point out two apparent problems for the
rules-in-equilibrium account. Both stem from the fact that this account treats
institutions as incentive-compatible by default. First, the rules-in-equilibrium
account cannot accommodate a kind of institutional failure, namely, that many
institutions fail because they produce adverse incentives. This implies that
they were institutions in the first place. But according to the Guala-Hindriks
account, incentive-incompatible institutions are not badly designed institu-
tion, which may fail for this reason, but they are not institutions at all.19 This
sits uneasily with the standard use of the word “institution”, which allows for
the possibility of this kind of institutional failure. For instance, the failure
of socialist economies has been attributed to the incompatible incentives that
those economies provide their citizens with (Myerson (2009)). But surely, eco-
nomic systems are prime examples of institutions in the standard meaning of
the term. Denying them the status of institution seems problematic, unless
there is good reason to do so.
It would be of no help to reply that socialist economies can be excluded as
19At some points, Guala could be interpreted differently. For example, he writes that
“an effective institution is an equilibrium state where all the relevant individuals have an
incentive not to deviate from a certain pattern” (Guala (2016), p. 18; also cf. Guala (2018a),
p. 541). This passage could be interpreted as saying that, when not all relevant individuals
have an incentive not to deviate from the pattern in question, we don’t have an effective
institution (as opposed to no institution at all). However, this interpretation is inconsistent
with his definition that institutions (simpliciter) are rules-in-equilibrium, which implies that
out-of-equilibrium states are not institutions.
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important institutional arrangements as most socialist economies have van-
ished. This is because, if Myerson’s analysis is correct, capitalism is incentive-
incompatible too.20 This points at the second possible problem for the rules-
in-equilibrium account: the account risks disregarding the fact that incentive-
compatible institutions are in most interesting problems difficult to come by.
The simple, two-trader example might convey a taste of this difficulty. Re-
laxing some of its unrealistic assumptions – e.g. that each trader is of one of
two types with an independent probability that is commonly known – quickly
makes the problem intractable. The search for incentive-compatible insti-
tutions is a research programme that has led to important, general charac-
terisations of the social goals that can be implemented, and what form the
mechanisms that implement them take (Maskin (1999)). But an account of
institutions that assumes their incentive compatibility by default runs the risk
of trivialising the search for incentive-compatible institutions.
However, this does not mean that defining institutions as mechanisms (in-
centive-compatible or not) would fare better. Instead of excluding important
institutions, this would be far too permissive. Not all mechanisms are institu-
tions because any interaction is subject to a mechanism, but not every inter-
action is an institution. So what are institutions, after all? I have suggested
that they are entities that govern specified interactions through the use of
mechanisms, and mechanisms can be used to make some important character-
isations. In particular, institutions that use incentive-compatible mechanisms
are likely to be successful in implementing the social goal in question, while
those that use incentive-incompatible mechanisms are unlikely to implement
the social goal and are prone to fail. But, as mentioned at the beginning of this
discussion, there is more to an institution than its mechanism, for instance,
its material basis. Not much more of interest can be said about the concept
20Myerson (2009) gives simple models to show that the choice between capitalism and
socialism is subject to trade-offs between the two kinds of incentive problems: while social-
ism is better than capitalism in incentivising citizens to reveal their private information,
capitalism has an advantage when it comes to motivating hidden actions.
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of institution at this level of abstraction.
This discussion has important implications for non-classical theories of ra-
tionality. Remember that some non-classical theorists may wish to hold a
contextual notion of rationality (that is, they advocate option (3.) of the pre-
vious section). Such a non-classical theorist will need to delimit the scope of
her theory by excluding institutional contexts. Remember also that she could
make use of two kinds of features to delineate the possible scope of her theory:
structural features of games, or features that lie outside the game-theoretical
description of an interaction. The two kinds of features recurred in our dis-
cussion about the concept of institution: some attempts have been made to
define institutions through structural features alone, using concepts from game
theory, but institutions also possess features, such as a material basis, which
are external to their game-theoretical description. If my analysis is correct,
structural features do not go a long way towards defining institutions. In order
to exclude institutional contexts, it seems that our non-classical theorist must
then make use of external features. But, as I argued above, external features
are problematic in their own right.
2.5 Conclusion
The colonial rulers’ mistake in the “Great Hanoi Rat Massacre” was to ignore
the fact that their bounty system did not provide the locals with incentives to
combat the rats. We know the end of the story. The failure of the system is
an illustration of the importance of incentive compatibility as a constraint on
the institutions through which we interact.
Non-classical theories of rationality in games are at odds with incentive com-
patibility. Therefore, proponents of these theories face three options. They
could let go of incentive compatibility, but they would thereby make the same
mistake as the colonial rulers. Or they could blame citizens for their purported
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irrationality, but this option looks rather unappealing from the perspective of
non-classical theories. Or they could decide not to blame the citizens but their
own rationality standards. They may argue that these standards apply under
conditions that are not satisfied when agents interact through institutions.
The latter strategy would then direct attention to the very concept of insti-
tution, because institutions would delimit the possible scope of non-classical
theories. Since game theory does not go a long way towards delineating the
concept of institution, theorists opting for this option need to search for condi-
tions under which non-classical rationality allegedly applies outside the game-
theoretical description of a choice situation. It is difficult to see how this could
be done.
Institutional design constitutes a challenge for non-classical theories of ra-
tionality to which proponents of those theories haven’t given a convincing
response. In the meantime, the institutions through which we interact must
be designed. In doing so, the working hypothesis should be that individuals
are rational, in the classical meaning of the word.
Chapter 3
A General Epistemology of
Economic Engineering
Economists are increasingly engaged as “engineers”: instead of taking market
outcomes as mere phenomena to be explained or predicted, they also seek to
bring about desirable outcomes by creating or changing markets. While the
recognition of this field in economics is growing – for instance with the award
of recent Nobel Memorial Prizes1 – its precise epistemology is less clear. Most
philosophers of economics have examined the use of models and other tools in
the service of explanations or predictions, and not in how interventions change
market outcomes.
The few philosophers of science who have discussed market design – most
notably, Anna Alexandrova and Francesco Guala – have noted a complex
dependence of this practice on different sources of evidence, in particular ex-
perimental methods and game-theoretic models. However, they have only
examined a case from spectrum auction design. In this chapter, I introduce a
1For example, in 2007, the award went to Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin und Roger My-
erson “for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory” (The Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences (2007)), and in 2012, to Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley “for the theory
of stable allocations and the practice of market design” (The Royal Swedish Academy of
Sciences (2012)).
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novel case study: the matching market that allows medical graduates in the
US to find training positions in public hospitals. In the 1990s, game theorists
were significantly involved in the redesign of this market, which was commis-
sioned as a response to market failure. The result was one of the great success
stories of market design, and a key motivation behind the 2012 Nobel Prize
to Lloyd Shapley and Alvin Roth, which is worth discussing in some detail.
My case study corrects some of the claims that have been made about the
epistemology of economic engineering. In particular, Alexandrova is critical
of the role of analytical models, because in the design of spectrum auctions,
models were not decisive for some of the most important design questions.
Instead, experiments were crucial for informing the final design. She contrasts
descriptions of the design process by theoretical and experimental economists,
and argues that theorists oversell the contribution of their models. But this
picture of theorists and experimentalists as competing for the importance of
their contributions does not accurately represent other instances of economic
engineering. In the case of the matching market for medical graduates, the
theoretical and experimental economists involved do not appear to be com-
petitors; in fact, they were largely the same persons.
I put forward an account of the process by which engineering knowledge is gen-
erated, which is consistent with both cases from auction design and matching.
According to this account, models, e.g. from game theory, allow defining
properties that may correspond to policy goals. Moreover, the theory encodes
counterfactual information in its models, which can be used to track how inter-
ventions within a model change its outcomes. I use directed graphs, which may
acquire a causal interpretation, to illustrate how these model-interventions
suggest interventions in the target institutions to implement the policy goals.
But models famously make false assumptions and isolate mechanisms which
are in the real world interfered with by other, distorting mechanisms, thus pre-
cluding a causal interpretation. The complementary application of laboratory,
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natural and computational experiments, but also tinkering with the models,
allows for inferences about real-world institutions.
Thus, models and empirical methods are complementary tools in the search
for desirable institutions. Typically we cannot say what combination of these
tools – models, experiments, etc. – is efficient for economic engineering. This
urges some scepticism with respect to the so-called “efficiency question in
economics”: a recent call in the philosophy of science for evaluating whether
models are efficient means to achieve economists’ goals, relative to other tools.
My discussion shows that in economic engineering, this may be the wrong
question to ask.
This chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, I present some of the
conclusions that philosophers of science have drawn from the design of spec-
trum auctions about how knowledge is generated in market design. Section
3.2 describes the redesign of the matching market for medical graduates. In
section 3.3, it is argued that this case proves inconsistent with parts of the
claims that are motivated by the spectrum auctions, and calls for a general
account of the epistemology of economic engineering. I endeavor to provide
such an account in section 3.4, in which directed graphs are used to describe
how models, complemented by experiments and other tools, allow project-
ing institutions. Section 3.5 concludes with some remarks on the efficiency
question.
3.1 Philosophers of Science on Spectrum Auctions
In the most general terms, economic engineers seek to bring about desirable
outcomes through suitable institutional design. I shall focus here on market
design, in which the institutions are markets and the outcomes are market
outcomes. What properties should be considered to be desirable in a given case
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involves ethical questions, which will be disregarded here.2 I shall assume that
exogenous policy goals determine what properties outcomes should possess.
Typically, market designers seek to exploit agents’ conscious, strategic pursuit
of their individual goals in order to implement those properties, which explains
why models from (non-cooperative) game theory, or rational choice models
more generally, are usually thought to play an important role.
Philosophers of science have to date primarily studied the design of auctions
for allocating spectrum licenses to telecommunication service providers in the
US. Spectrum refers to a range of electromagnetic frequencies, which are used
to transmit video, sound and data. In the US, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) organises the allocation of the licenses. In the 1990s,
the FCC decided to replace an inefficient lottery system with auctions. The
auctions aimed to achieve specific policy goals, in particular efficiency, that
is, to allocate the licenses to the providers that value them most. What kind
of auctions would best promote these goals was a complex design question,
which was subject to much controversy among the stakeholders before the
first auction was conducted in 1994, and the FCC as well as potential bidders
consulted economists about crucial design decisions.3
The resulting auctions are generally seen as a big success, efficiently allocating
the licenses and raising many billions of dollars of revenue for American tax-
payers. Moreover, it was supposedly economic theorists, in particular game
theorists, who designed them, so they were presented in media and, little sur-
prisingly, by the theorists themselves, as a success story of game theory. For
example, R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, two theorist-consultants,4
2See Li (2017a) for a general treatment of ethics and market design. We shall discuss two
cases of market design that are particularly ethically loaded in depth in the second part of
this thesis: a matching market for asylum, and kidney exchange.
3For detailed accounts of the history of the market, see the references to Alexandrova and
Guala below.
4By the time, both were professors of economics, McAfee at the University of Texas,
Austin, and McMillan at the University of California, San Diego. McAfee was involved
in the design of the auctions working for the wireless telephone service provider AirTouch
Communications, and McMillan for the FCC.
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wrote: “Fortune said it was the ‘most dramatic example of game theory’s new
power...It was a triumph, not only for the FCC and the taxpayers, but also for
game theory (and game theorists)’ ” (McAfee and McMillan (1996), p. 159;
in the quote, they refer to Fortune magazine, February 6, 1995, p. 3).
Philosophers of science have challenged this received view. Starting with Guala
(2001), they showed that it is not game theory alone that should be credited
with the successful design, and they have instead emphasised the importance
of laboratory experiments (also cf. Alexandrova (2006, 2008); Alexandrova
and Northcott (2009); Guala (2005, 2006, 2007)). They typically note that no
theorem from auction theory (a subfield of game theory) was directly applica-
ble to the design of the auctions. The main problem was that bidders value
licenses more depending on whether they also get complementary licenses.
For example, this could be licenses in a neighbouring state for a bidder who
wishes to extend coverage. But different bidders may prefer different bundles
of licenses, which is why the FCC could not simply define all the bundles of
complementary licenses. Most of the bundles had to be determined through
the participants’ bidding instead. However, there were no analytical solutions
as to what kind of auctions could achieve efficient allocations of goods that
include complementarities.
Complementarities were but one complication that analytical models alone
could not resolve. Another one was the ‘winner’s curse’: a phenomenon to be
prevented, in which the bidder who most overestimates the value of a good
wins the auction and thereby makes a loss. There was some evidence, both
theoretical and experimental, that open instead of sealed-bid auctions could
help reduce the risk of the winner’s curse (because bidders can learn about the
true valuation by observing other bidders). However, whether this would turn
out to be true in the presence of complementarities, and further complications
of the market, was not clear. The problem was to find out whether and how
these features would interact – and again, models from auction theory were
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silent on the matter.
It required experimentalists to cope with these complications. Most promi-
nently, Caltech economist Charles Plott was involved in the auctions consult-
ing for the telecom provider Pacific Bell. Together with his team, Plott created
experimental testbeds, controlled laboratory environments of auctions in which
some features, such as complementarities, can be controlled for. Importantly,
testbeds are not intended to isolate single causal mechanisms – unlike models,
according to prominent accounts such as Nancy Cartwright’s, (e.g. Cartwright
(2009)), or Uskali Ma¨ki’s (e.g. Ma¨ki (2009, 2011)). Rather, they test mate-
rial environments holistically, in which possible interactions between different
causal mechanisms are in effect. It was numerous such environments in the
lab that were finally decisive in favouring a simultaneous, multiple round as-
cending bid auction over its rivals.
Alexandrova (2006) and Alexandrova and Northcott (2009) contrast the lines
in which theoretical economists (such as McMillan) and experimental economist
(Plott) interpreted the design process. According to them, the theorists over-
state their case when they claim that the FCC “chose an innovative form of
auction ... because theorists predicted it would induce more competitive bid-
ding and a better match of licenses to firms” (McAfee and McMillan (1996),
p. 160). Instead, they argue that game theory merely provided heuristics
and pointed to problems that could possibly arise and which experimentalists
should take into account. According to them, the bulk of the evidence required
was delivered by experiments. Thus, instead of providing a success story of
game theory, the case in fact shows how limited the theory is.
This conclusion can be interpreted in light of a recent proposal by Robert
Northcott. Northcott (2018) urges philosophers of economics to engage in
what he labels “efficiency analysis”: do models, or other tools, provide effi-
cient ways to achieve goals such as explanation, prediction, or in our case,
design? Should economists engage more in modelling, or should they invest
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resources (money, intellectual labour, education of students, journal space,
etc.) elsewhere? The analyses by Alexandrova and Northcott would sug-
gest a revisionary move: since theorists overstate their case, and experimental
methods were more important than the narrow models from auction theory,
resources should be redirected from theoretical to empirical work in the con-
text of economic engineering.5 I will next introduce in some depth a case study
that hasn’t been considered in the philosophy of science, which indicates some
caution is needed with respect to this view.
3.2 The Matching Market for Medical Residents
Before becoming doctors, medical graduates in the US are required to take up
training positions in public hospitals. The positions are called “residencies”,
which allow the “residents” to specialise in a specific medical branch. The
National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) is the clearinghouse that or-
ganises the matchings between residents and residencies. Since the residencies
determine a good deal of the residents’ future careers, and for the hospitals
they provide a significant source of labour force, it is vital that this market is
organised fairly and efficiently. In the 1990s, there was a crisis of confidence in
the market of the prospective doctors, and the NRMP directors commissioned
game theorist and later Nobel laureate Alvin Roth to direct a redesign of this
market. I shall sketch the history of the market first, which is based on Roth’s
and his collaborators’ accounts.6
In general terms, the matching process is the following. After interviews take
place, the NRMP collects rank order lists (“ROLs”) from both students and
hospitals: lists that reflect the students’ preferences over the hospitals they
5Alexandrova and Northcott (2015) make a similar, revisionary recommendation in a
different context, which is repeated in Northcott (2018). I therefore believe that this is a
fair interpretation of their convictions.
6Roth’s interest in the market dates back at least to Roth (1982). For technical and
historical accounts, cf. Roth (1984); Roth and Sotomayor (1990); Roth and Peranson (1999);
Roth (2002, 2003); Kojima et al. (2013); Roth (2013, 2015b, 2018), amongst others.
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had previously had an interview with, and the hospitals’ preferences over the
students they had interviewed. The assignments are then determined algo-
rithmically through a matching mechanism (see below).
In its early years in the 1950s, the market functioned to the satisfaction of
the participants, as indicated by high rates of participation in the system
(over 95%; participants are free to decide whether to find matches through
the centralised clearinghouse or on their own). However, over the years sev-
eral changes occurred. Initially, interns were predominantly male, and when
female interns entered the market in the 1970s, there were increasing numbers
of married couples who graduated from medical school together. Members of
couples often have interrelated preferences, particularly to find positions close
to one another. For example, even if a member of a couple prefers, say, a
position in Boston to a position in Los Angeles other things being equal, these
preferences may switch if their partner attains a position close to L.A. In other
words, couples give rise to complementarities, similar to those encountered in
the FCC auctions. But the matching mechanism in use could not accommo-
date such desires because it would process only single preference lists. The
NRMP modified the system to permit couples to hand in pairs of ROLs to-
gether and to specify a “leading member”. The mechanism would then match
the leading member first, followed by an editing of the other member’s prefer-
ence list to eliminate positions far from that of the leading member. However,
this rather ad-hoc modification could not prevent rates of participation from
dropping.
The accommodation of couples was not the only challenge the NRMP was fac-
ing. Hospitals may have interlinked numbers of positions such as, say, five in
the neurology department if internal medicine fills all its positions, but fewer
otherwise. This was a source of a different kind of complementarities (cf. Roth
and Peranson (1999) for a full description of the kinds of complementarities
present in this market). Furthermore, the numbers of graduates relative to
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residencies offered increased substantially over the years, which led to match-
ings being less favourable for the former. In the 1990s, the dissatisfaction
among applicants – as expressed by various student associations – was at a
peak. Many claimed that the mechanism would show favouritism to the hospi-
tals at their expense; and there was a rumor among applicants that one could
‘game the system’ by submitting ROLs that wouldn’t truthfully reflect their
preferences. As a consequence, some student associations requested a change
of the matching mechanism, or that the applicants be given more information
on how to hand in their ROLs strategically.
The Board of Directors of the NRMP reacted in 1995 and commissioned the
design of a new mechanism. They set three policy goals, which the new mech-
anism should implement as far as possible: to incentivise the applicants and
hospitals to stick to the matchings (i.e. not to make arrangements outside the
system); to make the matchings as favourable as possible for the applicants;
and to reduce their opportunities for strategic behaviour. The new mechanism,
which is now known as the “Roth-Peranson algorithm”7, was first introduced
in 1998. It has been working successfully since, and has been adopted by
numerous labour market clearinghouses.
In order to answer how Roth and his collaborators reformed the market, we
need to dive a bit deeper into the models and other tools used. I shall next
sketch a simple model of the market – a model from a subdiscipline of game
theory called “matching theory” – and some of the theoretical results that
hold in this model. Subsequently, I will flesh out three lessons about how
this model was manipulated, enriched, and complemented with other tools to
inform the reform of the market.
7Elliott Peranson is founder and president of the National Matching Services Inc., a
company devoted to providing matching solutions by implementing what they advertise as
a “Nobel Prize acclaimed algorithm”.
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3.2.1 A Simple Model of the Market
From a game theory perspective, a matching mechanism, together with the
agents’ (that is, the applicants’ and the hospitals’) preferences, defines a game,
in which their actions are to submit ROLs (or to opt out). More formally, there
is a set of students S = {s1, . . . , sm} and a set of hospitals H = {h1, . . . , hn}.
Each hospital hi offers a number of residencies which is specified by a quota,
qi. We assume that the agents’ preferences {s1 , . . . ,sm ,h1 , . . . ,hn} are
transitive, irreflexive and complete lists for each student over the hospitals she
had an interview with and that she finds acceptable, and for each hospital over
the students it had interviewed and whom it finds acceptable.8 The agents’
actions – their ROLs – are structures just like their preferences: transitive,
irreflexive, complete lists over acceptable partners on the other side of the
market. Note, however, that agents can be strategic, viz. submit ROLs that
do not truthfully reflect their preferences.
A matching mechanism is a function from combinations of ROLs to matchings,
which are the outcomes of the game. Formally, a matching µ is a subset of
S×H such that any student appears in at most one pair (i.e., is either matched
or unmatched) and each hospital hi appears in at most qi pairs (i.e., is either
full or has empty places). Let’s have a look at the mechanism in use by the
time the NRMP directors commissioned the new design. As shown in Roth
(1984), in our simple model it is equivalent to the hospital-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm (DAAH). It therefore suffices to sketch the latter:
• In the first step, each hospital “proposes”9 to the highest-ranked students
8This simple model neglects the possibility that some groups of residents may be com-
plementary for hospitals (e.g., a hospital may prefer applicant s1 to s2 if it also employs s3,
but prefers s2 to s1 otherwise). Here, it is assumed that hospitals’ preferences over residents
are responsive: they always prefer to add an applicant si to a group of residents rather than
applicant sj (or to leaving a place empty), just in case si is acceptable si  sj . See Roth
(1985). Idealising assumptions will be subject of section 3.4.2.
9It is common to describe the algorithm using the predicates ‘propose’ and ‘ac-
cept’/‘reject’. Of course this refers not to the agents’ behaviour in a decentralised market
but to the algorithm’s processing of the ROLs.
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on its ROL, until its quota is filled. Each student tentatively “accepts”
the highest-ranked proposer on her ROL, and rejects the other proposers.
• In the n-th step, each hospital subject to rejections in step n−1 proposes
to the highest-ranked students to whom it has not previously proposed
until its quota is filled. Each student tentatively accepts the highest-
ranked hospital on her ROL among the proposers or the hospital she
tentatively accepted in the previous step, and rejects the others.
• The process is repeated until there are no more proposals, at which point
the students are matched to the hospitals whose offers they are holding
(or remain unmatched otherwise).
As shown in the seminal article Gale and Shapley (1962), in the simple model
described above, DAAH implements stable matchings with respect to the
ROLs submitted. A matching is stable if no one is matched to an unacceptable
partner, and there is no blocking pair : a pair that consists of a student and a
hospital that are not matched to each other but each is higher-ranked on the
other’s ROL than some partner assigned to them in the matching.10
3.2.2 Reforming the Market: Three Lessons
The concept of stability and the fact that DAAH implements it are results
from matching theory. The original algorithm wasn’t designed with the help
of models from this theory, and consequently, it was unlikely known to be
10The intuition behind the proof that DAAH implements stability is simple: under this
procedure, no one can be matched to an unacceptable partner, and there can be no blocking
pair because, if a student sj is ranked higher on a hospital hi’s ROL than a student matched
to it, hi must have applied to sj at some previous step and been rejected. Thus sj must
have ranked hi lower than her actual match and so (sj , hi) is not a blocking pair.
82 Chapter 3. A General Epistemology of Economic Engineering
stable in this sense.11 Intuitively, stability is an important concept because,
assuming that agents submit ROLs that reflect their preferences, the absence
of blocking pairs removes incentives for making deals outside the system. This
suggested that stability was the formal equivalent to the directors’ first goal
to provide incentives to stick to the matchings.
However, this is a hypothesis on the basis of the model alone. To gain con-
fidence that stability would really achieve this goal, the designers resorted to
natural experiments. Among others, there were regional matching markets
for physicians and surgeons in Britain. Of the eight markets investigated, six
used unstable mechanisms and only two of them had survived by the time
the study was made (Roth (2002)). The two remaining markets used stable
algorithms, and both were performing well. This gave evidence for the impor-
tance of stability. It was still logically possible that the survival or not of the
different markets was due to other factors than stability. In order to dispel
this doubt, simple environments were created in laboratory experiments in
which the only difference would be the mechanism in use. The experiments
reproduced the field results, thus providing confidence that stability is key
for achieving the first goal stated by the directors. I take this to be the first
lesson from the NRMP: a simple model suggests properties which may corre-
spond to policy goals, and mechanisms that implement those properties. Then
experiments that mirror the model – natural, laboratory, or others – provide
evidence that properties “work” in the real world and can be brought about by
the mechanisms.
Stability seemed to be the directors’ first-order goal. With respect to their
second-order goals, the outcomes of different stable mechanisms can be com-
11By the time the NRMP directors felt the need for a new matching mechanism they were
apparently aware of some results from matching theory. Roth recalls a personal conversation
with David Gale in which the latter mentioned that he had already sent a copy of Gale and
Shapley (1962) to an administrator of the NRMP in 1976. He adds that this “seems to have
been the first time that anyone associated with the program became aware of the game-
theoretic formulation of the problem and the results concerning [optimal stable matchings]”
(Roth, 1984, 1001).
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pared in the simple model above. Suppose we substitute DAAS for DAAH ,
which is the equivalent algorithm but with the roles of the students and the
hospitals switched. DAAS produces matchings that are stable too, but which
are weakly preferred by all students to all other stable matchings with respect
to their ROLs submitted, whereas the hospitals weakly prefer the matchings
from DAAH to all other stable matchings. So it could be hypothesised that
DAAS would perform better with respect to the second goal to produce stable
matchings as favourable as possible for students. Furthermore, DAAS makes
it a dominant strategy for all the students to submit their true preferences,
whereas DAAH does not make it a dominant strategy for either side of the
market to reveal their preferences (an asymmetry that stems from the fact
that hospitals take multiple students whereas students are assigned to a sin-
gle hospital). Moreover, there will be some room for strategic behaviour, as
there is no stable algorithm that makes it a dominant strategy for all agents
to reveal their preferences. Since the final goal was to reduce opportunities
for strategic behaviour, and this was particularly conspicuous on the part of
the students, DAAS might be considered the algorithm of choice.
However, our simple model lacks relevant features of the market. As described
above, there are couples among the applicants that are permitted to hand in
ROLs specifying pairs of positions. Couples are absent in the model above,
but they can be added to it. Which leads to the second lesson: models are
intervened on; different mechanisms are tested within a model, and features of
the market previously missing are accommodated.
Some of the theorems described above do not generalise to models with cou-
ples; in particular, the set of stable matchings can be empty (Roth (1984)).
Such negative results pointed at some of the problems that could arise in the
real-world market. The designers next asked whether there was an algorithm
that would produce stable matchings whenever they exist. A simple deferred
acceptance algorithm (modified to process couples’ ROLs specifying pairs of
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positions) would not do this job – which explains the fact that when couples
entered the market in the 1960s, rates of participation dropped.12
Roth and Peranson (1999) designed a modified DAAS which seeks to find
stable matchings by detecting blocking pairs and repairing them, if possible,
at intermediate steps. The Roth-Peranson algorithm is much more complex
than a simple DAAS (for an insightful graphical representation of the algo-
rithm, see Roth (2013)). Many questions about its design could not be de-
cided through existing theorems: for example, effects of different sequencings
of proposals were not known. In order to compare the performance of differ-
ent designs, computational experiments were made using ROLs submitted in
previous years.
Another example of computational experiments will lead to the last lesson.
Because the set of stable matchings can be empty, there was of course no
guarantee that the Roth-Peranson algorithm would always find a stable match-
ing. But computational experiments suggested that, under certain conditions
(not too great a proportion of couples and sufficiently short ROLs), in large
markets stable matchings exist with a high probability. So the result in the
model located problems, and suggested computational analyses to investigate
magnitudes that were, by the time, not known from the model. Interestingly,
these analyses in turn prepared the ground for new theory: the computational
results suggested that there could be theorems proving the existence of stable
matchings in large markets. This intuition turned out to be correct about a
decade later, when Kojima et al. (2013) proved analytically that, if there are
sufficiently small numbers of couples and ROLs are short, as a market becomes
large, the probability that a stable matching exists tends to certainty. The
12Roughly, the problem is the following. Suppose DAAS is running, and the members of
a couple are both tentatively accepted by two programmes. Then, if in the next step the
first (but not the second) gets displaced by a preferred applicant, the couple applies to the
next best preferred pair of positions which means that the second member of the couple
is withdrawn from the programme that had tentatively accepted her. But then blocking
pairs may occur between that programme and applicants it has rejected in order to hold the
second couple member.
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final lesson from the NRMP is that, not only do (lab, field or computational)
experiments provide evidence for theoretical hypotheses; they also point at new
theory, in which case it is theory/analytical models that confirm results from
those experiments.
The Roth-Peranson algorithm has since its introduction in 1998 found stable
matchings every year, and it also performs well with respect to other policy
goals, for example, it practically makes it a dominant strategy for applicants
and programmes to state their true preferences (Roth (2013)). It is a prime
example of successful market design; but apparently, it doesn’t fit well with
accounts that treat models and empirical studies, or theorists and experimen-
talists, as rivals.
3.3 The Need for a General Epistemology of Eco-
nomic Engineering
The reforms of the FCC and the NRMP differ in various respects. First, the
kind of “goods” to be allocated partly determine the kind of market to be
designed: the FCC organises auctions to allocate spectrum, whereas residents
are of course not auctioned, but allocated through two-sided matchings in
which the currency is preferences not money. Second, in the design of the
medical match, a centralised matching system already existed, which had to
be changed, whereas the spectrum auctions were to be designed from scratch.
And third, the relative importance of models and various experimental meth-
ods seems to have differed in both cases. For instance, in the NRMP, field data
complemented models in providing evidence that stability matters. In the auc-
tions, where such field data were largely absent and the models available more
circumscribed, experimental test beds were heavily drawn on.
A general account of how knowledge is generated in economic engineering
must be consistent with both cases. A simplistic view that gives credit to
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models alone cannot account for the fact that in both cases, experiments were
also needed. This view thus proves inadequate, as Alexandrova and Guala
convincingly show. On the other hand, accounts such as Alexandrova’s, which
highlight the role of experiments at the expense of models, or which generally
treat theorists and experimentalists as competitors, are inadequate, especially
for explaining the NRMP.
I shall argue in the following that the three lessons from the NRMP hold
more generally and can be seen as a starting point for a general epistemol-
ogy of economic engineering. In both cases, the initial step was to come up
with a model of either the existing market (in the NRMP), or of a projected,
possible market (in the FCC). For the FCC, experimentalist Plott provides
evidence: “Designs are motivated by ... a mathematical model, a body of the-
ory .. that is perhaps completely devoid of operational detail” (Plott, 1981, p.
134). Empirical methods provided important evidence in the design processes,
but models came first, both chronologically and epistemically. This is not a
coincidental order, but rather, I contend, the typical case. First, a model is
typically needed to give precise meaning to policy goals, such as removing
incentives to make deals outside the system, by defining properties, such as
stability. These properties are defined relative to assumptions of the model,
e.g. idealised preference structures. The properties may strictly speaking be
meaningless in the real market, where those assumptions are unlikely to univer-
sally obtain. Second, a model is typically needed to provide guidance to what
kinds of mechanisms should be tested. Models exclude those mechanisms that
have no chance of leading to desirable properties, such as unstable algorithms.
Narrowing down the potentially infinite number of mechanisms to those that
could possibly implement these properties would usually be hopeless through
trial and error (cf. Jackson (2018)).
The second lesson, too, holds quite generally: not only are target systems
modelled, but those models are intervened on to see how outcomes change
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if the model structure is altered. Even outside engineering contexts, it has
been noted that this is an important function of models. Cartwright (2009)
writes, “we probe models as a means to understand how structure affects the
outcomes” (p. 57, emphasis original). According to Morgan (2012), this is
even a defining characteristic of models: what makes a model a model is the
fact that it can be manipulated. Manipulability is particularly perspicuous in
engineering, where economic institutions are altered or created, which directs
attention to the way in which counterfactual information is encoded in the
models used. This will be made precise in the next section. Note, however,
that it does not mean that one can naively read off what happens in possible
alterations of the circumstances. In both the FCC and the NRMP, when
adding complications of the real market to a model, it was found that some
theorems holding in the simple model did not hold in the resulting, more
complicated one. These negative results directed attention to experiments,
which wouldn’t have materialised without prior intervening in the models.
The final lesson from the NRMP is that, not only do models suggest hypothe-
ses, e.g. that a mechanism implements certain properties, but sometimes
experiments suggest hypotheses, which may in turn be confirmed analytically
in the model. This lesson is also true of the FCC auctions, which sparked a
comprehensive new body of theory. Thus, not only do models used in mar-
ket design call for experiments, but the converse is also true. Roth famously
stated this observation thus: “in the service of design, experimental and com-
putational economics are natural complements to game theory” (Roth, 2002,
p. 1342, emphasis original). I shall next provide a general account of economic
engineering, which does justice to these lessons.
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3.4 A General Epistemology of Economic Engineer-
ing
In line with the view that models typically “come first”, I start in the next
subsection by giving an account of models, which coheres with the logic of eco-
nomic engineering: it shows how models project structure and allow tracking
how interventions change their outcomes. In the subsequent subsection, I show
that complementary uses of models and empirical methods enable inferences
about interventions in the real world.
3.4.1 An Interventionist Account of Models
I shall focus on models from game theory. Both auction and matching theory
consist of game-theoretic (GT) models, showing the importance of this class
for economic engineering. For illustrative purposes, I will introduce a class of
simple textbook, non-cooperative GT models that are not directly applicable
to either case, but most of what will be said holds for more complex GT models
and other economic models as well.
GT models are formal structures of sets and relations between them. Interpre-
tations connect the formal structures to target systems. This will be subject of
the next section; for now, suffice it to say that the intended interpretation is,
roughly, that the sets correspond to the agents involved, their possible choices,
their beliefs, desires, and reasoning processes; and the relations between them
reflect how the agents’ beliefs, desires and reasoning processes result in choices,
as well as which outcomes result from combinations of choices.
Engineers model institutions as variables to be intervened on (cf. the classical
expositions Hurwicz (1972, 1973)). Taking this view literally, I use directed
graphs to describe the structure that models impose on the defined sets, as
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GAME
GAME FORM PREFERENCES
BELIEFS RATIONALITY
OUTCOME
Figure 3.1: Graph of GT models. The nodes in the graph are variables and
edges represent functional relations.
in figure 3.1.13 The graph consists in a set of nodes and directed edges be-
tween the nodes. The nodes represent random variables, each of which takes
values in a specific class of sets, which will be defined below. I shall talk in-
terchangeably of nodes and variables whenever this does not cause confusion.
The edges represent functional relationships, so that the value of a given node
is a function of the values of its parents (that is, those nodes directly pointing
at the node). For example, the graph specifies that GAME is a function of
GAME FORM and PREFERENCES.
Informally, the graph can be described as follows. Starting from the top, the
GAME FORM variable ranges over possible rules that govern an institution.
The PREFERENCES variable ranges over combinations of the players’ pref-
erence relations.14 Together, these variables define a GAME variable whose
values are particular games. The GAME variable, together with a RATIO-
NALITY and a BELIEFS variable, defines the OUTCOME variable, which is
the only leaf node in the graph. Notice that at this stage, all of these structures
are purely mathematical, with no presumption about what they represent in
the real world, in spite of the loaded language used in the standard definitions.
For example, with “preference relation”, we just mean a partial order, etc.
That the graph represents models from non-cooperative game theory (other
models, e.g. from cooperative game theory, general equilibrium models, etc.,
13Although I apply this strategy in the context of economics, this approach might be useful
in more general contexts where models express information about interventions.
14This node could be split into various nodes, e.g. one for each player’s preference rela-
tion, but for our purposes it is convenient to summarise those relations in a single variable.
The same holds for the RATIONALITY and BELIEFS variables below. Thanks to an
anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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may be represented by different graphs), is consistent with standard textbook
presentations (e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)). These typically start
by defining a game in normal form Γ =< N, (Ai), (i) >, where N is a set
of players and for each i ∈ N , Ai is a set of available actions and i, her
preference relations over action profiles A = ×i∈NAi.15 For now, think of the
GAME variable in the graph as ranging over Γ.
The definition of a game is in textbooks usually followed by the introduction
of solution concepts, mappings from games to (sets of) action profiles, which
select a value for each Ai. Then, the epistemic conditions are presented that
constitute solution concepts. (At this stage, this too is simply a mathemati-
cal statement about how certain conditions constrain the possible values that
the Ai can take.) These constraints are represented by the BELIEFS and
RATIONALITY nodes in the graph, whose values together with GAME de-
fine the value of OUTCOME, which is a set of action profiles. For example,
the most prominent solution concept, Nash Equilibrium, is obtained, roughly,
if the RATIONALITY variable takes as value that every player chooses an
optimal strategy, and that the BELIEFS variable takes as value that players
hold correct beliefs about the game they are playing (this includes complete
information about the opponents’ preferences) and the rationality of the oppo-
nents, and there is common belief in the players’ strategy choices. Or, consider
the case in which the BELIEFS variable takes as value not that players know
the opponents’ preferences but that probability distributions over preferences
are commonly known. This constitutes a game of incomplete information, and
the solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In order to define play-
ers’ rationality and beliefs as set-theoretic entities, epistemic models must be
introduced (which would lead us too far astray, but cf. Aumann and Bran-
denburger (1995)). The lower part of the graph – the variables BELIEFS,
15For ease of exposition I will ignore mixed strategies. They could be added in the standard
way: assume that players’ preferences range over lotteries on action profiles. Then, if their
preferences follow the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, they can be represented by payoff
functions ui : A −→ R, for all i ∈ N .
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GAME, RATIONALITY, and OUTCOME – reflects the standard definition
of a game plus solution concept, which result in action profiles.
A more general case is that the OUTCOME variable ranges not over sets of
action profiles but over their consequences. This case can be accommodated
if we add to the game a set of consequences C, and g : A −→ C a function
from action profiles to consequences. The players’ preferences (i) are defined
on C. So in this general case, the GAME variable is a tuple < N, (Ai), (i
), C, g >, and the OUTCOME variable ranges over C. Finally, we distinguish
between two parts of the GAME variable: the preferences, and the remaining
parts. Accordingly, two separate variables are defined: a PREFERENCES
variable that ranges over (i), and a GAME FORM variable that ranges over
< N, (Ai), C, g >. I choose to present these as the exogenous variables that
map into the GAME variable because, since we are concerned with the design
of institutions, it will be important to distinguish the institutional, ‘public’
parts of the game which can be changed or imposed as a policy (the game
form) from the ‘private’ parts that cannot (the players’ preferences).
Remember Cartwright (2009)’s claim that models are examined to discover
how their structure affects outcomes. Within the graphical representation of
GT models, in which their constituents are treated as variables, this intu-
ition can be made precise: it amounts to model-interventions. The following
example uses a simple game to illustrate these interventions.
Example 3.1 (Prisoners’ Dilemma and Prisoners’ Delight) Suppose GAME
FORM takes as value the rule specified in table 3.1. There are two players,
Row and Col, who can choose to cooperate or defect. The four possible action
profiles result in consequences a, b, c, and d.
We assume that PREFERENCESRow = c  a  d  b, and PREFERENCESCol =
b  a  d  c. This determines the value of the GAME variable: we have
a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Suppose RATIONALITY takes as value that play-
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GAME FORM = cooperate defect
cooperate a b
defect c d
Table 3.1: Value of GAME FORM : rule governing a two-player interaction
between Row and Col that can both choose to cooperate or defect. The action
profiles result in outcomes a, b, c, or d, as shown in the table. When a value
is specified for PREFERENCES, this defines the value of GAME.
ers play optimal strategies, and BELIEFS, that they hold correct beliefs about
the game. (Note that beliefs about the opponent’s rationality don’t matter in
this case because both players have a strictly dominant strategy.) Then, both
players will defect and OUTCOME = d.
GAME FORM = cooperate defect
cooperate a c
defect b d
Table 3.2: An intervention on the GAME FORM variable: switching the
asymmetric outcomes.
Suppose we intervene on the GAME FORM variable, which results in the
value specified in table 3.2. This illustrates a change of the institutional rules,
in which the asymmetric outcomes are switched. It induces a different game
(“Prisoners’ Delight”) in which cooperation is a dominant strategy for both
players. If we suppose that RATIONALITY and BELIEFS are held fixed at
the values of before, then OUTCOME = a, which is the second-best as opposed
to the second-worst outcome for both players.
The example shows that game theory encodes counterfactual information in
natural collections of its models: it allows calculating what the corresponding
outcomes are for different values of the variables. The counterfactual informa-
tion encoded in a model is at the core of my argument of how game theory, or
economic theory more generally, can be harnessed for economic engineering.
Engineers use this information to intervene on the GAME FORM variable:
game forms are designed which “force” players to produce outcomes that are
considered desirable.
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3.4.2 From Model-Interventions to Real World-Interventions:
the Complementarity of Models and Other Tools
Within a GT model, different games can be compared and the one selected
whose equilibria come closest to the policy goals in question, or more precisely,
to what are interpreted to be the policy goals within the model. The idea is
to make the market resemble that game, in particular by imposing rules that
correspond to the game form in question. If the design is successful, those
rules induce the intended policy goals in the real world.
This requires a kind of external validity : roughly, that interventions within
the model inform interventions in the real market in the sense that the latter
interventions reliably establish outcomes that resemble those in the model.16
So it seems that what is required is the truth of a causal hypothesis: viz.,
that there exists a causal mechanism in the real world, to which the structure
of the model corresponds; and that the game form in the model implements
properties that correspond to the relevant policy goals. The truth of this
hypothesis would justify confidence in the prediction that institutional rules
corresponding to the chosen game form in the model, will produce desirable
outcomes.
The hypothesis can be made precise in terms of our graphical representation:
what it says is that the directed graph of a given model can be interpreted
as a causal graph of its target system (which may be a possible, future sys-
tem). A causal interpretation of a graph consists in, first, specifying that its
variables range over events, and second, that its edges correspond to causal
16“External validity” usually refers to the generalisation of laboratory results to circum-
stances outside the lab. For a general methodology of external validity in economics, cf. Part
II of Guala (2005). Here, I use external validity in a broad sense that includes inferences
from models to the real world.
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relationships.17 As an example of the first, suppose the graph in figure 3.1 is
a causal graph of a particular interaction. Then the variable GAME FORM
takes as value the event that a specific rule governs that interaction, specifying
which choices are available to agents and how their choices jointly result in
outcomes. The PREFERENCES variable takes as value the event that agents
have specific preference relations. The BELIEFS variable takes as value the
event that agents have specific beliefs about the situation they are in, and
their opponents’ reasoning processes. And so on. Second, its directed edges
denote direct causation:18 roughly, that there are different values of the parent
node such that changing it from one to another, the child node changes its
value from one to another, given that its other parent nodes are held fixed at
specific values.
If a graph can be interpreted causally, the structural relations in the model to
which it corresponds describe a causal mechanism effective in the real world.
Model interventions can then reveal information about how the outcome of the
target interaction would change as the rules that govern it change. However,
economic models famously make false assumptions. False assumptions pose
a problem for the external validity of model interventions because they seem
to prevent a causal interpretation of their associated graphs. These graphs
may be imperfect, that is, the values of some variables are not known, or it
is known that values specified in the model are false of the target interaction.
For example, standard GT models assume that agents are perfectly rational,
but they may not be in the projected interaction. But this assumption is
needed to identify equilibria. So we lack confidence that agents act according
to our predictions based on equilibria. Graphs may also be incomplete, that is,
17To show that it is in principle possible to interpret a graph causally in the sense of,
e.g. Spirtes et al. (2000), requires specifying a probability distribution over the graph which
satisfies the causal Markov condition and the minimality condition. Under the standard
GT textbook interpretation of the nodes that I gave above, the graph in figure 3.1 trivially
satisfies these axioms, thus allowing for a causal interpretation.
18I do not wish to commit to a specific theory of causation. It should be clear though that
theories in which interventions figure prominently – such as Woodward (2003)’s theory – fit
well with my account of models.
3.4. A General Epistemology of Economic Engineering 95
lacking nodes or edges that may change the outcomes of target interactions.
For example, recall the winner’s-curse phenomenon in auctions, in which the
bidder who most overvalues an item wins. Models from auction theory sug-
gested that open auctions could reduce the risk of the winner’s curse, but it
was not clear whether they would do so in the presence of complementarities,
which did not figure in the models.
Typically, economic models (or rather, their associated graphs) are both im-
perfect and incomplete. How can the external validity of such models be
established? In some cases, suitably constructing the model and intervening
on it goes some way towards it. A prime example is the treatment of private
information. In order to know what game is induced by a game form, the
value of the PREFERENCES variable (called the players’ types) must nor-
mally be specified. But the designer does not know the players’ types, and
since they may have incentives to hide their preferences, it is of no help to
simply ask them. Indeed, one of the problems encountered in our case study
was precisely that agents were trying to “game the system” by handing in
ROLs strategically.
Theorists seek to overcome this problem by designing “robust” game forms,
that is, game forms that implement desirable properties for variable types and
populations of players (cf. Kuorikoski and Lehtinen (2009) for the logic of
robustness). For instance, deferred acceptance algorithms implement stabil-
ity in the simple model above with respect to ROLs submitted, no matter
whether a given agent prefers Chicago to L.A., or the other way around. So
the imperfection of the model that arises from the lack of knowledge of the
players’ preferences is to an extent outwitted. “To an extent”, because do-
ing so requires assumptions on the agents’ preferences (e.g. that they are
complete and transitive) and agents must be given incentives to reveal their
preferences, otherwise there may be instabilities. But, as we have seen, there
is no mechanism that achieves this for all agents.
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At this stage, complementing models with empirical data may establish ex-
ternal validity. In the NRMP, natural experiments gave evidence for the well-
functioning of matching markets that use stable algorithms and the malfunc-
tioning of markets that do not. These findings could be replicated in the
lab, where the stability property was identified as the main cause of the well-
functioning of simple matching markets. By showing that model results can,
or cannot, be replicated in lab environments, experiments confirm, or correct
imperfect graphs. Experimental systems are also used to supplement incom-
plete graphs by introducing mechanisms which the model is silent about, as
in the noted, holistic treatment of experimental test beds. All these cases
vindicate the view that experiments “mediate”, or “bridge the gap”, between
models and their intended target systems (cf. Guala (2005); Guala and Mit-
tone (2005)). As we have seen, empirical data may also lead to new theory.
In the NRMP, this took the form of running the algorithm over sample data,
which suggested a large market theorem (“in a market with couples, the set
of stable matchings is unlikely to be empty if the number of participants is
large...”) that could later be proven analytically.
What combination of tools – models, laboratory or field experiments, compu-
tational methods, etc. – achieves reliable inferences, and which tools figure
most prominently in a design process, may differ from case to case. The dif-
ferences between the NRMP, where models went a long way towards the final
design, and the FCC, where their applicability was more circumscribed, are a
case in point. A recent proposal by Esther Duflo can be used to put different
design processes in rough order. Duflo (2017) introduced the term “plumb-
ing” for cases of economic design in which it is uncertain what the relevant
features of a target system are. So, for example, the NRMP would have been
a case of plumbing had there been no data available confirming that stabil-
ity causes a market’s well-functioning. There is no single, clear-cut feature
that distinguishes plumbing from engineering; rather there is a spectrum, on
which plumbing lies on one end, abstract mechanism design on the other, and
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engineering occupies an interval in between. Moving towards the plumbing
end of this spectrum, things get more detail-focussed, the knowledge created
more context-specific, and models can be relied on to a lesser extent. It seems
fair to say that, while both the NRMP and the FCC are cases of economic
engineering, the latter is closer to the plumbing end of the spectrum.
Where on the spectrum a given case is located depends on the specific charac-
teristics of the target system and on the existing models and other tools that
the designers can resort to. It is not usually known ex ante exactly where
on the spectrum a given case will be located. Ex post, we may be able to
reconstruct design processes (as I have done for the NRMP) and to give an
account of what combination of tools got the designers ahead. But ex ante,
the economists’ intuitions, and to an extent trial and error, determine the
methods used for the design. I conclude by considering the implications of
this insight for efficiency analysis.
3.5 Conclusion: Economic Engineering and the Ef-
ficiency Question
What combination of models, experiments, or other tools, provides efficient
ways to design markets? An answer to this question, either globally or for
a given case, has implications for how resources should be spent. Northcott
(2018) rightly points out that efficiency analyses are inevitable and happening
anyways, such as when researchers decide to model an institution, or to organ-
ise experiments, or when teams of theorists or experimentalists are assembled.
But Northcott urges philosophers of science to explicitly keep tabs on current
practices: to analyse and assess whether they are efficient, or whether a shift
of resources is commendable, for example towards experiments and away from
models.
The NRMP and the FCC are prime examples of successful economic engineer-
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ing. Contrasting their design processes, we found that the relative importance
of different tools differed in the two cases and that it is not usually known ex
ante what methods will move us forward. This urges some caution, at least
on a global approach to efficiency analysis. Juggling the variety of different
cases on the spectrum of economic design in global efficiency claims may be
seriously misleading and might thwart the goals of efficiency analysis.
Would the design process of the NRMP have been more efficient had a differ-
ent combination of methods been applied? This is what the local efficiency
question for the NRMP amounts to (equivalently for the FCC). It could mean
either that the matching mechanism, which materialised and which turned
out to be successful, could have been designed using fewer resources had a
different combination of methods been applied; or that the same resources,
allocated differently, could have led to a design at least as successful as the
default. Both counterfactuals are, I believe, practically impossible to assess.
Fewer resources spent would have led to different teams of researchers, to
different combinations of models and experiments used, and so on. In other
words, they would have led to a different history of the NRMP, and a fortiori
would likely have brought about an altogether different design. Because of
the complex and potentially long causal histories involved, it is hard to as-
sess whether the same institution could have been designed more cheaply. It
is equally hard to evaluate whether the same resources, allocated differently,
could have achieved a more successful design. This would require assessing
what that design would have looked like, which again involves complex and
potentially long causal histories.19
This problem is inherent to engineering. It may be straightforward to ask
for a given explanandum whether one or another explanans (which may use
different mixes of models and other tools) performs its task of explaining
19A futher difficulty is, when does the relevant causal history start in the first place?
For example, the model introduced in section 3.2 traces back to Gale and Shapley (1962)’s
marriage model. Should the causal history be traced back to 1962?
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more efficiently. For example, Northcott compares Axelrod’s game-theoretic
analysis of truces in World War I trench warfare to historical analyses of
the same phenomena. But when a market is designed, it is the result of
a particular design process – a causal history that includes policy makers
setting policy goals, the teams of researchers and the techniques they apply to
project causal structure and intervene on it. Had this history been different,
the product would likely be different.
I take these to be reasons to abstain from philosophical efficiency analysis,
at least in the context of economic engineering, and to promote free research
instead. Paul Milgrom, one of the protagonists of the FCC auctions, writes,
“We are celebrating the fruits of research that could just as easily have found
itself ridiculed. Who knows what tomorrow will bring?” (Milgrom (2017)).
Chapter 4
Towards a Fair Distribution
Mechanism for Asylum
Recently there has been increasing interest not only in the number of refugees
that countries (should) accept, but also in achieving good “matches” between
refugees and their host countries. For example, the mechanism for relocating
refugees from Greece and Italy to other member states of the European Union
(EU) seeks to realise this goal by allowing countries offering relocation to in-
dicate preferences over refugees (see European Commission (2015)). Good
matches are important because a refugee’s international protection needs, and
her opportunities to flourish, are served differently in different countries. More-
over, a country’s costs for hosting refugees and the public opinion towards them
may differ for different types of refugees, which may affect policy makers’ will-
ingness to comply with international legal norms (Bansak et al. (2016)).
The question of how to distribute asylum amounts to a problem of designing
refugee distribution mechanisms according to criteria that may be considered
desirable or morally required. Relevant criteria may include maximising the
number of places for refugees, fairness, or efficiency considerations. The aim
of this chapter is to provide some insights into the normative issues that the
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design of distribution mechanisms raises in this context. One important issue
is this: satisfying refugees’ or countries’ preferences may in some cases reduce
the number of refugees matched. It is argued here that there is no simple
solution to this problem, and that in instances where a trade-off between the
satisfaction of preferences and the number of refugees matched occurs, it is
not a reasonable policy to take preferences into account.
On the positive side, I show that a simple sufficient condition can be given
which, if satisfied, precludes the trade-off from occurring: that all the countries
within the system deem all refugees acceptable, and that all refugees deem all
countries acceptable. The latter can only be required if each refugee’s rights
are respected in each country within the system, rather than in the country she
is matched to alone. I interpret this as a precondition that must be satisfied
for an asylum policy to reasonably take preferences into account.
Finally, I argue that, in an appropriate decision framework for asylum, coun-
tries should not be allowed to express preferences over groups of refugees in
the first place. Instead, priorities over refugees should be imposed that take
into account humanitarian factors such as vulnerability, as well as fairness
conditions among the countries within the system. Furthermore, in the con-
text of distributing asylum, the elimination of justified grievance is arguably
a weightier normative criterion than efficiency considerations.
In order to make the arguments precise, I draw on tools from game theory.
The distribution of asylum is modelled as a (bipartite, many-to-one) matching
problem under preferences: refugees and countries offering asylum make up
a two-sided market in which the members of one side are to be distributed
over members of the other side. Moreover, members of the market have pref-
erences over or may give priority to members of the other side of the market,
the satisfaction of which makes for the goodness of the matchings. Formulat-
ing the asylum market in this way allows us to use tools from matching theory
to provide a more precise understanding, and may eventually contribute to
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the implementation of more fair or efficient policies. Various social scien-
tists have recently argued for imposing centralised matching systems and have
investigated mechanisms that could be implemented in different stages of asy-
lum seekers’ path to their final destination (Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga and
Rapoport (2014, 2015a,b); Jones and Teytelboym (2017a,b, 2018); Delacre´taz
et al. (2016 version); Andersson and Ehlers (2018)).1 While I am sympa-
thetic to this line of research, this chapter does not directly contribute to it.
Rather, it serves as a commentary on normative issues that typically arise in
this context.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next Section, our
main case study is introduced: the relocation mechanism that is currently in
effect in the EU. The case study naturally suggests three desiderata on the
distribution of refugees that are made precise in Section 4.2 through a simple
model from matching theory (the “College Admissions model”). A mechanism
that takes preferences into account is shown to achieve some of the desiderata.
I also show that there may be trade-offs between two of the desiderata, and
so a condition is given to prevent these trade-offs from occurring. However,
in Section 4.3, it is shown that within this model one of the desiderata is vio-
lated: the model opens the door to discriminatory policies and unduly favours
popular host countries at the expense of less popular ones. This motivates de-
signing an asylum market that corresponds to a different model (the “School
Choice model”). This model is described in Section 4.4, where I also argue
that fairness beats efficiency in the context of distributing asylum. Section 4.5
concludes.
1See also the organisation Refugees’ Say (https://www.refugees-say.com/), which aims
to “empower refugees and communities” by developing resettlement schemes that account
for their preferences.
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4.1 Desiderata on the Distribution of Refugees: The
EU Relocation Mechanism
To prevent terminological confusion, let refugee denote a recognised refugee or
an asylum seeker with a justified claim to refugee status.2 We are concerned
with their distribution on a supranational scale: refugees are to be distributed
over a given set of nation states (henceforth ‘countries’) which—voluntarily or
enforced by a superordinate (con)federation government—agree to be possible
host destinations. The distribution problem may either occur in the context
of resettlements: the distribution of refugees from third countries or refugee
camps among the countries in the system; or in the context of relocations: the
redistribution of refugees already in a country in the system.
The context determines the number of refugees in the system. This can be a
target set by a superordinate institution (such as the EU’s target to relocate a
certain number of refugees), or the sum of pledges made by the countries within
the system (such as some EU member states’ pledges to resettle a certain
number of refugees). Moreover, there may be (although there need not be)
quotas: numbers of refugees that countries will accept. These numbers may
be individual pledges made by the countries; or they are imposed according
to a distribution key (e.g. as proposed in Bartsch and Bovens (2016) or Grech
(2016)); or they may be the outcome of a market of tradeable immigration
quotas (as suggested in Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2014)).
Let us take a concrete distribution problem as a case study. In September
2015, the European Commission proposed a mechanism for the relocation of
refugees from Greece and Italy among EU member states. The proposal shows
awareness of the importance of good “matches” between refugees and countries
of relocation:
2This presupposes a consistent definition of what counts as a justified claim (at least
among the countries within the system), which is a controversial issue (see Shacknove (1985)).
For simplicity, this problem will be ignored except for a short discussion in Section 4.4.
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“[I]n order to decide which specific Member State should be the
Member State of relocation, a specific account should be given
to the specific qualifications and characteristics of the applicants
concerned, such as their language skills and other individual indi-
cations based on demonstrated family, cultural or social ties that
could facilitate their integration into the Member State of reloca-
tion.” (European Commission (2015))
Subsequently, the Council adopted the proposal in a decision on a temporary
relocation of 160,000 asylum seekers in clear need of international protection
from Greece and Italy (Council of the European Union (2015, 2016)). In order
to comply with the target of achieving good matches, the relocation mechanism
allows member states of relocation to indicate preferences over refugees who
applied for relocation. Greek and Italian authorities then choose among appli-
cants and thereby “try as much as possible to meet the preferences expressed”
(Council of the European Union (2016)). After determining the matches, they
send relocation requests to the countries, which are legally binding.
However, the relocations are not running smoothly. Three problems are partic-
ularly noticeable. First, there seems to be considerable discontent with some
matches. Many refugees have disappeared after learning about the decision
on their destination country (European Commission (2016a)). Others have
vanished after their relocation, and preventing such irregular secondary move-
ments has become a central policy goal (Council of the European Union (2015);
European Commission (2016c)). Second, the number of refugees distributed
lags far behind the policy target. By July 2016, almost a year after the Com-
mission’s proposal had been adopted, the total number of persons relocated
equalled only 3056, which corresponds to less than 2% of the 160,000 people
envisaged (European Commission (2016b)). As of July 2017, the mechanism
seems to have gained some traction, but still less than 25,000 refugees were
relocated (European Commission (2017)). Third, the preferences that some
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countries express are ethically problematic and in conflict with the EU’s policy
goals. For example, although the Council appealed to the member states to
prioritise particularly vulnerable persons (e.g., unaccompanied minors, preg-
nant women, disabled and elderly persons), some member states are reluctant
to receive persons from these groups (European Commission (2016a)). Fur-
thermore, although legally required to accept all types of refugees (including
those low-ranked on their preference orderings), some member states have re-
jected allocations on the grounds that their preferences were not respected
(European Commission (2016a)).
The problems with the EU relocation mechanism motivate three desiderata
on asylum matchings that will be adopted in this discussion. First, available
places should be used efficiently (in a sense to be specified). Roughly, the
refugees’ or countries’ preferences should be satisfied “as much as possible”. In
particular, refugees’ incentives to vanish or partake in secondary movements
should be minimised. Second, the number of refugees matched should be
maximised and should possibly equal the policy goal. Third, the system should
ban what is called an “incorrect use of preferences” (European Commission
(2016a)): preferences should be expressed in line with fundamental ethical
principles and higher-order policy goals.
The desiderata can be defined precisely within the framework of matching
theory, which shall be introduced next.
4.2 Asylum as College Admissions Problem
Matching under preferences is a tool from cooperative game theory. It can
be applied to two-sided markets in which heterogeneous agents, or goods,
of one side are to be distributed over agents or goods of the other side of
the market, and the satisfaction of agents’ preferences, or respect for agents’
priorities, matter. Gale and Shapley (1962) laid the theoretical foundations
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for the theory. Centralised matching systems have since been implemented
in different contexts such as matching students to universities, job-seekers to
employment, or kidney donors to patients.
Various economists and political scientists have argued that implementing a
matching system in the context of asylum would be beneficial for refugees,
or their possible host countries. Jesu´s Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga and Hillel
Rapoport were the first to suggest a matching system which is embedded in the
tradeable immigration quotas system they propose for, among other things,
the distribution of refugees over EU countries (see Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga
and Rapoport (2014, 2015a,b)). Moreover, Will Jones and Alex Teytelboym
advertise the implementation of matching systems both on a global and on a lo-
cal scale (see Jones and Teytelboym (2017a) and Jones and Teytelboym (2018),
respectively). David Delacre´taz, Scott Duke Kominers and Teytelboym pro-
pose specific mechanisms for locally matching refugees with communities in
different institutional and informational settings (Delacre´taz et al. (2016 ver-
sion)); and Tommy Andersson and Lars Ehlers design a matching system in
the context of assigning private housing to refugees in Sweden (Andersson and
Ehlers (2018)).
Rather than argue for a specific matching system, or matching systems gen-
erally, our interest here is to show that matching theory yields insights that
are important for the ethics of asylum distribution. The main difference be-
tween the EU’s relocation mechanism and a centralised matching system is
that, in the latter, the matchings are determined through the application of
a mechanical procedure. The resulting matchings can be compared along the
same properties, however, and thus the desiderata within the framework of
matching theory and the theoretical results hold equally for contexts such as
the relocations in the EU.
Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2014) propose implementing a Col-
lege Admissions (CA) model. This model resembles our case study in that it
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takes into account the preferences countries have over (groups of) refugees,
which is why it serves as a natural starting point. It differs from the case
study in that members of either side of the market are equally treated as agents
with preferences over members of the other side of the market: countries have
preferences over refugees and refugees have preferences over countries, which
is why the CA model allows for more general mechanisms than the EU’s re-
location mechanism which only takes countries’ preferences into account. A
matching affects the countries’ and refugees’ welfare relative to the satisfaction
of their preferences.
Formally,3 a CA-instance of a refugee-country matching problem is a four-
tuple (C,R, q,P), where C = {c1, . . . , cm} and R = {r1, . . . , rn} are disjoint
sets of m countries and n refugees, respectively. The agents of the market
are the members ak ∈ R ∪ C. We are concerned with many-to-one matchings
since it can be assumed that n  m and each refugee can obtain asylum
in at most one country, whereas a given country can accept many refugees.
The maximum number of refugees that can be matched to each country is
determined by a vector of quotas q = (qj)j∈{1,...,m} ∈ Nm. As described in
the previous section, quotas may be imposed according to a distribution key,
the outcome of a market of tradeable immigration quotas, or they may be
individually set by the countries. But quotas might be rejected altogether on
ethical grounds. The model does not take up a stance on this because it does
not commit us to effective quotas. For instance, setting qj = n for all cj ∈ C
makes them dummies. Finally, P = {P (c1), . . . , P (cm), P (r1), . . . , P (rn)} is
a set of preference lists which induces a complete, transitive, and irreflexive
preference profile for each country over the set of refugees and for each refugee
over the set of countries. Write c1 ri c2 to denote that ri prefers c1 to c2,
and equivalently for countries’ preferences.
For the time being, we suppose that refugees may declare countries unaccept-
3My notation loosely follows Klaus et al. (2016).
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able, and countries may declare refugees unacceptable (we shall discuss and
restrict this condition later on). Hence, there is a subset E ⊆ R × C of ac-
ceptable refugee-country pairs. Denote A(ri) = {cj |(ri, cj) ∈ E} the set of
acceptable countries for a given ri ∈ R; and equivalently for the countries.
An assignment M is a subset of E, and the set of assignees for a given ak ∈
R ∪ C is denoted M(ak). A refugee ri can be unassigned so M(ri) = ∅, or
otherwise assigned. Similarly, a country cj is undersubscribed if |M(cj)| < qj ,
and full if |M(cj)| = qj .
Definition 4.1 (Matching) A matching is an assignment with
(i) |M(ri)| ≤ 1 for all ri ∈ R; and
(ii) |M(cj)| ≤ qj for all cj ∈ C.
Condition (i) says that a given refugee is either assigned to a single country or
unassigned under a matching. As usual in the literature, I will use M(ri) to
refer to the country to which ri is matched instead of the singleton containing
that country, whenever this does not cause confusion. Condition (ii) says that
a given country accepts a subset of the set of refugees, the cardinality of which
is restricted by that country’s quota. In the following, we say equivalently that
ri is matched to cj and that cj is matched to ri under M if (ri, cj) ∈M .
4.2.1 Stability and Deferred Acceptance Algorithms
We can now turn to the desiderata encountered in the previous section. I will
argue that the desideratum that preferences be satisfied “as much as possible”
amounts to stability (ST) in the CA model. We shall first define this property
and introduce an algorithm that produces stable matchings (that is, matchings
that satisfy ST) for every CA-instance.
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A matching M is blocked by a refugee-country pair (ri, cj) ∈ E \M if ri is
unassigned in M or prefers cj to M(ri), and at the same time cj is undersub-
scribed in M or prefers ri to a member of M(cj). A matching is stable if it is
not blocked by any refugee-country pair.
Deferred acceptance algorithms produce stable matchings in every CA-instance
(Gale and Shapley (1962)); in the following, we call such mechanisms stable
too. Consider the following, “country-proposing deferred acceptance algo-
rithm”, µC :
• In the first step, each country proposes to its most preferred acceptable
refugees until its quota is filled. Each refugee tentatively accepts her most
preferred country among the acceptable proposers and rejects the other
proposers.
• In the second step, each undersubscribed country proposes to the next
best preferred acceptable refugees to whom it has not yet proposed until
its quota is filled. Each refugee tentatively accepts her most preferred
country among the acceptable proposers and the country she tentatively
accepted in the previous step, and rejects the other proposers.
• The process is repeated until there are no more proposals.4
The ending condition applies when either all refugees are matched, or all coun-
tries are full, or there are unmatched refugees and undersubscribed countries
4I should add two qualifications. First, µC is a simple algorithm which is not fit for
purpose. For example, it cannot accommodate the fact that many refugees flee as couples
or in families that should not be separated. It is nevertheless introduced in order to make
clear the ethical problem that the size and the “quality” of matchings can be in conflict—a
problem which is present in more complex algorithms (e.g., Delacre´taz et al. (2016 version)).
Second, µC is not the only stable mechanism. The reason it is presented here is that it is the
deferred acceptance algorithm which is arguably closest to implementing the mechanism used
in the EU relocations in which the countries “pick” refugees according to their preferences.
But whereas µC also respects the refugees’ preferences, they are not taken into consideration
in the EU mechanism. Whether a country- or a refugee-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm is preferable is debatable as both have pros and cons (for example, Ferna´ndez-
Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2014) propose µC , whereas Jones and Teytelboym (2017a)
prefers a refugee-proposing algorithm). For our purposes, nothing hinges on this question
and our arguments in the following hold equally for other deferred acceptance algorithms.
110 Chapter 4. Towards a Fair Distribution Mechanism for Asylum
but all such agents are deemed unacceptable by the remaining partners they
find acceptable. For an illustration of the algorithm, consider a small CA-
instance.
Example 4.1 There are three refugees, r1, r2, r3, and two countries c1, c2 with
q1 = 2 and q2 = 1. The preference relations are as specified in Table 4.1.
Countries Refugees
r1 c1 r2 c1 r3 c2  c1 for both r1 and r2
r2 c2 r1 c2 r3 r3 declares only c2 acceptable
Table 4.1: Table specifying refugees’ and countries’ preferences. a c b denotes
that c strictly prefers a to b.
Apply µC . In the first step, c1 proposes to r1 and r2, and c2 proposes to r2.
r2 tentatively accepts c2 and rejects c1, and r1 tentatively accepts c1. c1 has a
free place. In the second step, c1 proposes to r3 and r3 rejects. c1 has a free
place but no more refugees to propose to so the algorithm stops. The resulting
matching is ((c1, r1), (c2, r2)).
It can easily be checked that the matching is stable. For example, r1 prefers
c2 to her actual match, c1. However, c2 does not form a blocking pair with
r1 because it is full and prefers its actual match to r1. Similarly for the
unmatched r3.
Why does (ST) in the CA model amount to satisfying preferences “as much
as possible”? First, it implies Pareto efficiency in the CA model: agents could
only be made better off by making other agents worse off. (It can easily be
verified that this is true in the above example.)
Second, a distribution that satisfies (ST) can be considered to be fair in the
following sense. Only if c2 had free places available or preferred r1 to its
actual match would r1 have a justified claim to be matched to c2, but this is
ruled out because the matching is stable. This lack of justified claims is what
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makes for a fair distribution. Note that this condition may not be sufficient
for eliminating all discontent with the matchings: it does not imply that all
agents get what they want most (which is usually impossible, see Example 1).
It only implies that they are matched to an acceptable partner and that they
are not matched to a less preferred partner when a more preferred partner
would be available.
Third, the sense of fairness that (ST) conveys can be expected to contribute
to the thickness of the market: it gives agents on both sides incentives to par-
ticipate in the system. Conversely, if (ST) is violated, both sides of the market
may be dissatisfied. There is ample evidence that in many contexts, agents
seek to arrange bilateral arrangements outside the system when this happens
(we encountered this unravelling of the market in the context of matching
doctors with hospitals in Chapter 3). Note that the EU relocation mecha-
nism violates (ST) in a specific way: it does not systematically take refugees’
preferences into account, which is why the resulting matchings may be con-
sidered unfair for refugees. In this context, it may be difficult for refugees to
arrange bilateral arrangements outside the system. Instead, the failure to take
their preferences into account may contribute to the finding from the previous
section that many vanish after learning about their destination countries, or
partake in illegal secondary movements.
4.2.2 Maximum Cardinality vs. Stability
Let us now consider the second desideratum encountered in Section 4.1. Call
the number of refugees assigned in a matching its cardinality. The cardinality
of a matching depends on the set of acceptable refugee–country pairs, that is,
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the set E ⊆ R × C.5 Call maximum cardinality (MC) the desideratum that
matchings should not waste places. More precisely, for a given CA-instance,
a matching M satisfies (MC) if and only if |M | ≥ |M ′| for all matchings M ′.
In example 1 above, ((c1, r1), (c1, r2), (c2, r3)) is the unique maximum cardi-
nality matching. It is not stable because (c2, r1) and (c2, r2) are blocking pairs:
both r1 and r2 prefer c2 to c1, and at the same time c2 prefers both r1 and
r2 to r3. In contrast, remember that applying µ
C produced the stable match-
ing ((c1, r1), (c2, r2)), leaving r3 unmatched and c1 undersubscribed. Thus,
satisfying (ST) comes at the price of failing to satisfy (MC).
The fact that (MC) and (ST) may conflict poses a problem because both (MC)
and (ST) have normative appeal. In many contexts where matching theory
is applied, (ST) is the primary policy goal, and there is some loss in the size
of the matchings allowed for because it can be compensated through different
instruments from market design. Two such instruments shall be discussed
briefly and shown to be inadequate in the context of the asylum market. This
suggests that there is no simple resolution to the problem.
First, in some matching markets (e.g. for medical residents, or for graduate
economists’ academic jobs), so-called “scrambles” have been established for
unmatched and undersubscribed agents. These are decentralised post-match
markets where available agents of both sides of the market can find each other
and positions can be filled (Coles et al. (2010)). However, the fundamental
difference between matching asylum and contexts where matching theory is
usually applied is that in those contexts, both sides of the market have incen-
tives to fill available places. In the context of asylum, many countries have
5The cardinality of matchings also crucially depends on countries’ quotas which are taken
as exogenous variables here. In passing, note that in contexts in which countries state vol-
untary quotas the application of deferred acceptance algorithms is problematic because they
generate incentives to capacity-manipulate: countries may gain by stating smaller quotas.
As shown in So¨nmez (1997), there is no stable mechanism that is immune to capacity-
manipulation. Hence, µC combined with voluntary quotas would incentivise countries to
enter a race of diminishing their stated capacities—which is an extremely undesirable conse-
quence for a good in short supply, and may serve as an argument against voluntary quotas.
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opposite incentives, and few countries not filling their quotas would advertise
this in a scramble. A scramble is thus unlikely to be efficient or even to emerge
in the first place.
Second, countries unable to fill their quotas may be penalised.6 Penalties are
often difficult to impose, however, even when countries’ participation in a re-
location mechanism is obligatory. In the EU context, for example, it has been
proposed that countries not filling their quotas pay a fine of 250,000 Euros for
every assigned place that remains empty. What the prospects are for this pro-
posal is questionable, however, as various countries, most notably members
of the Visegra´d Group, are virtually boycotting the relocations. Moreover,
Hungary and Slovakia took legal steps against the relocations and refused to
accept any more refugees before a verdict would be announced.7 The Eu-
ropean Court of Justice dismissed the suit,8, but Hungary’s prime minister
Viktor Orba´n declared that this won’t change Hungary’s policy of not partic-
ipating in relocations.9 While it may be possible to penalise Hungary for not
complying with the EU regulations in the future, the process can be expected
to be long and politically tedious. Update from September 2018: the EU par-
liament voted to punish Hungary over ‘breaches of core values’, which opens
the possibility to suspend Hungary’s voting rights. However, a suspension is
unlikely to happen because it would require an unanimous vote, but other
countries of the Visegra´d Group are likely to vote against a suspension.
Besides worries about the prospects for implementing penalties, note that they
make the system manipulable: it may pay for refugees to be “picky”. This
is the case when the revenues from the penalties are used to provide more
asylum places elsewhere, thus in the best case satisfying (MC). In example 1,
applying µC , r1 gets assigned to her least preferred country, c1. Now, suppose
6Penalties are proposed in Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2014) in the context
of a market of tradeable immigration quotas, where the penalty is a function of the difference
of the quota negotiated and the number of refugees assigned to the country under µC .
7See Rettman (2015) online, accessed on 22 September 2017.
8See Court of Justice of the European Union (2017), accessed on 22 September 2017.
9See Office (2017), accessed on 22 September 2017.
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that for each place that remains empty, c1 is penalised and with the help
of the penalty, a place is created elsewhere. If r1 prefers a place elsewhere
to c1, she would gain by declaring c1 unacceptable even though she finds it
acceptable. Although these are not definite reasons for the intractability of
imposing penalties, they do suggest some caution: imposing penalties may be
difficult, and may lead to undesirable incentive structures. Since these issues
do not seem to have a definite solution at present, penalties will be neglected
in the following.10
Whenever (ST) and (MC) are in conflict, we must bite the bullet and give up
one of the desiderata. Which one? Consider again example 1. Suppose r3
is justified in declaring c1 unacceptable. For example, she may belong to an
ethnic or religious group that is persecuted in c1 (and suppose r1 and r2 do not
belong to such a group). Refugee r3 is then in a particularly disadvantaged
situation because she cannot expect protection in one of the countries within
the system. By assigning her to the acceptable country c2, the maximum
matching gives priority to r3. Since priority is given to the worst-off, (MC)
could be interpreted as a prioritarian condition.11 It is moreover a condition
that the Rawlsian maximin principle would embrace (Rawls (1971)).
Giving priority to the worst-off may come at the cost of making other agents in
the market worse off. In the example, r2 and c2 are worse-off in the maximum
matching than in the stable matching. As we have seen, (ST) implies Pareto
10For more arguments against penalties, cf. Jones and Teytelboym (2017a). A third resort
to fix the problem is to internalise it in the matching system by imposing minimum quotas.
This strategy is not relevant here because the context of asylum is different to the setting
where minimum quotas are usually investigated. For example, Fragiadakis et al. (2015)
investigate minimum quotas in the context of school choice. They assume that all schools
are acceptable to all students and vice versa, and look at the case where the number of
students is strictly between the sum of the schools’ minimum quotas and the sum of the
schools’ maximum quotas. In the case where the number of students exceeds the number
of places available—which is to be expected in the context of asylum—minimum quotas are
dummies in this setting. In contrast, the problem we are concerned with is the case in which
places may be wasted due to the size of the set of acceptable refugee-country pairs. The
special case where students may declare schools unacceptable is considered in Fragiadakis
et al. (2015), but their mechanisms allow violating minimum quotas and don’t satisfy (MC).
11E.g. Parfit (1997, 2012).
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efficiency in the CA model. Moreover, we have interpreted this property as the
desideratum that agents’ preferences should be satisfied “as much as possible”
in the CA model. Thus, in contrast to (MC), (ST) in the CA model could be
approximately characterised as “utilitarian”.12
Which condition should be the dominant consideration? Arguably, in the
context of asylum in which by definition, people are in disadvantaged and
vulnerable situations, it is a more reasonable policy to give priority to the
worst-off. There is empirical evidence that this agrees with a widespread
intuition in many receiving countries (Bansak et al. (2016)). This suggests
that satisfying preferences is not a reasonable policy in instances in which it
violates maximum cardinality.
A second reason for giving priority to (MC) over (ST) is that asylum is a public
good and is as such in constant short supply (Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga and
Rapoport (2014)). For example, remember that the total number of persons
relocated in the EU up to July 2016 was less than 2% of the 160,000 people
envisaged (European Commission (2016a)). On a larger scale, the UN Refugee
Agency estimates the projected global resettlement needs in 2017 more than
seven times higher (over 1.19 million) than the sum of the expected global
quotas from resettlement countries (170,000, see UNHCR (2016)). The gap
between demand and supply is so blatant that the desideratum to bring many
refugees into a safe harbour trumps the desideratum to satisfy “as much as
possible” the preferences of fewer.
4.2.3 When Preferences Can Be Taken into Account
It is also possible to investigate the conditions under which (ST) and (MC) are
jointly satisfied. For example, Andersson and Ehlers (2018) design a mecha-
12E.g., Harsanyi (1976). Note that this is not a precise characterisation because the
matching framework introduced here does not allow for cardinal utilities which are required
for utilitarianism to be a meaningful doctrine. The labelling as “utilitarian” is a mere
approximation.
116 Chapter 4. Towards a Fair Distribution Mechanism for Asylum
nism that produces maximum stable matchings for assigning refugee families
to landlords in Sweden. In that context, maximum stable matchings exists be-
cause refugees’ and landlords’ preferences only range over common languages
spoken and the sizes of families, and they are assumed to be correlated in
a specific way. In the present context of distributing refugees over countries,
preference structures are more complex. However, a simple sufficient condition
can be given: note that (ST) and (MC) conflict only if some countries deem
some refugees unacceptable, or if some refugees deem some countries unac-
ceptable. Recall that E ⊆ R×C denotes the set of acceptable refugee-country
pairs, so that E = R × C indicates that everyone finds everyone acceptable.
Then, we have the following simple fact.
Proposition 4.1 In CA-instances in which E = R × C, stable maximum
matchings exist.
It is easy to see that the proposition is true. Suppose E = R × C in a given
CA-instance. It can then be shown that the stable mechanism µC provides
a maximum matching. Applying µC , a refugee ri accepts any country cj ’s
proposal in a step n unless in some step up to n, a preferred country has
proposed to ri. Recall that qj denotes country j’s quota. There are two cases
to consider. First, suppose there are more places than refugees, i.e., |R| <∑m
k=1 qk. Each refugee who gets a proposal at some point will get matched
because she only rejects if she already has a better offer. However, each refugee
gets a proposal at some point because E = R×C. Thus, the resulting matching
M has a cardinality equal to the number of refugees, |M | = |R|, and so M is
maximum. Second, suppose the number of refugees exceeds or equals the sum
of all quotas, i.e., |R| ≥ ∑mk=1 qk. Because E = R × C every country will fill
its quota, and |M | =∑mk=1 qk. Hence, M is again maximum.
Although the proposition states a very simple fact, it leads to interesting
moral considerations. Can we require as a policy that every country deems
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every refugee acceptable and vice versa? The former is the case in the context
of the EU’s relocation mechanism: member states are required to accept all
types of refugees, not only those on their preference lists (Council of the Euro-
pean Union (2015)).13 The reason this is required is that unilaterally declaring
groups of refugees unacceptable may open the door to discriminatory policies.
Moreover, it would allow countries to “play dummy”: by stating a small or
empty preference list, countries could participate in the system without fulfill-
ing their quotas. It is reported in European Commission (2016a) that this has
indeed happened in the context of relocations in the EU—although it is an
illegal practice—and that member states are urged to refrain from it. Thus,
for the initiators of the EU relocation mechanism, it seems uncontroversial
that countries must accept all types of refugees, and the problem is rather to
enforce this rule. However this may be enforced in practice, the CA model
should be modified by imposing the restriction that the countries’ preference
profiles range over the whole set of refugees; formally, A(cj) = R for all cj ∈ C.
To require that all refugees deem all countries acceptable is more problematic.
As shown in the above example, if it is to be expected that in a given country
the rights of a certain group of refugees are violated, then refugees who belong
to this group can justifiably refuse to go there. Reasons for justified refusal
include denial of non-discriminatory access to national services and public
goods.
On the other hand, if it is the case that in each country within the system all
refugees’ rights are respected, refugees can be expected to deem all countries
acceptable. Suppose the sum of the available places equals the number of
refugees within the system. The following may then be considered a condition
of fairness: a given refugee gets matched if she declares all countries accept-
13Cf. “Member States retain the right to refuse to relocate an applicant only where there
are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to their national security or
public order”, and: “Member States of relocation...should be ready to welcome all types of
migrants (families, unaccompanied minors, single male applicants)” (Council of the European
Union (2015)).
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able.14 In other words, if a refugee is willing to be matched with any country
within the system she is guaranteed a place. This fairness condition agrees
with the European Commission’s proposal according to which refugees’ suc-
cessful applications to the relocation scheme do not imply a choice as to which
country they move, but they do imply a relocation (European Commission
(2016a)).
To sum up, if refugees’ rights are respected in each country within the system,
then it can be required that “everyone finds everyone acceptable”, which guar-
antees that (ST) and (MC) can jointly be satisfied. However, whenever the set
of countries includes a country where some minorities’ rights are violated—
although for other groups it may be a safe harbour—refugees that belong to
these minorities cannot be expected to deem that country acceptable. (ST)
should then be given up: in such instances, it is not a reasonable policy to take
preferences into account. The trade-off between (ST) and (MC) can thus be
interpreted as delimiting the area where preference satisfaction is a desirable
policy goal. In the remainder of this article, it is assumed that the condition of
no rights violations is met, and thus that a maximum stable matching exists.
4.3 Compliance with Higher-Order Policy Goals and
Ethical Principles
In this section, it is argued that, even if the requirement of no rights violation
is met and a modified CA model adopted in which “everyone finds everyone
acceptable”, this model must be rejected. The reason is that the CA model
conflicts with the third desideratum encountered in Section 4.1: that the sys-
tem should ban the possibility of “incorrect uses of preferences” (European
14The proof is a trivial extension of the one for proposition above: if there are refugees
who deem some countries unacceptable, then a refugee who deems all countries acceptable
gets matched to at least as good a country as in the case where all refugees deem all countries
acceptable.
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Commission (2016a)). An “incorrect use of preferences” is an expression of
preferences which are in conflict with higher-order policy goals or ethical prin-
ciples. Call this desideratum on the system compliance (COM). Compliance
is also violated if agents can “game the system”, i.e., achieve a more preferred
matching by handing in preference lists strategically. It is a well-known re-
sult in matching theory that no stable mechanism is strategy-proof in the CA
model (Roth (1982)). In the following, two additional lines will be discussed
along which (COM) is violated in the CA model: the model enables the ex-
pression of impermissible preferences; and popular countries may be unduly
favoured at the expense of less popular countries.
4.3.1 Impermissible Preferences of the Countries
So far, we have examined a model in which countries have strict and com-
plete preferences over refugees. In practice, since the number of refugees may
be large, countries cannot give strict preference lists over refugees. Rather,
countries have preferences over groups of refugees that are identified through
a classification according to properties the countries are interested in, such as
profession, languages spoken, family status, urgency, etc. Suppose such a clas-
sification system is available. Countries are then indifferent between members
of one and the same group, and a tiebreaker must be applied in order for the
system to work.15
The task of designing a feasible classification system immediately gives rise
to ethical problems: what properties of refugees can permissibly figure in
countries’ preferences? It has been argued that immigrants should generally
not be selected on grounds of ethnicity, and that countries’ preferences should
15This is usually a randomisation device, which has potentially problematic consequences.
For some strict CA-instances obtained by breaking the ties the matchings produced by
deferred acceptance algorithms may be Pareto dominated for the refugees by results of
other possible tie breakings. The algorithms may be modified to solve for Pareto efficient
matchings but only at the cost of strategy-proofness (Erdil and Ergin (2008); Abdulkadirog˘lu
et al. (2009)). This may pose a problem in practice; for simplicity, it will not figure in the
arguments given here.
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be restricted to range over “neutral” properties such as particular skills (Miller
(2008)). This principle should arguably also be applied in the context of
asylum. It agrees with the EU’s relocation mechanism, which allows member
states to express their preferences over refugees, albeit with “due respect of
the principle of non-discrimination” (European Commission (2015)).
It is, however, hardly possible to entirely ban the use of ethically impermissi-
ble preferences in the CA model if there are countries in the system with such
preferences. Restrictions can be imposed on the classification system—e.g.,
that preferences along ethnicity be forbidden. However, ethnicities also deter-
mine other features that are present in any reasonable classification system,
such as mother tongue. Correlations between different such factors may make
it possible to game the system, thereby violating (COM).16 In line with the
standard rationality assumption in market design that was discussed in Chap-
ter 2, we assume that the market participants game the system whenever it is
possible to do so.
Even if it were possible to design a classification system that cannot be ma-
nipulated in this way, countries’ preferences may still conflict with ethical
principles and higher-order policy goals. The EU relocation mechanism pro-
vides plenty of evidence. For example, European Commission (2016a) urges
countries to express preferences in line with the policy goal “to facilitate inte-
gration of the relocated person in the Member State of relocation”. However,
“the majority of Member States use the preferences as a means to exclude
possible candidates rather than to allow for a better matching process for
better integration”. As a consequence, it is demanded that “Member States
of relocation should limit to the extent possible the preferences expressed”
(ibid.). However, this stands in stark contrast to the rules of the relocation
mechanism, which allow countries to express preferences in order to achieve
16Miller (2008) excludes this on grounds of “good faith”. However, with regards to asylum,
good faith is a weak hope to rely on in reality, particularly considering that many EU
countries have not complied with their humanitarian responsibilities during the refugee crisis
(Lu¨cke (2016)).
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good matches. It also stands in contrast to the CA model.
4.3.2 Unequal Treatment of Countries
Another important policy goal in the EU’s relocation mechanism is to achieve
equal treatment of countries. For example, concerning particularly vulnera-
ble applicants, the Council urges “the necessity of ensuring a fair distribution
of those applicants among Member States” (Council of the European Union
(2015)). Equal treatment of countries is desirable both for fairness considera-
tions and because it may be practically infeasible to impose a system in which
some countries are worse off than others. If the system cannot ban the expres-
sion of preferences that leads to unequal treatment of countries, then there is
a violation of (COM). The CA model may violate (COM) in this respect, in
the following way.
In a usual asylum market, there are more and less popular countries for large
proportions of refugees, that is, their preferences are correlated. If refugees’
preference relations are sufficiently homogeneous, then deferred acceptance
algorithms (including µC) in the CA model show favouritism to the most
popular countries. For example, suppose there are two countries, HI and LO,
and 100 refugees r1, . . . , r100, all of whom prefer HI to LO. Applying µ
C , HI
can “cherry-pick” its favourite group of refugees until its quota is satisfied.
The problem is that LO’s preferences are not at all taken into account: under
any possible preference list, it will be assigned the same refugees. Moreover,
this implies a practical problem: why should LO be willing to join the system?
But if countries that consider themselves on the “losing side” are discouraged
from participating in the system, this may produce a market that is too short
on the supply side if participation is voluntary, or no market at all if they are
co-policy setters with sufficient weight.
Are refugees’ preferences really so homogeneous that popular countries would
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be shown favouritism at the expense of unpopular countries? This question
has not been answered conclusively. First of all, it is not clear how to set the
threshold of when unacceptable favouritism begins. However, even if this is
settled, so far not much data have been collected as to the actual preferences
of refugees, and it is difficult to infer from the total or relative numbers of past
asylum applications in a given country to the popularity of that country; for
asylum seekers may not have had a choice as to where to apply for asylum.
It seems a risky policy to implement a system in which popular countries are
shown favouritism if refugees’ preferences are sufficiently homogeneous, given
that it is an open question whether their preferences are indeed so homoge-
neous.
Furthermore, there are indicators suggesting that refugees’ preferences are rel-
atively homogeneous. Two of the most important factors that shape refugees’
preferences are family and diaspora in a country (e.g., Roth (2015c); on a
local level also Katz et al. (2016)). These factors tend to cluster the prefer-
ences of a population of refugees from a given country or region and make
them more homogeneous than those of populations from different countries
or regions. But currently, the main population of asylum seekers is centred
on few countries.17 This may be evidence that their preference relations are
indeed relatively homogeneous.
Jones and Teytelboym (2017a) argue that one can turn the tables on homo-
geneity of preferences. The risk of homogeneity may have positive effects on
the market, so their argument goes, because countries will have incentives to
court refugees in order to become popular destinations. This, however, seems
to be an overly optimistic claim. For instance, a country may be unattractive
for reasons that cannot be eliminated by changing its incentives—particularly,
economic reasons. It seems that this country would then be unjustly disad-
vantaged in the CA model, if refugees’ preferences are homogeneously biased
17In 2015, almost one out of three first time asylum seekers entering the EU originated
from Syria, followed by Afghanistan (14%) and Iraq (11%) (Eurostat (2015, 2016)).
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against it. Moreover, the argument does not address the problem that the mar-
ket may not even come into existence if states are not interested in “courting”
refugees. This will be the case especially if they consider themselves on the
losing side as a consequence of past deterrence of refugees.
Moreover, the incentives argument can be turned around. As discussed in the
previous section, refugees can be expected to deem a country acceptable only if
their rights are respected there. However, a country interested in diminishing
the number of refugees matched to it may have incentives to deter them from
coming through drastic messages, or even to violate the rights of refugees
already in the country in order to achieve this goal. Such policies are in effect
in various countries all over the world,18 and the fact that the CA model may
enforce the incentives for such policies casts doubt on its normative desirability
and effective operation.
Summing up, the CA model not only makes it difficult to prevent discrimi-
natory policies. It also likely disadvantages some countries at the expense of
others, thus provoking inequality among the countries and yielding undesir-
able incentive structures. The CA model violates (COM) in these respects,
and, arguably, this is sufficient reason to reject the CA model for the asylum
market.
4.4 Asylum as School Choice Problem
In the previous section, we encountered two lines along which the CA model
violates (COM). First, even if the classification of refugees is restricted to
“neutral” properties, it cannot be ruled out that some countries manipulate the
system by expressing “incorrect preferences” (European Commission (2016a)).
Second, popular countries’ preferences likely receive overproportional weight
18For example, Hungary has been accused of criminalising and thereby violating refugees’
rights (e.g. UNHCR (2015), or Amnesty International (2015)). Similar reproaches have been
addressed to Australia (e.g. Fletcher (2014)).
124 Chapter 4. Towards a Fair Distribution Mechanism for Asylum
at the expense of less popular countries.
What drives both problems is that countries are allowed to state preferences
over groups of refugees. This motivates the following modification of the sys-
tem. Refugees’ preferences are taken into account, as before. However, coun-
tries are not considered economic agents with preferences over the people they
provide with asylum; instead, asylum in a country is an object to be consumed
by an asylum seeker. It is an object in short supply, but at the same time, it
would be “repugnant” to sell it on a free market, in the sense of Roth (2007):
many people think such transactions should not occur even if agents in the
market would voluntarily engage in them.
How should asylum be distributed, if not through a free market? Arguably,
a country should give its available places to the applicants who need it most
or would most profit from it. This may be determined through priorities for
specific features of refugees (instead of preferences over refugees). Priorities
may comprise features such as vulnerability, urgency, dependants in a coun-
try, languages spoken, specific skills, etc. (these examples are policy goals
set by the Council of the European Union (2015, 2016)). Criteria for set-
ting priorities must be commonly agreed on, plausibly in conformance with a
supranational institution such as the European Parliament, and should com-
prise only “neutral” properties. For example, a country could be allowed to
prioritise refugees who speak its language but should not be allowed to priori-
tise race (Jones and Teytelboym (2017a)). National governments could then
determine which features to prioritise while respecting the criteria agreed on.
In terms of matching theory, this suggests modelling asylum as a School Choice
(SC) problem. The SC model was developed for the assignment of pupils to
public schools in US school districts. In this context, schools are not as-
sumed to be strategic agents, and it is only the pupils’ welfare that matters
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003)). Formally, the SC model can be at-
tained from the CA model by restricting the set of preference lists to the
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refugees, and defining priority lists for the countries. Thus, an SC instance
of a refugee-country matching problem is a five-tuple (R,C, q,P,Pri) with
P = {P (r1), . . . , P (rn)}, and where Pri = {Pri(c1), . . . , P ri(cm)} is the set
of countries’ priority lists. It is assumed that all refugees deem all countries
acceptable and priorities range over all refugees, so E = R×C. The definition
of a matching is equivalent to that in the CA model.
Priority rankings are usually generated through a point system. If two appli-
cants have identical points, the priority ranking may be determined through
a lottery or continuous factors. In the context of the refugee match, it seems
plausible to give a refugee who has been waiting longer for transfer more points
in all countries’ rankings than to a refugee with less waiting time spent, other
things being equal; so waiting time since registration in the system could be
used as a continuous variable to break non-strict priorities.19
Stability (ST) is in SC-instances usually interpreted as the elimination of justi-
fied envy (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003)), but, in the context of asylum,
the term elimination of justified grievance may appear more appropriate. If a
refugee does not get matched to her most preferred destination and the match-
ing satisfies (ST), then she has a lower priority in that country than all the
refugees matched to it and, hence, there is no ground for grievance. Deferred
acceptance algorithms are applicable to SC-instances, and produce matchings
that satisfy (ST). Let µR be the algorithm equivalent to µC but with the roles
switched: the refugees propose and the countries accept the proposals in each
step of the refugees with the highest priorities up to filling the countries’ quo-
tas. µR is typically preferred to µC in the SC model in which only refugees’
welfare is taken into account because it produces the refugee-optimal stable
matchings. Moreover, it is strategy-proof for refugees and thus strategy-proof
19Depending on the context, refugees could be registered in member states of the system
or hotspots (reception centres in frontline states within the system), in camps external to
the member states of the system, or even in diplomatic missions such as embassies in the
region of origin (Ademmer et al. (2015)).
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tout court in a model in which countries do not strategise.20
An immediate normative problem that arises when applying the SC model
to the distribution of asylum is that in this model, stability does not imply
efficiency (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003)).21 The following example from
Roth (1982) illustrates this.
Example 4.2 There are three refugees, r1, r2, r3, and three countries c1, c2, c3
with q1,2,3 = 1. The refugees’ preferences and priorities are specified in Table
4.2.
Table 4.2: Priorities and preferences in example 4.2.
Pri P
r1 c1 r3 c1 r2 c2 r1 c1 r1 c3
r2 c2 r1 c2 r3 c1 r2 c2 r2 c3
r2 c3 r1 c3 r3 c1 r3 c2 r3 c3
The unique stable matching is ((r1, c1), (r2, c2), (r3, c3)). It is Pareto-dominated
by a matching where r1 and r2 switch their countries: ((r1, c2), (r2, c1), (r3, c3)).
This matching is not stable because (r3, c1) forms a blocking pair.
Is asylum a context in which complete elimination of justified grievance should
be ranked before efficiency, or vice versa? This depends on which interpreta-
tion of priorities is deemed appropriate in this context. Following Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003), if the interpretation ought to be, “a refugee of
higher priority in a country is entitled to asylum in that country before a
refugee with lower priority”, then we obtain elimination of justified grievance
because there cannot be blocking pairs. If priorities are interpreted in a weaker
sense and can be violated, exchanges as in Example 2 are possible which
achieve efficient matchings but at the cost of producing blocking pairs.
20The importance of strategy-proofness in the context of locally matching refugees is dis-
cussed in Jones and Teytelboym (2018) and Delacre´taz et al. (2016 version).
21Note that this is the case only when we insist on strategy-proofness; there is no such
tradeoff when countries strategise because stable outcomes are then efficient. See e.g., Kesten
(2010). Thanks to an anonymous referee of the journal Games for raising this point.
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While there may be some leeway for policy makers to decide which criterion
to prioritise (cf. Jones and Teytelboym (2017a)), we anticipate that (ST) is
important for the refugee match and normatively called for even if this leads
to some efficiency loss. In the example, the efficient matching assigns r3 to her
least preferred country even though she has higher priority in her first-choice
country, c1, than r2 who is assigned to it. Thus, the switch can be deemed
unfair against r3 because it causes r3 to have justified grievance. (ST) blocks
such unfair switches. This suggests that the elimination of justified grievance
can be interpreted as a condition of fairness. There is a further argument to
the effect that this fairness condition trumps efficiency in this context: we have
a trimmed efficiency criterion that only takes into account the welfare of one
side of the market. If switches are possible as in the example, then countries
could well complain by asking, “why are priorities even collected in the first
place”, and refuse to accept matches that are a result of such switches. (ST),
on the other hand, achieves fairness not only among refugees but also towards
countries because their priorities for refugees are respected.
As mentioned in Section 4.2, in many contexts fairness also contributes to the
thickness of markets, giving agents incentives to participate in the system. In
many contexts, if (ST) is violated, then the lack of fairness leads agents to
rematch and finally, to an unravelling of the system. In our context, agents
could be forced to participate in the system, and rematchings could perhaps
be made impossible (cf. Jones and Teytelboym (2017a)). Note also that of
course fairness cannot prevent illegal secondary movements. Nevertheless, a
lack of fairness would likely lead to frustration with the redistribution system,
which may, in turn, reinforce incentives to engage in illegal movement to coun-
tries other than the one matched to, or to vanish from the system altogether
after learning about the matched destination country. Moreover, if countries’
priorities are public information, then it is relatively easy for refugees to check
whether they are being treated unfairly. They would just need to ask others
about their priorities and check whether they are matched to a more pre-
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ferred country. Such information flows can be expected to be particularly
high in the important stage when refugees are waiting in a hotspot or camp
for their relocation, and when it is crucial that they have confidence in the
fairness of the system. Finally, there may also be practical arguments that
(ST) should be prioritised over efficiency. If justified grievance is not com-
pletely eliminated, then there may be legal appeals from individuals who have
a justified grievance.
4.4.1 Discussion and Objections
The desiderata (ST), (MC), and (COM) can be jointly satisfied if priorities can
be agreed to be imposed in a certain way. Since it is assumed that everyone
finds everyone else acceptable, (ST) and (MC) can be mutually satisfied, and
deferred acceptance algorithms solve for stable matchings of maximum cardi-
nality (the argument in Section 4.2 extends to this case). Moreover, priorities
can be formulated that satisfy (COM), and thus the two problems encoun-
tered in the previous section can be resolved in the SC model. First, criteria
must be agreed on for priorities that are acceptable. For example, it seems
reasonable that countries be allowed to prioritise refugees that speak their
language (Jones and Teytelboym (2017a)). Some countries may still be keen
to prioritise refugees on non-neutral properties such as religion; this is why
it is crucial to clearly determine which types of priorities are acceptable and
which are not. Doing so requires countries to give public reasons for the impo-
sition of priority structures, and possibly mediation by a confederation-level
institution. This would also prevent countries from being strategic, thereby
adapting to the rules of the SC model.
Second, in addition to the specific needs of the refugees, relational factors be-
tween different host countries can be taken into account so as to avoid the
danger of favouritism due to homogeneity. In the example where all refugees
prefer country HI to country LO, suppose HI has a stronger economy than
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LO, as measured in GDP per capita. Suppose, moreover, that all refugees
are workers with identical skills but half of them, r51–r100, are war-affected
and unable to work. For fairness reasons among the countries, humanitarian
factors could be given a higher priority in HI and economic factors (such as
integrability into the labour market) a higher priority in LO, thus matching
overproportionally many refugees from r51–r100 to HI and overproportion-
ally many refugees from r1–r50 to LO. This is again a process that calls for
negotiation and mediation by a higher-level institution.
If priorities are imposed as described above, (MC), (ST), and (COM) can be
jointly satisfied using deferred acceptance algorithms in the SC model. This
model should thus be preferred to the CA model in the context of asylum.
However, there is a counterargument: this comes at the price of treating asy-
lum places as objects to be consumed by refugees. If a supranational institu-
tion is involved in the decision as to which types of priorities are acceptable
and which are not, national policy makers may receive the impression that
their national sovereignty is threatened under this model. On the face of it,
it seems more realistic to model countries as agents with preferences because
their governments clearly have preferences on issues of immigration. However,
if the CA model appears more attractive to national governments than the
SC model, it may be difficult in practice to impose the latter as an asylum
policy whenever countries can voluntarily choose to participate in the system
or have legislative co-determination.22 This may, the objection goes, provide
a justified reason for why the EU allows countries to express their preferences
over refugees in the first place.
To counter this objection, remember what the European Commission seeks
to achieve by allowing countries to express preferences over refugees: to “fa-
cilitate their integration into the Member State of relocation”. However, be-
22This is the case in the EU: in the context of resettlements participation is voluntary
and in the context of relocations participation is obligatory but countries have legislative
co-determination through the Council.
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cause of her private information, a refugee herself knows best where she will
thrive; namely, “refugees go and integrate where they have family, where they
have community, or where they think they can support themselves—in that
order”.23 It can be assumed that this is also the member states’ primary
goal. However, for this objective, countries interested in their integration
will share refugees’ preferences to pool their families and communities and to
integrate them into the labour market. The SC model achieves this by collect-
ing refugees’ preferences and allowing countries to prioritise certain groups of
refugees along neutral properties.
A supranational mandate for the asylum system has additional advantages.
Importantly, it permits a consistent definition of what counts as a justified
asylum claim. A system that takes refugees’ preferences into account is more
attractive for refugees than a system that does not. Such a system can thus be
expected to increase the demand for asylum. However, countries usually have
an interest in narrowing down the market, rather than provoking a bigger run
on asylum. An effective way to prevent this is to apply a clear-cut definition
for the identification of justified asylum claims. However, this is difficult to
agree on by single states with diverse standards for asylum. In a nutshell, we
need a “communitarised” asylum system (Ademmer et al. (2015)). The SC
but not the CA model takes a step in this direction.
4.5 Conclusions
Policy makers are increasingly interested in the question of which refugees to
provide with asylum, in addition to the question of how many. The fact that
mechanisms for distributing refugees can be designed in different ways gives
rise to novel normative considerations. Reflecting on these has been the aim
23The CEO of the refugee resettlement agency Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS),
quoted in Roth (2015c). In a similar vein, Rapoport (2016) writes: “numerous studies show
that the best indicator of future integration of migrants is the preference they express for a
particular country”.
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of this chapter.
Some distribution mechanisms, such as the relocation mechanism in effect in
the EU, seek to achieve good matches by taking countries’ or refugees’ pref-
erences into account. I have argued that doing so may reduce the number of
refugees matched if refugees may declare countries unacceptable or vice versa.
However, to require that refugees accept any possible match presupposes that
each refugee’s rights be respected in all countries within the system—even in
countries where they do not end up living.
Second, I argued that national governments should not express preferences
over refugees. Instead, priorities for refugees should be imposed according to
humanitarian factors and fairness considerations among the countries within
the system. We then made the case that fairness is normatively called for and
may in the context of distributing asylum beat efficiency considerations.
In terms of matching theory, I identified several reasons why asylum should
not be modelled as a College Admissions but as a School Choice problem.
Results from matching theory also helped to identify some of the problems
that occur in the EU’s relocation mechanism. For example, the fact that
the mechanism does not systematically take refugees’ preferences into account
leads to unstable matchings and thereby violates fairness, which can be seen as
a minimal condition for content. I hope to have shown that matching theory
provides important tools for allocation problems in which agents’ preferences
matter and, thus, for numerous problems of distributive justice.
My aims have been normative: to reflect on the conditions under which it is a
desirable policy to take preferences into account, and whose preferences to take
into account. More technical work remains to be done for market designers,
in particular to design fair mechanisms for matching refugees who migrate
as families, and to investigate how relocation processes could be accelerated.
Moreover, more work remains to be done for policy makers, to impose fairer
asylum policies by drawing on insights from matching theory combined with
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the kinds of normative considerations that have been discussed here.
Chapter 5
Kidney Exchange and the
Ethics of Giving
Over 1.2 million people worldwide die of kidney disease each year, making it
a little-noticed epidemic, which is comparable in scale to all deaths by road
injuries.1 Increasing the number of kidney transplants from live or deceased
donors would save many lives, and it would improve the life expectancy and
quality of many more. At present, there is a striking shortage of kidneys for
transplantation.
Many patients have willing live donors, who cannot donate to their loved ones
because they are biologically incompatible. Kidney exchange (KE) promises
relief. For example, suppose your partner needs a kidney, but you cannot
donate because you are incompatible. If the same is true of a different donor-
recipient pair, it may be possible that you donate to the other recipient and
your partner gets the other donor’s kidney. Moreover, some people decide to
donate altruistically, that is, they give a kidney to a stranger without receiving
anything in return. Their gifts can trigger chains of KEs, thus multiplying the
1See Wang and et al. (2016), pp. 1483 and 1490 for kidney disease. They estimate the
number of deaths by road injuries worldwide at 1.3-1.4 million annually (p. 1491).
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benefits from a single donation. Below, a detailed description of different types
of KE will be provided.
However, KE frequently meets ethical objections, in particular concerning
donor protection. These are embodied in the transplant laws in many coun-
tries, which prohibit live organ donations to strangers, making the implemen-
tation of a broad range of KE procedures impossible. In light of the shortage
of kidneys for transplantation, it is an urgent matter to clarify the ethics
underlying KE.
This chapter aims to do this. It examines the implications for live kidney
donations of some weak tenets from the ethics of giving. What I call the
effectiveness principle is such a tenet. It says, roughly, that if a donation
can be allocated to benefit some persons, or to benefit more persons than the
first allocation, and the benefits to everyone are roughly identical, then we
ought to choose the second allocation. This principle implies that, when an
autonomous donor is given a choice between donating into a waiting list or
into KE, in many cases morality requires the latter. KE is thus instrumental in
meeting a moral obligation, which provides a novel argument for KE. We also
consider the motivations for kidney donations. KE programmes maximise the
goodness that a kidney donation can achieve; in particular, in their presence,
a donation can trigger > 1 life savings. Therefore, KE may increase the
motivation for donating, which constitutes a further argument for KE.
A balanced discussion must also take seriously the ethical concerns regarding
KE programmes. Throughout, the German transplant law is used as a case
study that expresses many of those concerns. I seek to distinguish the objec-
tions that are well-founded from those that are not and for the former, examine
their implications for different forms of KE. It will be argued that even very
conservative views on donor protection and distributive justice do not in prin-
ciple oppose KE. Together, these arguments make a robust case in favour of
providing a legal framework that allows implementing KE programmes.
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This chapter is organised as follows. The next section argues for some weak
principles from the ethics of giving. Section 5.2 explains the rationale for
and basic procedures of KE. Section 5.3 examines the implications of the in-
troduced principles for the allocation of kidneys, which constitutes the first
argument for KE. Section 5.4 considers some of the critics’ concerns and ar-
gues that they might restrict the domain and procedures of KE, but they do
not in principle reject KE. Section 5.5 considers motivational aspects of live
kidney donations, which constitute the second argument for KE. Section 5.6
concludes.
5.1 The Conditional Obligation to Donate Effec-
tively
Before turning to the allocation of kidneys, some basic principles from the
ethics of giving will be introduced. The philosophy of effective altruism has
recently drawn increased attention to this ethical branch. Effective altruists
believe that charitable giving should be done in a way that is most efficient
in promoting the most good.2 Effective altruism raises two questions: first,
to what extent (if at all) is there a moral imperative for individuals to give
resources to good causes; and second, if someone decides to give some of their
resources to a good cause, what does morality imply for their allocation? We
will only be concerned with the second, conditional question. To answer it,
weak principles suffice that many people who are not effective altruists will find
acceptable as well. The following trolley problem, which stems from Theron
Pummer (see Pummer (2016)), may help to find these principles.
Example 5.1 (Trolley) A trolley on a track A is headed for one innocent
person, and another trolley on a track B is headed for 100 different, innocent
2See Singer (2015) or MacAskill (2016). The former includes a chapter on altruistic
kidney donations.
136 Chapter 5. Kidney Exchange and the Ethics of Giving
persons. Each trolley will kill everyone on its track with certainty - unless you
stop it. You can stop one, but not both trolleys, by laying your arm on the
respective track. If you do so, you will lose your arm, but everyone on that
track will be rescued and nothing else will happen to you.
In line with the above, we make no claim as to whether there is a moral
obligation to stop a trolley by sacrificing your arm. Instead, we are interested
in the conditional question: if you choose to help, which trolley should you
stop? Most will agree that you ought to stop trolley B. It would not be
permissible to stop trolley A because you would only save one life instead of
100 by bearing the identical cost, namely your arm. Your rescuing would be
terribly ineffective. This appears to be a robust moral intuition. For instance,
suppose that, instead of sacrificing a limb, you can donate an amount of money
to stop one of the trolleys (but not both). Or suppose that your donation (be it
money, or your arm) will not save the lives of the persons on a track but would
merely prevent them from having short, miserable, or diseased lives, where this
benefit would roughly be the same for each beneficiary, no matter on which
track. The felt conditional obligation to benefit many, rather than few, when
the benefit is the same for each person, holds under a broad range of variations
of the problem. Accordingly, we shall assume the following principle:
Definition 5.1 (Effectiveness Principle) If one and the same donation
can be allocated to benefit some persons, or to benefit more persons than the
first allocation, and the benefit is roughly identical for each person under the
two possible allocations, then, other things being equal, there is a conditional
moral obligation to choose the second allocation.
It is worth emphasising that the effectiveness principle, while implied by ef-
fective altruism, is weaker and therefore less controversial than the latter.
For instance, effective altruism is demanding in terms of the cause that you
should support. If fighting malaria brings about the most good in the most
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cost-effective way, then effective altruism may imply that you ought not to sup-
port charities fighting homelessness in developed countries. The effectiveness
principle would only make this recommendation if the benefits were roughly
identical to each beneficiary and the beneficiaries under the former interven-
tion more numerous. But typically, these benefits are unequal for the homeless
in developed countries and persons suffering from malaria. Furthermore, ef-
fective altruism is typically thought to rely on a consequentialist and welfarist
moral theory.3 The effectiveness principle presupposes neither, as the condi-
tional obligation implicated by it could instead be argued to arise, for instance,
from fulfilling more claims to our aid.
The effectiveness principle is equipped with an other-things-being-equal clause
in order to accommodate factors which can make a difference in various moral
theories. For example, suppose the person on track A is a friend or family
member. This and other “agent-relative” reasons break the symmetry between
the two tracks, and they may excuse people from bringing about outcomes that
are less-than-optimal from an impartial point of view.4 There are also other
possible circumstances that may block the consequent of the effectiveness prin-
ciple, for example, if the person on track A would die with certainty whereas
the persons on track B have a non-zero chance of survival, or if helping has
bad side effects. The other-things-being-equal clause is supposed to capture
all such relevant considerations.
I shall next extend the effectiveness principle minimally along three, indepen-
dent lines. Each will be motivated by slightly altering the trolley problem.
3See Gabriel (2017). However, cf. Halstead et al. (2019).
4Horton (2017), p. 98. Absent agent-relative reasons, Horton agrees with Pummer that,
if we are willing to make a sacrifice, we are morally obliged to bring about the best possible
outcome by making this sacrifice. He gives a very similar version of the trolley problem,
which differs in that stopping trolley B rescues all 101 persons. For example, this could be
incorporated in the assumption that stopping trolley B also induces trolley A to stop, but
not vice versa. This version is weaker because, if you deem it a conditional moral obligation
to rescue the 100 persons on track B in Pummer’s problem, it seems unjustifiable for you to
hold that there is no conditional obligation to rescue everyone in Horton’s problem. I choose
the stronger version here because it is structurally similar to some cases of kidney donations
we will be interested in.
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(i.) We assumed above that your sacrificing an arm will stop a trolley with
certainty. But suppose instead that your arm only slows a trolley down,
stopping it later, so there is a small, positive probability that it will
still reach any given person on its track. You have no reason to believe
that this probability differs systematically for different persons, or differ-
ent tracks: from your perspective, indistinguishable strangers stand at
roughly the same distance on both tracks from indistinguishable trolleys
that approach with roughly the same speed. Arguably, under this vari-
ation of the problem the effectiveness principle continues to hold. Since
you cannot rationally differentiate between the probabilities of different
persons being overrun or saved, the only morally relevant feature that
distinguishes tracks A and B is the numbers of persons on them, just
as before. So we shall assume that the effectiveness principle holds in
cases in which the benefits of the donation accrue to beneficiaries with
probabilities smaller than 1, where there is no reason to believe that these
probabilities differ systematically for the beneficiaries under the two al-
locations.
It is worth noting that this extension of the effectiveness principle is
weaker than a principle prescribing the maximisation of expected value.
The latter would require sacrificing your arm on track B even when the
probability of surviving for the persons on track B were much lower than
for the person on track A. Our extension is silent about cases in which
these probabilities differ.
(ii.) Suppose that your motivation for stopping a trolley is not the goal to
rescue lives, but a different goal, such as meeting social expectations,
or the desire to be seen as a hero. It seems that, even if such a non-
altruistic motive is the driver behind the decision to help, it would still
be morally wrong to rescue only one person instead of many. (Note
that, in this case, you are not motivated by agent-relative reasons that
would break the symmetry of the options.) So the thought experiment
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advocates the effectiveness principle even when the donor’s motivation
for donating is not altruistic and in the absence of agent-relative reasons
that would break the symmetry of the options.
(iii.) Finally, suppose a stranger is in the choice situation and you, instead of
stopping the trolley yourself, observe her free choice. If she decides to
stop a trolley, no matter on which track, you can prevent her from doing
so. Suppose she decides to stop trolley B, thus rescuing 100 persons.
Most of us will likely have the intuition that it would be morally wrong
of you to stop her from doing so. (Perhaps the case would be more
difficult should she decide to stop trolley A instead, but for our purposes
this can be ignored.) There are limits to this intuition. For example,
suppose the donor would not only lose her arm but would also bleed
to death. Many think we should prevent people from sacrificing their
lives. We shall assume that, within reasonable limits, one ought not
to prevent a donor from exercising her conditional obligation under the
effectiveness principle. We need not take up a stance here on how to set
the reasonable limits in general, although we will touch on it below with
respect to kidney donations.
For the rest of this chapter, the effectiveness principle and its three extensions
will be assumed. We will employ them in the section after the next. Before
doing so, we introduce kidney exchange in some depth.
5.2 Kidney Exchange and Altruistic Donations
Worldwide, there is a growing number of patients on waiting lists for kidneys.
These are patients who suffer end-stage renal disease, that is, their existing
kidneys fail. In most countries, there is a sizeable shortage of kidneys for
transplantation. For example, in the US, 83,978 people were on the deceased
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donor waiting list for kidneys in 2015,5 5,400 in the UK,6 and around 8,000 in
Germany.7 The average time a person spends on these waiting lists is two and
a half to three years in the UK,8 almost four years in the US,9 and around six
years in Germany.10
In the meantime, many receive dialysis. But dialysis diminishes patients’
quality of life and their life expectancy, and many die while on the waiting list.
Moreover, dialysis is extremely expensive, thus putting a strain on healthcare
services and it requires a medical infrastructure which is unavailable in many,
especially developing countries (Wang and et al., 2016, p. 1525). Kidney
transplants would extend many patients’ life expectancy and life quality, and
they are in most cases the cheaper alternative to dialysis. Thus, there is an
urgent need to increase the supply of kidneys.
Healthy people have two kidneys and can donate one. Live donor kidney trans-
plants offer the best prospects with respect to recipients’ life expectancy and
quality (e.g. Wallis et al. (2011)). However, because of incompatibility, which
is mostly due to blood types, or specific antibodies of the donor, many willing
donors are not eligible for donating to their loved ones.11 KE promises relief
for these patients. KE programmes seek to determine the matches between
donors and recipients that maximise the number and quality of transplants.
To ensure an informed discussion of the ethics of KE, I shall in the following
5https://www.usrds.org/2017/view/v2_06.aspx, last accessed on 04/11/2018. The
number refers to dialysis patients only.
6https://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/news-and-campaigns/news/nhs-blood-and-
transplant-reveals-nearly-49-000-people-in-the-uk-have-had-to-wait-for-a-
transplant-in-the-last-decade/, last accessed on 04/11/2018.
7http://statistics.eurotransplant.org/index.php?search_type=&search_organ=
kidney&search_region=All+ET&search_period=by+year&search_characteristic=
&search_text=, last accessed on 04/11/2018.
8https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/kidney-transplant/waiting-list/, last accessed
on 04/11/2018.
9https://www.usrds.org/2017/view/v2_06.aspx, last accessed on 04/11/2018.
10https://www.dso.de/organspende-und-transplantation/warteliste-und-
vermittlung/niere.html, in German, last accessed on 04/11/2018.
11Biro´ et al. (forthcoming), referring to data from the Global Observatory on Donation
and Transplantation, report that, “[d]epending on the country, 40% or more of recipients
are incompatible with their intended donors” (p. 6).
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introduce the basic procedures of KE in depth.12
The simplest procedure of KE is “two-way kidney paired donation”, as shown
in Figure 5.1, part (A). This procedure matches two incompatible donor-
recipient pairs that are mutually compatible. So the donor of the first pair
must be compatible with the recipient of the second pair, and the donor of
the second pair compatible with the recipient of the first pair, in order for
the exchange to happen. This requirement of reciprocal compatibility can be
relaxed if additionally, more-than-two-way paired donations are feasible (Roth
et al. (2007)). For example, part (B) in Figure 5.1 shows a three-way paired
donation.
Other forms of KE alleviate the requirement of reciprocal compatibility by
combining paired donations with altruistic donations. An altruistic, or “non-
directed” donor is someone who gives a kidney to a stranger without receiving
compensation.13 In the absence of KE, altruistic donor kidneys are allocated
to highly-ranked compatible patients on the waiting list. When combined
with KE, an altruistic donor does not donate directly to the list. Instead, she
donates to the recipient of an incompatible pair, whose incompatible donor
simultaneously donates to the recipient of yet another incompatible pair, and
so on, up to the last donor who donates to a patient on the waiting list. Since
the altruistic donation kicks off various transplants, the resulting chains are
called “domino chains” (Montgomery et al. (2006); Roth et al. (2006)). A
domino chain is shown in Figure 5.1, part (C).
12The idea for kidney paired donation dates back to Rapaport (1986). The first exchange
was realised in South Korea in 1991. Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun So¨nmez, and M. Utku U¨nver
initiated a literature from a mechanism design perspective that searches for systematic proce-
dures to increase the quantity and quality of transplantations (see Roth et al. (2004, 2005)).
For a detailed history of KE, see Wallis et al. (2011).
13 Altruistic donors do not typically specify the characteristics of the person whom they
wish to receive their kidney, which is why “non-directed” and “altruistic” refer to the same
class of donors. However, in some countries, e.g. the UK, directed altruistic donations
are legal, that is, donors may donate to specific but unrelated persons, for example, a
patient whose predicament was reported on TV. Directed altruistic donations may give rise
to “repugnance” (Roth (2007)), for example if they produce markets for attention among
patients with end-stage renal disease. However, they seem to be a marginal phenomenon
and will not be considered here.
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Figure 5.1: Simultaneous KE procedures. A solid arrow from A to B denotes
an intended kidney donation from A to B. Exploding arrows denote incom-
patibility of the intended donor.
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Similarly, paired donations could be combined with list exchanges, as in part
(D) of Figure 5.1. In conventional list exchanges, the donor of an incompatible
pair donates to a patient on the waiting list and in return her recipient gets
priority on the list.14 Instead of donating directly to the list, the donor could
also donate to the recipient of another incompatible pair, thus kicking off a
sequence of simultaneous exchanges, in which the last donor donates to the
list and the recipient of the first donor gets priority on the list (Roth et al.
(2006)).
Each of the procedures (A) through (D) triggers at least two transplanta-
tions, which are carried out simultaneously. This is because the promise to
give a kidney is not legally enforceable, which poses the problem that in non-
simultaneous chains, possible donors might renege on their promise to donate
once their recipient received a kidney. The size of simultaneous chains is cir-
cumscribed, in particular by hospitals’ logistics (each transplantation requires
two operating rooms, and hospitals cannot accommodate many transplan-
tations simultaneously), or by geography (kidneys must be transplanted as
quickly as possible and should therefore not travel far).
However, there have been successful, “non-simultaneous, extended, altruistic
donor” (NEAD) chains (Rees et al. (2009)). These consist in segments of
domino chains, as shown in Figure 5.2. The last donor of a segment becomes
a “bridge donor”: instead of simultaneously donating to the waiting list, she
initiates a new segment at a later date. There are two types of NEAD chains:
closed NEAD chains specify a last donor, who donates to the waiting list
simultaneously with the other donations of the last segment. Open-ended
NEAD chains, in contrast, consist of indefinitely many segments. They end
only when a bridge donor is ineligible to donate (e.g. because of a difficult-
14There are also list exchanges in which a donor donates now in exchange for a voucher
that places her recipient on top of a waiting list in the future. This is viable when the
donor’s intended recipient does not need a kidney yet but can be expected to need one
in the future, when the donor might be too old, or other mismatches might occur. For a
news story about such a case, cf. https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/14/health/kidney-
voucher-grandmother-donation-eprise/index.html, accessed on 19/11/2018.
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Figure 5.2: Non-simultaneous, extended, altruistic donor (NEAD) chain. An
altruistic donor initiates a domino chain (Segment 1). The last donor (denoted
X ) from segment 1 becomes a bridge donor and initiates another domino chain
(Segment 2) at a later date. The last donor of segment 2 either donates to
the waiting list, in which case the NEAD chain ends; or she becomes a bridge
donor and initiates segment 3, and so on.
to-match blood type), or if a bridge donor reneges on his promise to donate.
Being non-simultaneous, NEAD chains alleviate the logistical obstacles that
confine simultaneous chains. They promise a further increase in chain lengths
(Ashlagi et al. (2011)), some of which have reached over 30 recipient-donor
pairs in recent years. However, they raise ethical and motivational issues for
the bridge donors, which we will encounter below.
KE programmes are being increasingly implemented in many countries (e.g.
Roth (2015a, 2018), for Europe cf. Biro´ et al. (forthcoming)). Further devel-
opments that promise additional increase in the numbers and the quality of
transplantations include global KEs, some of which have already taken place
(e.g. Rees et al. (2017)); and the integration of compatible pairs into KE,
which is possible if those pairs would profit from the exchange, or if they wish
to engage in altruistic behaviour (Roth et al. (2008); Wallis et al. (2011)).
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However, while KE is expanding, it is at the same time meeting ethical con-
cerns. These are embodied in the transplant laws in various countries, which
virtually ban KE programmes. For instance, German legislation permits do-
nations only from persons of first and second degree of relationship, or who
otherwise “manifestly stand in a special, personally close relationship” to the
recipient.15 This restriction makes most KEs and all altruistic donations,
which are by definition provided by strangers, illegal. There have been piece-
meal two-way kidney paired donations where the two incompatible pairs es-
tablished personally close relationships with each other, thus allowing for legal
paired donation. However, since the requirements on exhibiting such a rela-
tionship are high, and in the absence of an appropriate clearinghouse, success
via this path is unlikely. This is even more so for three-way exchanges, the
integration of which would achieve a more efficient use of the donor pool.
Domino and list exchanges are rendered altogether impossible. The restrictive
transplant law in Germany has led some patients to join KE programmes in
other countries.16 The law has met opposition, for example, in some recent
newspaper articles,17 but at the same time, various interest groups lobby in
favour of retaining it.18
Germany is not an isolated case. In Europe, similarly restrictive laws are in
15Cf. paragraph 8 of the German Transplant Law, version from 04 September 2007 (BGBl.
I S. 2206), changed by article 2 from 21 November 2016 (BGBl. I S. 2623).
16For example, for a report about a woman who went to Spain to donate a kidney to
facilitate a transplant for her niece through KE, see https://www.stern.de/gesundheit/
organspende-niere-ringtausch-tausch-simone-reitmaier-6939720.html. The pa-
tient’s mother has since established a database for incompatible donor-recipient pairs
to find compatible matches (https://crossover-nierenspenderliste.de/), and she
is active in petitioning a change of the transplant law (https://www.change.org/p/
bundestag-gesetzes%C3%A4nderung-zur-einf%C3%BChrung-einer-datenbank-f%C3%BCr-
die-%C3%BCberkreuzspende-von-nieren). All webpages in German, and last accessed on
19/11/2018.
17E.g. https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/forum-nierentausch-in-
zeiten-des-mangels-1.2904824 and https://www.taz.de/Debatte-Organspenden-
in-Deutschland/!5519576/, both in German, argue for an extension of the possible donor
pool so as to allow broader KE. Both last accessed on 19/11/2018.
18For example, the interest group of live kidney donation, cf. https://www.bundestag.de/
blob/425002/51fac6cb911348a2c0723b971710919e/interessengemeinschaft-nierenle-
bendspende-e--v--data.pdf, from 2016, in German. Last accessed on 09/01/2019.
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effect in Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland and Hungary, among others.19 Less but
still relatively restrictive laws prevail, for example in Belgium, France, Greece,
Poland and Switzerland, which are more permissive concerning kidney paired
donation, but prohibit altruistic donations, thus ruling out domino chains.20
Thus, there seem to be concerns in particular about altruistic donations that
motivate many countries to impose restrictive transplant laws, which rule out
various forms of KE.21
We shall uncover the possible objections to different forms of live kidney do-
nations and their implications for KE in the section after the next. Before
proceeding to that, we will examine KE in view of the effectiveness principle.
For the time being, we shall assume that all types of live kidney donations,
including altruistic donations to strangers, are feasible.
5.3 Kidney Exchange and the Effectiveness Princi-
ple
It won’t come as a surprise what the effectiveness principle and its extensions
imply for the allocation of live kidney donations. Yet we need to take care
not to jumble different types of kidney donors. This section will consider the
most important types of donors successively, and it will end by examining the
implications for KE.
First, consider altruistic donors. When an altruistic donor donates to the
waiting list, she may help one patient on that list. In the presence of KE pro-
grammes, altruistic donations trigger KE chains, thereby helping at least two,
but possibly many more patients. From this and the effectiveness principle
it follows that, when an altruistic donor is offered the choice between donat-
19Wissenschaftlicher Dienst (2017), p. 17 and Lopp (2013).
20Biro´ et al. (forthcoming), especially p. 12 and table 1.
21It is noteworthy that in the US, where altruistic donation is legal, some transplant
centres have nevertheless been reluctant to accept these donors Tenenbaum (2016), p. 148.
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ing into a waiting list or into KE, morality requires the latter.22 Moreover,
KE programmes use optimisation algorithms that maximise the number of
possible matches within the pool of possible donors and recipients, subject to
quality constraints (see below). The use of these algorithms guarantees that
no possible allocation of kidneys in this pool could be more effective. There-
fore, an altruistic donor donating into KE is thereby donating as effectively as
possible.
So far, we have talked as if comparing successful transplants in the presence
versus the absence of KE. But there is no guarantee for success: in a small
number of cases graft loss, or other complications occur for the recipient.
When an altruistic donor is offered the choice between donating into a wait-
ing list or into KE, she does not know who would receive her kidney in each
case and what their respective chances of success are. Before KE programmes
were in effect, altruistic donations were typically allocated to highly-ranked
patients on the waiting list in such a way that takes the match quality into
account — including factors such as blood type compatibility, sensitization,
age, and others. This increases the chances of success. Likewise, the optimi-
sation algorithms used in KE programmes are programmed to maximise the
quantity, but also the quality of matchings, where the latter may include all
the factors that figure in the list allocations (Rees et al. (2009), p. 1100).
So altruistic donors will have no reason to believe that the chances of suc-
cess differ systematically for donating into KE versus donating to the waiting
list. In this situation, the first extension of the effectiveness principle applies.
According to this extension, the effectiveness principle is in effect when the
benefits of the donation accrue with probability < 1 and there is no reason to
22Note that, as before, we do not make unconditional claims about whether, or in what
situations, it might be morally obligatory to donate a kidney. It may never be morally
obligatory to donate a kidney because the costs of doing so in terms of risks to health are
substantial. Most theorists will likely agree that these costs exempt one from the obligation
to donate a kidney. An exception might be Singer, who holds that altruism is obligatory
to the point where the donors’ sacrifices equal the recipients’ benefits (e.g. Singer (1972)).
This condition is typically satisfied in kidney donations, most clearly in cases in which donors
don’t experience complications or long term consequences, while the recipient would have
died had they not received this kidney.
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believe that this probability differs systematically for the beneficiaries under
the two possible allocations. Thus, this principle requires donating into KE in
the probabilistic case as well.
In contrast to altruistic donors, directed donors have agent-relative reasons
that may block the obligation to donate into KE, as the other-things-equal
clause of the effectiveness principle applies when a donor wishes to help a
relative or friend. If they are compatible, it is usually uncontroversial that that
person will receive the organ. If they are not compatible, it may nevertheless
be possible for the recipient to receive a kidney through paired donation.
So they may engage in KE and thereby achieve an effective allocation, but
effectiveness results as a byproduct: it is not the effectiveness that requires
the donor to engage in the paired donation, but the agent-relative reason that
a donation to a stranger will provide a transplant for their loved one.
Next, consider bridge donors in NEAD chains. Remember that these donors
donate to strangers after their recipient received their transplant. Similarly
to altruistic donors, they either donate to a waiting list or they trigger a new
segment within a NEAD chain. However, their motivation for donating differs
from that of altruistic donors. A bridge donor donates to a stranger because
she honours her promise to do so after her recipient received his transplant.
She typically wouldn’t have donated to a stranger otherwise, and would have
donated to her recipient had he been compatible. This is why there are con-
cerns that bridge donors may renege on their promise to donate once their
recipients received their transplant, which will be discussed in the next sec-
tion. Here, we note that the second extension of the effectiveness principle
applies to bridge donors who deliver on their promise to donate. It stated
that the effectiveness principle is indifferent to the motivation for the dona-
tion.23 This implies that, no matter what their motivation, if a bridge donor
23The effectiveness principle ceases to apply if the motivation stems from agent-relative
reasons. But bridge donors’ reasons for donating are not agent-relative because their partners
already received their transplants and they donate to strangers.
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honours her promise to donate, and offered the choice to donate into a list or
to trigger a chain, morality requires the latter.
It is less clear whether the same holds for compatible pairs when they are
offered the choice to take part in KE. They may accept this offer for a range
of reasons, for example that the recipient would profit from KE by receiving
a better match than from her intended donor. Or they refuse the offer, for
example when the compatible recipient prefers the organ of a related party
to a stranger’s. In these cases, their motivation is agent-relative and the
effectiveness principle does not apply. In other cases, for example when they
are indifferent, or partly altruistically motivated, the effectiveness principle
does apply, requiring them to take part in KE.
Finally, consider the third extension of the effectiveness principle: it is not per-
mitted to prevent a donor from exercising her conditional obligation to donate
effectively. Concerning donations from the relevant groups above - altruistic
donors, bridge donors, and some compatible pairs -, KE is instrumental in
meeting their conditional obligation to donate effectively. Moreover, KE is
the only way to achieve effectiveness.24 It follows that it is morally wrong
to prevent these donors from donating into KE. As a corollary, it is morally
wrong to prohibit KE.
To sum up, weak principles from the ethics of giving have two important
implications for live kidney donation: (i) there is a conditional obligation for
altruistic and bridge donors, and for some compatible pairs, to donate into
KE instead of into a waiting list, if they can choose to do so; and (ii) since KE
is instrumental in meeting the conditional obligation to donate effectively, it
is wrong to prohibit KE.
The effectiveness principle may have other implications that will not be con-
24This is certainly the case at present. We neglect here possible innovations in medicine
that would overcome present immunological incompatibilities. We also neglect the possibility
of monetary markets for organs, which would likely make altruistically motivated donations
altogether unnecessary.
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sidered in depth here. For example, it might be applied to make a case for
global KE, which has the potential to substantially increase pool sizes and
thus numbers and quality of transplants. However, global KE may give rise to
separate ethical issues, for example, possible organ trafficking and unreliable
medical care in developing countries, and it has generated opposition on these
grounds (Delmonico and Ascher (2017)). These are difficult issues, worthy of
a separate investigation, and will therefore not be considered here.
5.4 The Scope of KE and the Design of Transplant
Laws
Where do the ethical concerns stem from, which are embodied in many trans-
plant laws that virtually ban KE? There are various potential issues that were
ignored in the argument from the effectiveness principle. We shall first discuss
influential arguments against donations from strangers, which rule out most
KEs. The Research Section of the German Federal Parliament provided a rich
source of these arguments in a technical report.25 We then discuss narrower
arguments against specific forms of KE, especially NEAD chains. Finally,
the implications of this discussion for the design of transplant laws will be
considered.
5.4.1 Arguments Against Donations from Strangers
Protecting donors from possible harms. There is no evidence that live
kidney donations significantly decrease donors’ life expectancy, or quality of
life (for a detailed discussion, cf. Tenenbaum (2016), p. 136 et seqq.). How-
ever, like any invasive surgery, they entail small risks of medical complica-
tions, including a very small, non-zero probability of death. These are possible
25Wissenschaftlicher Dienst (2017), especially p. 10 et seqq.
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harms to healthy persons who receive no medical benefits from the surgery.
Therefore, removing a kidney from such a person might be argued to violate
physicians’ duty to “do no harm”. Accordingly, one of the reasons that the
German transplant law prohibits donations from strangers is to protect live
donors from such harms that their decision to donate might entail.
But risk does not imply harm. Prohibiting live donations on the basis of donor
protection would require a duty to incur no risks of harm, or, more reasonably,
no risks above certain thresholds, which must arguably be set relative to the
benefits to the recipient. This is not the place to argue for a specific threshold
that is acceptable for live kidney donations, but it may nevertheless be helpful
to compare their risks to some other risks that many people face in their daily
life. It is estimated that 3.1 per 10,000 kidney donors die during or within
the first 90 days of their donation (Segev et al. (2010)). This mortality rate
is comparable to working in refuse and recyclable material collection for a
year, according to statistics on occupational hazards (Statistics (2017)). It
is five times smaller than a year working in logging, which is listed as the
most dangerous profession in these statistics. It has been argued, not least by
medical practitioners, that these risks are reasonably low.26 Moreover, they
are arguably far outweighed by the benefits to the recipient. Furthermore,
presupposing that donors are mentally healthy and not subject to coercion
or exploitation (concerns that will be discussed below), it seems they have a
right that their autonomous choice be respected (Cronin (2008)).
More central for our purposes is the fact that Germany and other countries
allow directed donations while prohibiting donations from strangers. Their
implicit assumption seems to be that the risk of harm to directed donors is
justifiable but the risk of harm to anonymous donors is not. But these risks
26For example, Richard B. Freeman writes, “[w]e expose patients to all kinds of risks
everyday for presumed benefits. Moreover, people willingly assume risks in their everyday
lives, often much greater than those imposed by donor surgery, that have little or no direct
benefit to their health. The risk that the harms from kidney donation will occur is very
small compared with many risks we all face in everyday life” (Freeman (2012), p. 273).
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do not systematically differ. So the claim that anonymous donors are more in
need of protection from their decision to donate than directed donors must be
based on other considerations than risk, which will be considered next.
Coercion. Germany also justifies the restriction of the possible donor pool
with the need to rule out the possibility of coerciveness of donations and to
secure their voluntariness. If it could be argued that anonymous donations
entail an element of coercion that directed donations to family members and
especially personally close persons do not, this would indeed constitute an
argument for the restriction. To examine whether this is the case, we shall
consider what a coerced donation could amount to.
In most countries, human kidneys are not for “valuable consideration”. This
is a legal term, meaning that it is prohibited both to donate and to receive
kidneys in exchange for money, or other valuable goods or services. A promise
is only legally enforceable if it is for valuable consideration. Thus, a promise
to donate a kidney is not legally enforceable. This rules out the strongest form
of coercion, which would subject the provision of a kidney to a legally binding
contract. It also rules out the exploitation of the poor, as it is not possible to
sell kidneys.
However, as legal scholars point out,
“consideration is a slippery doctrine ... donors are allowed to di-
rect that their kidneys be given to certain people: family members,
friends, and others. This might seem like a transfer without valu-
able consideration, but that is not necessarily the case. The donor
might transfer to such people rather than to a stranger because
she expects to receive something in return—for example, household
services or help in some other matter. Only a donation to an anony-
mous stranger could clearly be without consideration. Nonetheless,
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the common law of contract generally treats intrafamily transfers
as occurring without consideration, and regulated entities and reg-
ulators have apparently taken this position for kidney donations
to friends and family, as well.” (Choi et al. (2014), p. 290 et seq.)
Thus, compensation and coercion are harder to rule out when someone do-
nates to a close relative or friend. The organisation of KEs in countries where
they are legal reflects this concern that personal relations can be instrumen-
tal for exercising coercion. Not only do transplant centres seek to rule out
coercion through extensive background checks of potential donors, interviews,
and education; it is typically also made impossible for mutually unacquainted
persons in KEs to contact each other prior to the donation. There are various
practical measures to enforce this, such as using different hospital sites. Some
countries, e.g. Australia, discourage meeting even after the donation in order
to rule out the possibility of posterior compensations, or of raising accusations,
for example after graft loss.27
Alas, there is no guarantee that donations are always entirely free of some
soft forms of coercion, in particular in emotionally close relationships. The
argument that restricting the donor pool to especially close persons would
help secure the voluntariness of a donation gets it the wrong way around.
The altogether different conclusion here is that, if you want to allow directed,
e.g. intrafamily donations - as most countries, including Germany, do - then
there is no reason based on coerciveness for prohibiting anonymous donations,
including altruistic donations.
There is a more subtle issue concerning coercion in NEAD chains, which will
be considered below.
27Post donation, donors typically do have the right to know about the success of their
donation. They may also learn about the characteristics of the recipients, and possibly
the chain it triggered. This information could be, but is typically not given pre donation,
because it might produce a feeling of coercion, for example when they realise that many
people depend on their donation.
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Slippery slope: KE and the commercialisation human organs. Ger-
many also adduces the prevention of organ trade as a reason for the limitation
of the donor pool. However, this argument is not convincing. It is empirically
unfounded, as most countries condemn the practice of buying and selling or-
gans and there is not a single country that has commercialised organ donations
after implementing KE programmes.28 Concerning black markets, there is no
reason to believe that they are more likely to develop in the presence of KE.
(It might be argued that the opposite is the case because KE helps to decrease
the demand for kidneys.) Finally, the argument also commits the fallacy en-
countered before: why should it help for preventing valuable consideration in
kidney donations to restrict the donor pool to especially close persons, where
the risk of valuable consideration is higher?
5.4.2 Concerns about Specific Types of KE
Trade-offs between efficiency and fairness. As we have seen, without
KE, altruistic donations are allocated to highly-ranked compatible patients on
waiting lists. These lists incorporate medical, but also fairness principles, such
as time already spent waiting, or priority of children over adults. Now, suppose
that an altruistic donor decides to donate into KE instead of to the list. The
resulting concern is most visible in open-ended NEAD chains. Remember
that these are non-simultaneous chains, which end only when a bridge donor
becomes ineligible, or reneges on his promise to donate. Thus, open-ended
NEAD chains divert altruistic donations from the waiting list. Closed NEAD
chains, in which a last donor is specified who will donate to the waiting list,
are not necessarily subject to this diversion. But even in closed NEAD chains,
the last donor might not donate to the list, for example if a bridge donor of
an earlier segment reneged on his promise to donate.
When NEAD chains divert altruistic donor kidneys from the waiting list, they
28Iran is currently the only country where the sale of kidneys is legal.
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might disadvantage those particularly vulnerable patients on the list who don’t
have living donors, because those patients are not eligible to participate in
KE. On the other hand, these chains achieve large numbers of transplants.
Thus, NEAD chains can be seen as promoting efficiency at the expense of
fairness. The standard counterargument to this concern is that the efficiency
that NEADs achieve helps all patients on the waiting list, namely by removing
multiple patients from the list (Rees et al. (2009), p. 1100). Yet, diverting
altruistic donations from the list may disadvantage at least some patients
on the list. In particular, a patient does not profit if lower-ranked patients
are removed from the list, so patients that are already highly-ranked can be
expected to be disproportionately disadvantaged.
Unlike NEAD chains, other KEs do not in principle divert live donor kidneys
from waiting lists. However, combining KE with waiting lists may disadvan-
tage blood type O patients on the list. The reason is, very roughly, that blood
type O patients can receive kidneys only from O donors, whereas O donors
can donate to all blood types. Now, consider as an example a domino chain
that an altruistic donor triggers and that ends with an incompatible donor
donating to the list. The distribution of blood types among altruistic donors
resembles that of the general population. Therefore, there is a high probabil-
ity that this donor is O and she will donate to a hard-to-match O recipient.
But it is unlikely that the incompatible donor who donates to the list is O,
otherwise she would likely be compatible with her recipient. Thus, KE may
systematically divert highly demanded O kidneys from the list.29
Some theorists suggest that the crucial ethical question concerning the trade-
off between efficiency and fairness is this: how many additional transplants
must the inclusion of altruistic donors into KE chains generate in order to
justify the diversion of altruistic donors (in NEAD chains), or of blood type O
altruistic donors (in general) from the waiting list? Transplant laws could do
29A similar concern arises in list exchanges (conventional or combined with domino chains).
For a discussion, see den Hartogh (2010).
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justice to a specific answer to this question by stipulating that the inclusion of
altruistic donors into KE require a minimum number of transplants. Moreover,
concerning the loss of O donors, they suggest “a requirement that, for every
[altruistic donor] kidney donated to initiate a KE chain, a kidney of the same
blood type must be donated to the [waiting list] at the end of the KE chain”
(Woodle et al. (2010), p. 1464).
Risks for bridge donors. NEAD chains entail the risk that bridge donors
renege on their promise to donate. However, the rates of reneging bridge
donors appear to be small, and it has been argued that the utility benefits
from NEAD chains outweigh these risks (Wallis et al. (2011); Tenenbaum
(2016)).
There is yet another worry concerning bridge donors. NEAD chains are formed
on the understanding that the bridge donors will donate to initiate a segment of
transplants after their partners received their transplants (assuming that they
continue to be medically and psychologically eligible and their circumstances
have not changed substantially in the meantime). Because they gave this
promise beforehand, they may feel obliged to donate after their recipients
received their transplants. Bridge donors know that if they bail out, they
thereby break the promise they gave, on the basis of which their partners
received their transplant and on which various persons in need of kidneys
rely. This might impose pressure on them, which may be felt as a form of
coercion. It has been argued that it is morally problematic to put people in
this position, and NEAD chains have been criticised on these grounds (see
Tenenbaum (2016) for a discussion).
NEAD chains can also be argued to create coercion because the probability
that matches are found is high. In general, potential donors can opt out at
any moment before the transplantation without the transplant team revealing
the reason. It is therefore possible for donors to bail out and falsely laying
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the blame on medical reasons. This possibility is supposed to make the pos-
sibility of felt coercion less likely. However, NEAD chains make this excuse
unconvincing, because in a NEAD chain the probability is much higher that
a potential donor could go through with her donation (Wallis et al. (2011)).
On the other hand, it has been argued that NEAD chains can relieve donors
from family pressure - since their recipient already received their kidney at the
time of their donation –, which decreases the danger of coercion (Tenenbaum
(2016), p. 156 et seqq.). Concerning the above worries, transplant centres
select and educate possible bridge donors carefully. It may also be possible to
relieve them from some of the felt pressure to be triggering a great number
of transplants, simply by not telling them how long the chain will be prior to
their donation. Moreover, since evidence suggests that the amount of felt co-
ercion increases with time, time limits can be set within which their donation
should happen, otherwise their promise is void. A more conservative solution
would be to restrict KE to the simultaneous cases.
To sum up, we found the principled arguments against donations from strangers,
which preclude most types of KE, wanting. However, it might be ethically re-
quired to restrict the scope of KE procedures. In general, the efficiency gains
from allowing broader KEs must be weighed against increasing concerns with
respect to the diversion of altruistic, especially type O donors from waiting lists
and, in the case of NEAD chains, the potential felt coercion of bridge donors.
My aim was not to argue for a specific weighting. Instead, the argument is
the following. Suppose we take a conservative view and put heavy weight on
avoiding (O) donor loss and bridge donors’ felt coercion. A transplant law
embodying this view might restrict or prohibit NEAD chains. It may also re-
quire that KE chains divert altruistic donations from the list only when they
achieve a large number of transplants, and it may prescribe the prevention of O
donor loss. The result would be a transplant law that places heavy weight on
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donor protection and allocative fairness with respect to patients without living
donors. The point is that this legislation would not even resemble the trans-
plant laws we encountered earlier, such as the German transplant law, which
require a personally close relationship between donor and recipient. Even a
conservative view on live kidney donation, if sound, does not in principle reject
KE programmes.
5.5 The Attraction of Effectiveness
KE may generate motivational benefits for donors. Consider the following
report from Dylan Matthews, who altruistically donated his kidney in 2016:
“...the very same day that I donated, [the recipient’s] relative had
their kidney taken out as well and flown to the West Coast. This
second recipient also had a friend or relative agreeing to an ex-
change; so did the third recipient, who got the second recipient’s
friend’s kidney. Our chain will let people enjoy 36 to 40 years of
life they would’ve otherwise been denied.
Our four kidneys were pretty good, but some chains can go even
longer. A chain started by a 44-year-old man in California named
Rick Ruzzamenti wound up getting 30 people kidneys. Ruzza-
menti’s chain let people live 270 to 300 years longer. You can
literally measure the years of life his kidney donation chain gave
in centuries.”30
Matthews does not go so far as to suggest that he, or Ruzzamenti, decided
to donate because of the potentially large numbers of life years that their
donations would enable. But the passage provides clear evidence for the awe
30From https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/4/11/12716978/kidney-
donation-dylan-matthews, 2017, last accessed on 02/11/2018.
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that donors experience when considering the large impact of their donations in
terms of life years gained. This naturally suggests the hypothesis that, other
things being equal, a donor’s motivation is higher if the possible number of
transplants triggered, or of life years saved, is higher.
This hypothesis, if true, has implications for KE. As we have seen, KE pro-
grammes use optimisation algorithms that maximise the number and quality
of transplants. Thereby, they increase the number of lives saved, or of life
years gained.31 It follows that, if the motivation for donating is partly de-
termined by and increases with the impact of the donation, KE increases the
motivation for donating. The argument would apply to all donors who are
partly motivated by altruism. This includes altruistic donors, but also other
types - such as directed donors, bridge donors, compatible pairs -, as they may
often be partly motivated by altruism as well.
In light of the striking shortage of kidneys for transplantation, if KE pro-
grammes promote the emergence of altruism, this constitutes a significant
advantage. Thus, the hypothesis that the motivation for altruistic kidney
donations is partly determined by the amount of good that they can be ex-
pected to achieve, if true, constitutes a second, motivational argument for the
implementation of KE programmes.
This is not the place to investigate whether the hypothesis is true. It is
an empirical hypothesis that could be confirmed by comparing trajectories
of altruistic donations in countries where KE programmes exist to countries
where they don’t. We note here merely that the available evidence is consistent
with the hypothesis. In many countries in which centralised KE programmes
exist, e.g. in the US and the UK, the numbers of altruistic donations have been
increasing in recent years.32 More generally, there is evidence that donating
31Different algorithms may have unequal implications concerning numbers of lives saved
and of life years gained. We can neglect this point here because an altruistic donation will
typically increase both variables if KE is in effect as compared to the default of no KE.
32For data on altruistic donations in the UK, see Robb et al. (2018). For the US, e.g.
Tenenbaum (2016).
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effectively can boost donors’ motivation.33 We conclude that it is a reasonable
hope that KE promotes the emergence of altruism.
In contrast, transplant laws that restrict the donor pool to relatives and per-
sons manifestly close to recipients may involve problematic incentives. They
risk conveying the image that there is something unethical about the gift to a
stranger. Moreover, people hoping to go through with a kidney paired dona-
tion will have incentives to pretend that there are personally close relationships
even when in reality there aren’t. But such incentives to “game the system”
cannot be in the interest of legislative authorities, and they are detrimental for
building trust in the system. These motivational considerations speak against
prohibiting live organ donations to strangers, and in favour of combining them
with KE.
5.6 Conclusion
Weak principles from the ethics of giving make a strong case for KE pro-
grammes. These programmes are instrumental in allowing kidney donors to
meet their conditional moral obligations that are implied by those principles.
Therefore we ought not to preclude people from fulfilling these obligations by
banning KE. There are possible ethical reasons for restricting specific proce-
dures of KE, but they do not in principle reject it. Finally, KE may achieve
motivational benefits that constitute a further argument in its favour.
The arguments given here are not wedded to a specific moral theory. They will
appeal to effective altruists, but because of their weak, conditional premises,
many people who are not committed effective altruists will welcome them as
33Parbhoo et al. (2018), p. 21. In a survey, 85% of donors revealed they paid very
close attention to effectiveness when giving to charities (http://static1.squarespace.
com/static/55723b6be4b05ed81f077108/t/566efb6cc647ad2b441e2c55/1450113900596/
Money+for+Good+I.pdf, accessed on 10/12/2018). They also find that, even though they
care about effectiveness, few donors spend time investigating the effectiveness of the
charities they give to. So admittedly, the evidence is somewhat mixed.
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well. They are also consistent with conservative views on donor protection
and allocative justice concerning patients on waiting lists. I hope that these
arguments will lead to a clarification of the debates on the ethics underlying
KE, particularly in countries that have hitherto banned it.
This study calls for various follow-up projects. First, we explicitly excluded
global KE, which has the potential to substantially increase the numbers and
the quality of transplants. Ethicists are called for to weigh these benefit against
the concerns that have been raised about global KE, for example, whether the
risk of organ trafficking can be ruled out sufficiently in some developing coun-
tries. Second, the hypothesis about donors’ motivation on which our argument
from attractiveness drew should be investigated empirically. Third, in many
countries that currently prohibit live donations to strangers, changes to legis-
lation, for which we argued here, may turn out to be infeasible in the short
term. In the meantime, work remains to be done concerning the implementa-
tion of some “slim” forms of KE programmes in those countries. For instance,
restrictions of the donor pool to persons that are emotionally close to the re-
cipient provide the possibility to match donor-recipient pairs that could in the
next step meet in person and establish the required relationship. This would
enable some forms of KEs, in particular kidney paired donations, which are
currently conducted only sparsely in those countries. Making the most of ex-
isting transplant laws would improve the predicament of many people suffering
from kidney disease, but it does not excuse decision makers’ inaction.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The first part of this thesis examined the foundations of economic design and
I argued that they provide insights into important philosophical debates. In
chapter 2, these were debates about the nature of rationality and of institu-
tions. I showed that institutional designers’ core constraint of incentive com-
patibility sits uneasily with a family of unorthodox theories of rationality in
games that have been proposed. I argued that this leaves proponents of those
theories with three options, each of which looks rather unappealing: give up
the constraint of incentive compatibility, treat people as irrational, or give up
their own standards of rationality in the context of institutional design. I also
suggested an amendment to a recent account of institutions, namely that it
should include reference to mechanisms. Furthermore, the standard meaning
of “institution” allows for incentive-incompatible institutions.
In chapter 3, I analysed in depth the reform of a matching market for medical
residents, which hasn’t been considered in the philosophy of science to date.
In cases like this, economic engineers seek to generate counterfactual knowl-
edge about how creating or changing a market would bring about or alter its
associated market outcomes. Using causal graphs, I gave an account of how
this counterfactual knowledge is generated. According to my account, models,
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e.g. from game theory, allow formulating policy goals that these outcomes
should implement. Complemented with empirical methods, these models are
used to devise institutions that bring about those goals. I also argued that the
creation of knowledge in economic engineering shows that it may not be pos-
sible to evaluate from the philosopher’s vantage point how economists should
use models in economic design, and doing so might even do harm. A recent
proposal in the philosophy of economics to the contrary is presumptuous and
should be resisted.
In the second part of the thesis, we considered ethical aspects of specific match-
ing markets. In chapter 4, I argued that basic results from matching theory
provide insights into the distribution of refugees over host countries. There
may be trade-offs between satisfying refugees’ or countries’ preferences and
the numbers of refugees assigned, as well as between the efficiency and the
fairness of matchings. Implementing distribution mechanisms requires careful
weighing of these criteria.
In contrast to the specific distribution mechanisms that we examined for asy-
lum, the problem we studied with regard to kidney exchange was more coarse-
grained, because many countries ban this practice. In chapter 5, I tried to show
that this status quo should be changed. I gave two novel arguments for the
implementation of kidney exchange programmes: first, these programmes are
instrumental in meeting a moral obligation, namely to donate effectively; and
second, they may increase the motivation for altruistic donations, because the
donation of one kidney may trigger > 1 life savings. We also examined ethical
concerns that are embodied in transplant laws preventing the implementation
of kidney exchange, and I argued that they can be overcome.
There are many questions with regard to these ethically loaded matching prob-
lems that are yet to be answered. Concerning the distribution of refugees,
some recent studies have proposed matching them to localities through data-
driven algorithmic assignments. Bansak et al. (2018) argue that using such
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algorithms could significantly improve the integration of refugees into labour
markets. The ethical implications of these proposals should be examined. In
particular, it may be ethically problematic to distribute refugees algorithmi-
cally without taking their preferences into account. Concerning the allocation
of live donor kidneys, an important question is whether or not global kidney
exchanges that include donor-recipient pairs from developing countries are eth-
ically justifiable. Moreover, should kidney exchange programmes eventually
be replaced with a monetary market?
Of course, there is a multitude of problems for economic design in contexts
other than the allocation of asylum or of organs. For instance, climate change
presents problems which economic design can contribute to overcome. The
design of climate treaty negotiations and cap-and-trade systems are but two
examples. It is vital to keep in mind the lessons learned in chapters 2 and
3 when designing these systems, but unfortunately, these lessons have often
been neglected. For example, the rules of many climate treaty negotiations
are not incentive-compatible. Often, the global carbon emission abatement
plans are simply the result of independent pledges of individual countries.
But this does not align countries’ incentives with the social goal to transition
to a net-zero carbon economy in due time, but provides opportunities to free-
ride instead. An incentive-compatible mechanism would condition individual
countries’ pledges on the pledges of the other countries. For an illustration,
suppose all countries agree that collectively cutting down emissions would be
better for everyone than business as usual, while individual defection would
be better for the defector than cutting down emissions. Then the following
mechanism is incentive-compatible: a mediator asks all countries to make
pledges and commits every country to act on the least ambitious pledge of all
countries (see MacKay et al. (2017), chapter 2).
While these are important domains to which economic designers might in-
creasingly contribute in the future, I shall conclude with a few remarks on the
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possible return of large-scale design. There are some signs of this happening.
Posner and Weyl (2018) project a radical transformation of society through
the application of mechanism design. They argue that private property is
inherently monopolistic and should be abolished. They propose the common
ownership self-assessed tax (COST) to replace it. This proposal, inspired by
the ideas of Henry George, involves the utilisation of auctions on a very large
scale. In this system, people and corporations assess the value of all major
commodities that they wish to hold. The highest bidder wins the right to use
the commodity. Users of commodities pay a relatively high tax on them (in
the neighbourhood of 7 percent annually), which can be used to fund public
goods and a basic income for every citizen. The right to use commodities
is constantly auctioned: if someone else values a good more highly, she can
acquire it, henceforth paying the same tax rate on her valuation. This system
provides agents with incentives to reveal their true valuations and it achieves
the efficient allocation of commodities. The authors argue that the advan-
tages of this arrangement would be substantial, among them: the elimination
of market power by turning markets in private property into markets in uses;
increased public revenues; increased equality; increased innovation and invest-
ment in large scale projects; the transformation of private wealth into social
wealth, which might make people less materialistic.1
Their proposal is interesting not only from the perspective of political econ-
omy, but also methodologically. I argued in chapter 1 that we can distinguish
1Posner and Weyl also propose a transformation of democracy through quadratic voting.
In this system, important social decisions, e.g. about the provision of public goods, are made
through referenda. Every citizen receives an equal amount of “voice credits” annually, which
they can use on referenda in that year, or can stockpile to use in future referenda. They can
“buy” any number of votes with their voice credits, but the costs are calculated according to
a quadratic formula: 1 credit buys 1 vote, 4 credits buy 2 votes, and so on. Unlike current
voting systems, QV takes into account the intensity of people’s preferences – you can spend
as many credits as you own on referenda that are important to you. Therefore, people will
exercise influence in realms which they care about and in many cases know more about than
the average citizen. Since under quadratic voting rational agents will spend their credits in
proportion to how important the various referenda are to them, the system has the potential
to make the provision of public goods efficient, analogously to what free markets achieve for
private goods under ideal conditions.
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two grand traditions of economic design: the first seeks to provide a frame-
work for comparing and evaluating economic systems, but these comparisons
are sometimes ambiguous and they remained mainly theoretical. The second
is focused on the details of small-scale problems. It approaches design with an
engineering mindset and is closer to policy-making, but this practical advan-
tage came at the expense of losing the role of evaluating fundamental economic
institutions. Posner and Weyl refocus on large-scale reforms. However, they
also take into account lessons from economic engineering. Accordingly, their
proposals do not simply go back to early design economics, but lift it to a new
level. For example, the COST system, while constituting a radical reform of
our economic system, could initially be applied for items that governments
auction to the corporate sector, such as the radio spectrum. This connects
to existing work in auction design, a field to which Weyl has contributed and
which has been a successful area of application of economic engineering. So
this implementation strategy would accommodate insights from economic en-
gineering.
As economic engineers are gaining a better understanding of how real-world
institutions work, they become better equipped for larger-scale social reforms
through economic design. This is because understanding the details of specific
interactions appears to be a critical precondition for successful large-scale de-
sign. For instance, marketplaces in a market economy are embedded in larger
markets, which are in turn embedded in the economic system. Changing the
fundamental institutions will also change markets and marketplaces, for exam-
ple, by affecting the choices available to agents interacting in those markets.
The growing body of knowledge about particular marketplaces and markets
may improve the chances for successful large-scale design. The recent refocus
on the large scale might be a sign that the discipline has matured to a point at
which reformers can rely on system design. Whether this is the case remains
an open question at present.
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